University of Richmond

UR Scholarship Repository
Bookshelf

1982

The Politics of Annexation: Oligarchic Power in a
Southern City
John V. Moeser
University of Richmond, jmoeser@richmond.edu

Rutledge M. Dennis
George Mason University

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.richmond.edu/bookshelf
Part of the Urban Studies Commons
Recommended Citation
Moeser, John V., and Rutledge M. Dennis. The Politics of Annexation: Oligarchic Power in a Southern City. Cambridge, MA: Schenkman
Pub. Co, 1982.

NOTE: This PDF preview of The Politics of Annexation: Oligarchic Power in a
Southern City includes only the preface and/or introduction. To purchase the full
text, please click here.
This Book is brought to you for free and open access by UR Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Bookshelf by an authorized
administrator of UR Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact scholarshiprepository@richmond.edu.

The Politics of Annexation

The
Politics
of
Annexation
Oligarchic Power in a
Southern City
by

John V. Moeser
,,
and

Rutledge M. Dennis

SCHENKMAN PUBLISHING COMP ANY, INC .
Ca mbridge, Massachusetts

Copyright© 1982
Schenkman Publishing Company, Inc.
3 Mount Auburn Place
Cambridge, Massachusetts 02138
Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data

Moeser, John V., 1942The politics of annexation.
Bibliography: p. 215
1. Annexation (Municipal government)Virginia-Richmond. 2. Richmond (Va.)Politics and government. I. Dennis,
Rutledge M. II. Title.
JS344.A53R526
352' .006'09755451
ISBN 0-87073-501-2
ISBN 0-87073-502-0 (pbk.)

81-18384
AACR2

Printed in the United States of Amen·ca.
All rights reserved. This book, or parts thereof,

may not be reproduced in any form without written
permission from the publisher.

'

.0

I

Contents

I.
II.

III.

Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

vu

Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

1

Post-World War II Richmond: Race, Politics,
and City Expansionism..............................

29

Action/Reaction: Annexation and
the Struggle for Power . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
The Chesterfield Drama and
the Role of the Commonwealth . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
The Homer-Bagley Line ...........................
110

IV. Litigation and its Aftermath: Curtis Holt Versus the City . . . 143
Notes .............................................
189
Bibliography .......................................
215

Acknowledgments
This book would not have been possible without the contributions of
many individuals. Obviously, the fifty-four people who were interviewed
or who submitted answers to structured questionnaires provided a
substantial body of information for the study. Not one person refused to
be interviewed and all were willing to invest considerable time reflecting
about their role in the annexation dispute. In a study of this nature,
authors often rely on informants who were involved in important
meetings or observed important events but who wish to remain anonymous. For these individuals, many of whom still occupy positions of
authority and were willing to share what often was sensitive information,
the writers are particularly grateful More than once, the writers would
hit a dead end, only to call one of their key sources for assistance in
finding a new route.
John V. Moeser is appreciative of the leave of absence from his normal
university responsibilities which was arranged by Professor Allen
Ponoroff, Chairman of the Department of Urban Studies and Planning,
Virginia Commonwealth University, and for the faculty and staff at
Union Theological Seminary in Richmond, Virginia, where the author
did a large portion of his writing. Dr. Patrick D. Miller,Jr., the Dean of
the Faculty at Union Seminary, was most helpful in finding space for an
interloper, though he and the others at the seminary made him feel a part
of the community. Rutledge M. Dennis received valuable assistance
from the faculty and staff of the VCU Department of Sociology.
Collectin g and reproducing materials were made much easier, thanks to
the staff's cooperation and competence. Both authors are also grateful to
Mary Morris Watt and the other staff members of the Richmond TimesDispatch and News Leader library for their help while the writers pored
over the volumes of news stories pertaining to boundary expansion and
councilmanic elections.
vii

viii

The Politics of Annexation

Typing a book is not an easy task. Typing for one author is hard
enough, but typing for two authors of a single work can try a typist's
patience. However, the typists for this book were consistently eventempered and maintained a good sense of humor. In addition to quality
work, they gave encouragement and offered many helpful suggestions for
improving the manuscript. The authors are indebted to Harriett Mercer,
Sally Hicks, and Pandora Muse. For the excellent work of Annette
Joseph at Schenkman Publishing Company, specifically her assistance
in proofing the manuscript and for her guidance throughout the production of the book, the authors are grateful.
Of all the people who helped in producing this work, none are more
important than the authors' families. Wives and children often went
without their husbands and fathers while the book was taking shape.
More than once, the question arose, " Is Daddy going to work again
tonight?" Sharon Moeser and Sarah Dennis often had to be both mother
and father. Had it not been for this home support and the forbearance of
the children, the study would never have been completed. It is for this
reason that this book is dedicated to Sharon, Jeremy, and David Moeser,
and to Sarah, Tchaka, Imaro, Kimya, and Zuri Dennis.

JVM

RMD

I
Introduction
American central cities have long faced problems associated with population losses and deteriorating economies. As middle-class citizens
move to the suburbs and as shopping centers and industry join them, the
city experiences considerable difficulty raising money to fund the
services needed by i~ growing low-income population. Just as the
dwindling middle class produces strains in the city's economy, it also
alters and reshapes the contours of the city's politics. This was
particularly true of the 1960s since the vast majority of the out-migrants
was white and a large proportion of the growing number of low-income
city residents was black. Cities that historically were dominated by the
white elite were so changed demographically that the political status quo
was threatened Quick, effective remedies were necessary for the white
elite to achieve political stability and to reduce the dangers confronting
the established order.
A strategy traditionally employed by most cities and still available to
some cities is annexation . Such a strategy works equally well for cities
faced with an erosion of established power as for cities encumbered
with declining bases of public revenue. For those cities surrounded by
suburban municipalities , annexation is a useless device. Other cities,
however, by expanding their boundaries to include unincorporated
suburban areas, can acquire additional land, commerciaV industrial
enterprises, and people, all of which may generate new revenue to
match their increased expenditures. Furthermore, additional population
drawn from predominately white suburbs may represent new votes for a
city faced with an increasing black population. This strategy has proven
to be particularly useful in the South where, generally, the annexation
laws are less restrictive than those in other parts of the country, where
the cities are less likely to be hemmed in by other municipalities, and
where racial politics over the years has been most acute.
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After an eight year effort to expand its boundaries, the City of
Richmond, Virginia, on January 1, 1970, annexed twenty-three square
miles and 4 7,000 people from Chesterfield County. At first glance,
apart from the length of time involved in the land acquisition, this 1970
Richmond annexation could be viewed as one of hundreds of municipal
annexations since 1945. In fact, however, the boundary expansion was
unique. It so captured the attention of public officials and academicians
across the nation that it may now constitute the most celebrated
municipal annexation in recent American history. Apart from the legal
issues raised during the litigation following the annexation (U.S .
District Court Judge Robert E. Merhige once classified the case as the
most complex since the 1954 Brown v. Board of Edu cation of
Topeka), and the questions which the case poses for urban planners,
economists, and political and social thinkers, the annexation primarily
reflects an intense power struggle between establishment whites and the
city's activist blacks. It is the politics surrounding the Richmond
annexation that invokes such interest among scholars and the lay public
as well
This book constitutes a political analysis of the 1970 annexation
Specifically, this study explores the political rationale for annexation,
the process by which the intent was converted into public policy and the
political actors involved in the process. Though the study of. the
annexation includes lega~ economic, and urban planning issues, those
issues are only peripheral to the central concern-power.
On the surface, Richmond's absorption of territory did appear quite
"ordinary," though it should be noted that no two annexation cases are
exactly alike. Nevertheless, properties common to most annexations
seemingly characterized Richmond's.
First, the city needed revenue because of a declining tax base. Like
most older cities in the United States, Richmond was losing large
numbers of its middle-class population to the suburbs. Jobs, too, were
leaving. Industries interested in Richmond could not locate in the city
given its lack of developable vacant land This also meant that new
residential development was hampered It was argued that .the additional land, improvements, and people generated by boundary expansion
would produce the revenue to pay for increasing expenditures brought
about by the city's growing low-income population heavily dependent on
public support
Second, it was alleged that the public services in the target area were
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inferior to those in the city. The city contended that the target area, for
example, provided virtually no public recreation, relied largely on
volunteer fire service and on a small police force, supported schools
lacking the diverse curricula of city schools, assumed little responsibility for garbage collection, charged higher rates for water and
sewerage services, and depended on a small unsophisticated planning
staff ill-equipped to respond to a growing population and economy. The
city claimed that, in addition to reducing the cost of water and sewerage
services, it would institute new services and improve existing services.
Third, a strong community of interest prevailed between the city and
the target area since many suburban residents were economically and
culturally tied to the city. Over half the residents worked in the city;
also, city churches, synagogues, museums, theatres, libraries, restaurants, parks, civic auditoriums, and sports arenas served people in
both jurisdictions. The problem, however, was that the tax burden for
maintaining the roads and services associated with these city facilities
fell on city residents.
In still other respects, the Richmond annexation could be considered
"ordinary." The Census Bureau reports that annexations are more
likely to occur in cities with populations ranging from 20,000 to
250,000 than either smaller or larger cities. Richmond fits the national
pattern, given its preannexation population of 202,359. Moreover, for
many years annexation activity has been concentrated in the South and
West Again, Richmond conforms to the pattem 1 Finally, cities of
100,000 or more which increased their land area through annexation
by at least 50 percent did so usually through liberal annexation laws.
Such laws permit a city to annex without the approval of target area
residents. 2 Notwithstanding the changes made in Virginia's annexation
law during the 1979 session of the state legislature, special three
judge courts still determine annexations in Virginia Consequently,
whether a municipality annexes is a question resolved judicially based
on the merit of the case, not on the consent of target area residents.
But it is not the "ordinary" attributes of the Richmond annexation
that command attention. Rather, it is the political intrigue involving
some of the most influential leaders of Richmond that gives the event
such notoriety and compels serious investigation.
The Richmond annexation case is a classic example of the continuing historical struggle in parts of the South and other regions of the
country between the powerful white elite and growing numbers of
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central city blacks. In the Richmond case, however, the struggle was
made more dramatic by the tactics employed by the white leadership
and its ability to conduct its annexation negotiations in secrecy for a
period of five years. The small group of powerful individuals viewed the
increasing numbers of black residents in the state capital with alarm,
fearing that an inability to stem the growing black population would
result in a black-controlled city government
The role of this Richmond oligarchy in the annexation process is the
subject of this study. How annexation was employed as a political device
to dilute black voting power provides insight into the deep-rooted
racism that influenced the behavior of a few white city and state
leaders. Moreover, the legal challenge to the annexation reveals the
effectiveness of countervailing power generated by a poor black
Richmonder. The annexation itself, plus the reaction to the annexation,
triggered a series of significant events during the 1970s that affected the
city and state alike. Specifically, during the seven years from 1970 to
1977, ( 1) Richmond was enjoined by the U.S. Supreme Court from
holding local councilmanic elections; (2) the city shifted from at-large
to ward representation; ( 3) the 1977 election produced the city's first
majority black city council and its first black mayor; ( 4) the city
manager was fired in September, 1978; (5) the 1979 state legislature
granted immunity from annexation to urban counties; and (6) the
relationship between the city and its surrounding counties deteriorated
All six events are directly or indirectly related to the 1970 annexation
In short, the 1970 annexation is far from an ordinary example of
municipal boundary expansion It is instead a story of racial politics,
city-state complicity in "protecting" the capitai and legal maneuvering
in a revered city of the South.
Racial Politics in Virginia
In order to fully understand the intricacies of the role of race in the
Richmond annexation case, it is important to place it within the wider
context of the traditional role of race in Virginia politics. Richmond
may be viewed as Virginia in microcosm, and V. 0. Key, Jr.'s
statement that" of all the American states, Virginia can lay claim to the
most thorough control by an oligarchy," 3 may also be an apt description
of political rule in Richmond Oligarchic rule represents both upper
class hegemony over lower/middle-class whites and racial hegemony of
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whites over blacks. The effects of this class-racial hegemony were
captured in Key's observation that
Political power has been closely held by a small group of leaders who
themselves and their predecessors have subverted democratic institutions
and deprived most Virginians of a voice in their government The
Commonwealth possesses characteristics more akin to those of England
at about the time of the Reform Bill of 1832 than to those of any other
state of the present-day South. It is a political museum piece. 4

Though Key's statement is less true now than it was when he
initially made it in the 1940s, the differences might be arithmetical
rather than exponentiai for the chief characteristics of black-white
relations, structured inequality and the dynamics of insider-outsider
politics remained just as prevalent in the 1970s as they had been in the
nineteenth century. If one of the assertions stated here is correct, that is,
that there are both class and racial dimensions to Virginia's oligarchic
leadership structure, then it is necessary to examine what contributed to
the oligarchy's staying power. One probable answer is the politics of
paternalism. On one hand, the oligarchy promised the white population
that it would hold the line against attempts by blacks to force widescale political and economic changes, thus insuring a continuation of
white dominance in these areas. On the other hand, it sought out black
leaders and promised them piecemeal gains if they would legitimate
white oligarchic control It promised the black leadership that it would
hold the line against attempts by some whites to take away gains
already won by blacks, but it would only do so if blacks agreed not to
force certain issues that were divisive on racial grounds. Therefore, the
oligarchy attempted to assuage both groups and to convince both that it
represented their best interests.
No matter what rationale it gave and no matter how much it played
its own racial-class cards, the oligarchy supported the ideology of white
supremacy. This ideological component of racial politics in Virginia
was just as evident in the nineteenth century with the legalization of the
Black Codes, slavery itself, and post-Reconstruction Jim Crowism, as
it is true of the more recent use of literacy tests, poll taxes, and the white
primaries to exclude blacks from the voting booths. In fact, the
oligarchy's need to legalize and hence structure racial inequality is
indicative of the fact that blacks themselves never accepted their
inequality as divinely inspired or as being unchangeable and never
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ceased, therefore, to challenge the system whenever possible. White
leadership wanted the politics of paternalism to govern black-white
relations in general and black-white political relations in particular.
Black leadership recognized and accepted certain aspects of that
paternalism and accommodated itself to that structure as a necessary
strategy. Black leaders were afraid of the larger white population and
assumed that it had no choice but to gain and maintain contacts with the
white oligarchy. This process permitted the most obvious features of
the class and racial status quo to be maintained
Virginia's particular brand of oligarchy and paternalism was unlike
the racial politics of states in the lower South where trenchant racebaiting was more prevalent, a feature most scholars attribute to the
lower states' basically rural economies and high black population. The
ideology of race supremacy in Virginia has never resulted in elitesanctioned lynchings as was the case in the lower South. The oligarchy's
"velvet glove" approach to both the lower- and middle-class white
population and to the entire black population has always been shaped
by a code of"gentlemanly'' behavior that was almost "royalist'' in
tone and appearance. This leadership has cared no more for the vast
white population than it has for the collective black population since its
perception of its role, in addition to being oligarchicai has been
aristocratic.
The ideology of white supremacy was used to insure that oligarchic
rule would be free from competition by blacks. It is in the political
sphere that the black challenge to this ideology is most pronounced
This is understandable in view of the constitutional guarantees
supporting voting and citizenship rights. Blacks, therefore, have sought
to use their national constitutional rights to seek redress for the denial
of their rights by state and local politicians. They have more readily
challenged white political dominance than economic dominance since
the law sanctions black political participation and since effective
challenges to the economic status quo first requires the political
mobilization of the black population.
The annexation conflict can be viewed as an extension of the historic
role of white leadership. The logic of this leadership reads thusly: under
no circumstances should blacks be allowed to acquire power over
whites and, if such an event seems inevitable, whites should use
whatever powers, legal or illegai necessary to stem the tide. Thus, some
of the tactics used in the annexation dispute parallel similar tactics used
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during the era of Massive Resistance following the Supreme Court
Decision of 1954. 5 The oligarchic-aristocratic leadership, having a
stake in the status quo, could not espouse a politics of universalism
Consequently, undergirding its highly parochial political style was the
ideology of white elitism.
City-State Ties
Richmond occupies a special place in Virginia politics. This privileged
position obviously stems from Richmond's role as the state capital. Of
equal significance ( or, of greater significance, at least for those tenacious
Virginians still clinging to the nineteenth century) is the role Richmond
assumed as the capital of the Confederacy. For Virginia, indeed for the
whole of the South, Richmond was a major economic and political
power during and long after the Civil War, and that memory of
Richmond's past still shapes the perception many Virginians hold of
Richmond today.
As Virginia's "special place," Richmond and its politics are
inextricably entwined with the state. Consequently, a challenge to
Richmond's political order constitutes, by definition, a challenge to the
state's.
The percentile growth of the city's black population due, in part, to
the loss of its white population constituted such a challenge during the
1960s. Compounding the problem of this demographic shift was the
increasing black unrest in the nation's largest cities. The 1968 riots in
Washington, D.C., just an hour and a half away on Interstate 95, were
observed with alarm by state and local leaders alike. They believed that
the urban unrest was like a cancer that would eventually afflict
Richmond and provide a fertile ground for the emergence of black
power. Racially paternalistic, they believed that blacks lacked sufficient
knowledge and experience to govern local communities. The riots,
therefore, were viewed as shocking examples of the blacks' lack of selfcontrol and moderation. Black-run cities, they assumed, would encounter financial problems due to overspending and poor management In
addition, they charged that black politicians in black-controlled cities
would seek vengeance on white populations by destroying the symbols
of white supremacy. The legislative record suggests that many state
legislators believed that Richmond's monuments to Civil War heroes
were particularly vulnerable to angry blacks bent on wholesale destruction In the final analysis, however, these white leaders were less
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concerned about war memorials than another, more important matter .
Many believed that, should blacks become politically dominant, nothing
less than Richmond's and Virginia's " way of life" was in jeopardy .
Annexation was the city' s solution to the "problem ." The state, too,
at least its courts, supported the city's annexation strategy. A special
three judge court, the members of whom were selected by the Virginia
Supreme Court of Appeals, was responsible for determining whether
the city would annex. The use of this judicial procedure in municipal
annexation is distinctive of Virginia Most states require popular
approval of annexation. But in Virginia, at least prior to 1979 ( when
certain counties were granted immunity from annexation) , a city was
required to file a suit against the county that included the area sought
by the city.6 The court was to hear testimony from city and county
expert witnesses and then base its decision on such factors as the city's
need for land, the target area's need for services, the community of
interest existing between the city and the target area, and the city's
ability to finance the annexation should the court grant land to the city.
The annexation court that ruled on the Richmond case, however, was
particularly responsive to political cues. The court veered sharply from
precedent and gave little attention to the factors that normally shape its
decision. Rather, the basis for its decision was an out-of-court agreement made privately by two local politicians. The agreement clearly
favored Richmond's white oligarchy which, as our research reveals,
was more concerned with satisfying its own immediate political needs
than with the problems such gratification would ultimately pose for the
city.
Richmond's oligarchy desired to implement the annexation before
the next council election and its tenuous position was strengthened
considerably by the annexation court's adoption of the private settlement between Richmond and Chesterfield This obviated the need for
the court to make an independent evaluation and also enabled 4 7,000
people (97 percent of whom were white) to become city residents and
participate in the 1970 councilmanic election which was less than a
year away. When the election was held, it came as no surprise when the
white political organization retained its control of the city council The
critical issue is that the state's judiciary was closely allied with the city
in the annexation controversy. More than local interests was at stake.
Concern was mounting that, unless direct action was taken, the former
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capital of the Confederacy might fall for the first time in its history to a
majority black city council
The state legislature also played a key role. Before the annexation
court's decision, the General Assembly was concerned that the
negotiations between Richmond and Chesterfield officials regarding
city boundaries were moving too slowly, or, worse, were leading to a
stalemate. Consequently, the General Assembly initiated a move to
amend the state constitution so as to empower itself to unilaterally
expand the boundaries of the state capital once every ten years
following the decennial census.
The problem, however, was that Chesterfield officials remained
jealous of their local power and were not anxious for the state to
encroach on their prerogatives by mandating, through constitutional
amendment, a state solution to Richmond's "problem" Yet, they knew
that the state was prepared to act unless the county got serious about
seeking a compromise with the city. Some city officials, meanwhile,
knew that the county was under pressure to negotiate and wanted to
capitalize on the county's vulnerable position. By the same token,
these same city officials knew that the process of amending the constitution was lengthy and that even if the constitution were changed, it
would be too late for the 1970 councilmanic election. The county,
therefore, wanted to take advantage of the time pressure under which
the Richmond politicians were operating. Each jurisdiction was vulnerable and, at the same time, could exercise some leverage with its
counterpart The consequence was that a compromise agreement was
struck which then was ratified verbatim by the annexation court and
upheld by the state supreme court Annexation removed the immediate
need for the state to intervene, but had it not been for the willingness of
the state to intercede, the annexation might not have concluded in the
fashion that it did
Countervailing Power: Curtis Holt
Curtis Holt stands at the center of the Richmond annexation dispute.
To understand his role in this drama is to understand the dynamics of
intraracial as well as interacial politics. On one hand, Holt, who was
viewed as the" working-class hero" by many blacks, sought to challenge
what he viewed as the conciliatory views of Richmond's middle-class
blacks. Of equal importance, his opposition to the racially exclusive
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practices of the white power structure was of long standing, going back
before the oligarchy contemplated annexation. Beginning in the middle
fifties, Holt worked closely with the Richmond Crusade for Voters, the
major black political organization, and the state/local branches of the
NAACP to contest black exclusion from the political process.
Though Holt gained considerable prominence by fighting whitedominated city institutions, he was no less persistent against other
black individuals or black institutions whom he charged with being less
than faithful to the black cause. In fact, Holt proved to thousands of
poor blacks like himself that the exercise of raw power by whites could
be checked and checked effectively without the aid of the black
bourgeoisie. In an interview wth a local Richmond newspaper, Holt
suggested that one reason for his decision to fight for deannexation was
the fact that he lost the June 1970 councilmanic election. 7 First of al~
Holt rejected the bipartisan stance and what he viewed as the political
bargaining of the Crusade which resulted in its endorsement of several
white candidates who were supported by Richmond United, an organization based in the newly annexed area Richmond United, in turn, also
endorsed several Crusade Candidates.
Holt finished 17th in a field of twenty-eight councilmanic candidates.
He was incensed by his defeat "I thought my constitutional rights had
been violated I thought that I should have won the election, and so I
knew the only thing that could have stopped me . . . had to be the
annexation territory." 8 Although it is highly questionable whether he
would have been elected if the annexation had not occurred, Holt did
file two suits for deannexation. One suit contested the annexation on
constitutional grounds and the other challenged the annexation on
statutory grounds, namely, the Voting Rights Act of 1965, as interpreted
by the Supreme Court, covered such activities as municipal boundary
expansion.
Holt also entered the 1972 councilmanic election ( though the U.S.
Supreme Court later enjoined the city from holding the election), but
his campaign was given a severe blow when he was not endorsed by the
Crusade. The fact that the Crusade had endorsed two white candidates
( also supported by the rival white organization, which, in turn, endorsed
two Crusade Candidates) was bitterly denounced by Holt "The power
structure is only using the middle-class blacks to continue to isolate the
grassroots blacks [in order] to keep the city running in the hands of the
power structure." 9 Unlike the Crusade and the NAACP, which opposed
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at-large representation and supported a ward system that would guarantee a fixed number of seats for blacks, Holt would be satisfied with
nothing less than deannexation. He equated the ward system to a
system of " separate castles."
Just as Rosa Parks ' s role in the Montgomery Bus Boycott is seen in
its fullest dimensions when coupled with the leadership and direction of
Martin Luther King and the Southern Christian Leadership Conference, 1° Curtis Holt's role in the Richmond annexation dispute
cannot be adequately analyzed without knowledge of the alliance that
Holt forged with a Richmond white lawyer whose assistance Holt
sought after several black lawyers and several black organizations
turned down his request for legal assistance. Both Mrs. Parks and Holt
are examples of how single individuals, though powerless against the
institutional power of whites , have become, through other agencies and
other individuals, heroes to a large segment of the population. 11 These
individuals in fact become very important fighting symbols for an entire
people-both Mrs . Parks , who was portrayed as a quiet but dignified
fighter who refused to budge and thus disobeyed what she thought was
an unjust law, and Holt who challenged both white oligarchic power
and what he viewed as black middle-class power. Both cases demonstrate that individuals, often in alliance with powerful spokespersons
and groups, can make a ditTerence in the outcome of conflicts between
the powerful and the powerless. It is safe to say that even those with
institutional power are never always as powerful as their positions and
status might suggest Conversely, these examples also demonstrate that
those lacking institutional power are never quite as powerless as their
positions and status might suggest In the case of Holt, we see an
example of what some sociologists call "dual alienation" 12- alienation
from the prominent black civil rights groups and alienation from the
white-dominated political system. He was not, however, alienated from
what he called "grassroots blacks ." It was to this group that Holt
looked for confirmation of his raison d'etre.
Legal Complexity
The legal battles fought over the I 970 Richmond annexation are
considered by many observers , including attorneys in the U.S . Justice
Department, as the most complex, prolonged, and far-reaching of any
legal action triggered by municipal boundary expansion. For the
Richmond power structure, the Holt suits quickly became much more
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than minor irritants. They had the potential to radically change the
city's political landscape. What in past years involved fairly simple
and straightforward strategies designed to maintain the political status
quo now required, given the sophisticated legal challenges that Curtis
Holt mounted against the city, equally sophisticated legal responses .
The long cycle of action-response-reaction that characterized the
sequence of events in the courts was emotionally draining on both the
participants and the observers. The information generated by the
tedious research undertaken by attorneys for each side of the suits and
by consultants versed in urban and regional planning, economics, and
public administration, plus the lengthy depositions and courtroom
hearings was comparable to that of a small library. The legal battle was
made more complicated by the intricate routes traveled by the litigants
and the fact that the routes at different points crossed each other, ran
parallel to each other, and diverged at right angles. Journalists covering
the cases over the years were hard pressed to summarize the proceedings
in an intelligible fashion, as each year one case either became more
complicated or else was set aside as another, equally complex case,
was begun.
The litigation began in February 1971 when Curtis Holt initiated his
first suit contesting the annexation on constitutional grounds, and
concluded over five and a half years later in November 1976 following
a second Holt suit and a suit brought by the city. Litigation over
annexation led to a U.S. Supreme Court order suspending local
elections in Richmond that lasted five years and enabled the 1970
counciL which was to serve until 1972, to continue in power for almost
seven years. The arguments surrounding the various suits were presented
to six different judicial bodies, the U. S. District Court in Richmond, a
three judge district court in Richmond, a three judge district court in
Washington, D.C., a Special Master in Washington, the Fourth Circuit
Court of Appeals, and the U.S. Supreme Court The city expended
close to a million dollars in legal fees to the attorneys representing the
city and attorneys opposing the city.
Holt's first suit (Holt I) against the city was successfully argued
before the U.S. District Court in Richmond The city, however, was
successful in overturning the decision in the Fourth Circuit Court of
Appeals. Holt's response was an appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court,
but the high court denied the writ
Prior to the termination of the first suit, Holt brought a second suit
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( Holt II) against the city. Holt II was stayed by the federal court,
though not before the Supreme Court had enjoined further city council
elections. What prevented Holt II from moving forward was a suit
which the city filed
The city's suit was itself complex, notwithstanding the confusion
which was generated by the combination of the city's suit, Holt I, and
Holt II. The city's suit was brought before a special three judge District
Court in Washington which referred it to a Special Master for hearings
and recommendations. Upon receiving the recommendations of the
Master, the Washington court ruled against the city. The city appealed
to the Supreme Court where, by unanimous vote, the justices held that
there was racial motive for the annexation. The Court also ruled,
however, that, given single-member council districts (Richmond had
develped such a plan) and justifiable reasons such as economic or
administrative benefits reaped by the city from the annexed area, the
city could retain the annexed area But, the city had to prove that such
justifiable reasons existed and, moreoever, had to revert to ward
representation.
The Supreme Court returned the case to the Washington District
Court to determine whether verifiable reasons did exist The Washington
Court, once again, referred the case to the Special Master. The Master
found that the city could prove that it received economic and administr~
tive benefits from the annexed area and recommended, therefore, that
the city retain the area. The Washington Court agreed with the
recommendation of the Master and affirmed the annexation.
After conferring with members of the city's black community and
deciding that appeals and other legal action were only delaying the
reinstatement of councilmanic elections, Holt did not appeal the
decision to the Supreme Court With single-member districts, the black
population could be assured of at least four predominately black
districts within the nine district plan and possible a fifth given its 40
percent black population. Hence, with ward elections, blacks could
capture four and possibly five seats on city council It was conceivable
that blacks, for the first time since Richmond's founding, could acquire
a council majority and thus elect their own mayor . .
With the city's suit resolved, the injunctions against elections were
lifted and local elections were called for March 1, 1977. Furthermore,
Holt II, which was stayed pending the outcome of the city's suit, was
withdrawn by the Richmond District Court upon request of both the
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city and Curtis Holt The legal battle ended on March 8 when a
majority black council took office. During the first session of the newly
elected council, Richmond's first black mayor was elected.
Other Contested Annexations in the United States
That the 1970 Richmond-Chesterfield annexation was contested on
racial grounds is not uncommon in the post-Voting Rights Act era As
noted earlier, the events leading up to the annexation, the ripple effects
of the annexation, and the intricate, protracted litigation triggered by
the annexation do cast the Richmond case in a special light N evertheless the fact remains that since the passage of the 196 5 Voting Rights
Act, Richmond's annexation of twenty-three square miles from
Chesterfield County was only one of 244 municipal annexations
challenged under Section 5, which requires designated localities or all
localities in designated states to clear annexations with the U.S . Justice
Department To put this figure in proper perspective, however, it
should be pointed out that the 244 contested annexations represented
only 3 percent of the total number of annexations (7,249 as of this
writing) that had to be submitted to the attorney general for review. 13 In
other words, 97 percent of the submitted annexations were approved 14
As Table 1 indicates, fifteen of the thirty-three communities recorded
multiple annexations. Rome, Georgia, for example, had a package of
sixty annexations that was challenged in 1975, a "banner year" in that
over the eight-year period ( 1971-1978) for which the most recent data
are available, eight of the twenty-five localities (36 percent) had
annexations contested in that year alone.
Two Cities in Texas
San Antonio and Houston will be cited as examples of contested
annexations in other localities. Our rationale for selecting these two
. cases out of the more than thirty in Table 1 is as follows. They are the
only cities on the list that can be called "national cities." According to
the 1980 census, Houston is the fifth largest, San Antonio the tenth
largest Both cities also present unique examples of a new configuration
in ethnic politics- the introduction of the Mexican-American electorate.
A look at Houston and San Antonio may provide insight into the growing cultural pluralism associated with the expansion of the Hispanic
population and its concentration in the urban areas of the South,
Southwest, and, indeed, the nation as a whole. In addition, Houston
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TABLE I
ANNEXATIONS

Location
Alabama
Bessemer
Alabaster
• Alabaster
*Fairfield
Pleasant Grove
Georgia
Rome
Hinesville
*Monroe
*Savannah
Statesboro
College Park
Louisiana
Lake Providence
Newellton
• Shreveport
Mississippi
*Jackson
Sidon
*McComb
*Grenada
*Grenada
*Vicksburg
Mendenhall
North Carolina
Lumberton
• Rocky Mount
New Berne
South Carolina
*McClellanville
Charleston
Texas
• San Antonio
Houston
Port Arthur
Victoria
Virginia
*Richmond
Petersburg
Lynchburg

CONTESTED UNDER SECTION 5

No. of Contested Annexations
Pursuant to Section 5 of
1965 Voting Rights Act
7
6
I
I
I

60
I

2
I

2
17
I
I

51

1975
1975
1977
1975
1980
1975
1971
1976
1978
1979-1980
1977
1972
1973
1976

I
I

1976
1977
1973
1975
1975
1976
1981

3
36
2

1975
1977
1980

2
I

1974
1974

13
14
1
4

1976
1977
1980
1980

I

1971
1972
1975

I
I
I
I

7

I
--

Year Annexation
Contested

1

Total: 244
*Objection later withdrawn by the attorney general
Source· Calculated from U.S. Department of Justice, Civil Rights Division, Complete
Listing of Objections Pursuant to Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965.
(January 1, 1981).
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and San Antonio may be viewed as representatives of Sunbelt cities.
As such they are in a position to give us some idea of the future direction
of Sunbelt politics, and the relationship between the physical expansion
of Sunbelt cities and the distribution of power within the cities. Lastly,
in land mass and population, Richmond is closer to both cities than any
of the others in the table. ( Richmond is the third largest city on the list
following Houston, first, and San Antonio, second)

San Antonio
San Antonio was founded by the Spanish in 1718, and is generally not
considered Southern when its culturaL economic, racial and political
traditions are compared to those of other cities in the South. Its
population (nearly 800,000) is 55 percent Mexican-American, 36
percent Anglo, and 9 percent black. 15 San Antonio's 400,000-plus
Mexican-American population has two major distinctions. It constitutes
the largest concentration of persons of Mexican heritage outside of
Mexico City and Los Angeles. San Antonio is also the only major
American city in which Mexican-Americans are the majority. 16 Prior to
1944, the City of San Antonio annexed territory at irregular intervals.
However, annexations have occurred almost yearly from 1944 to the
present The first major annexation was initiated in 1952 when eighty
square miles were added to the city, thereby increasing its size from
seventy-five to 155 square miles. The size of this annexation prompted
small cities and counties to demand remedies that would safeguard them
against such annexations in the future. 17 The Municipal Annexation Act
of Texas, passed in 1963, circumscribed the annexation powers of the
major urban areas by two major provisions. First, it stipulated that cities
in any one year could annex up to" 10% of its current area provided the
area to be annexed lies within those cities' extraterritorial jurisdiction."
Secondly, it allowed cities to carry over any unused allocations of the
allowable amount for future years provided that" not more than 30% is
annexed in any one year." 18
Between 1952 and 1971 San Antonio annexed a total of forty-three
square miles in relatively small parcels. In 1972, however, the city
annexed sixty-three square miles. This was the second largest annexation in San Antonio's history. (The annexation of sixty-three square
miles exceeded the 10 percent allowable under the Municipal Annexation Act of 1963, but it was possible to do so since the act indicated that
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if a city had not annexed up to 10 percent of its land area in previous
years, it could simply carry over the unused allocations for those years.
San Antonio added its unused portion to cover its 1972 annexation.)
Blacks and Mexican-Americans, citing provisions of the 1965 Voting
Rights Act, viewed the 197 2 annexation as an attempt to dilute their
votes since the city's population was expanded by 51,417 people, 71.4
percent of whom were white; 24.4 percent and 4 percent were MexicanAmericans and black, respectively. The total number of the groups
annexed was 36,749; 12,583, and 2,085 respectively. It was threatened
legal action by one of the major land developers, however, that prompted
the city council to rescind the annexation. The developer, who feared
that the annexation would result in increased taxes for his land, cited
irregularities in the measurement of some of the territories annexed
After the city rescinded the May 25, 1972, annexation with its sixtythree square miles, it proceeded to pass separate annexation ordinances
beginning on September 11, 1972, which took in each of the rescinded
areas separately. This strategy was used by the city because it hoped to
avoid challenges to a collective annexation. If any one of the separate
ordinances were contested, the city could respond to that complaint
without having each of the separate areas contested San Antonio was
able to annex fifty-four square miles of land by annexing separately .
This contrasts to the sixty-three square miles the city had annexed
earlier.*
Immediately after rescinding the May 25, 1972 annexation, the city
manager appointed a task force to reexamine the annexation question.
The task force prepared a report for council which included a four point
rationale of the city's annexation policies. 19 According to the task force
annexation was necessary for the following reasons:
l. To promote orderly growth. Annexation was deemed important
for securing developable land subject to the city's land use policies and
zoning controls.
2. To provide services. According to the task force, a central city
remains viable only when it is able to provide services and higher levels
of services than that provided by a smaller community. Small unincorporated areas of the county must depend on voluntary staff and the
*This information was conveyed by officials in the San Antonio Planning
Department and the city attorney's office to the authors in telephone interviews,
August 7-8, 1981.
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county has a limited budget for police, fire protection, and road
maintenance.
3. To maintain a sound fiscal position. As a city becomes a major
metropolis and a cultural center for the region, the many services it
offers begin to go beyond those serving its citizens. The city is, therefore,
placed in the position of providing services to its suburban neighbors
who utilize city facilities without contributing to the upkeep and
expansion of these facilities. Annexation has been a procedure to
protect the central city's monetary base.
4. To promote unified government Fifty-eight governmental units in
Bexar County are surrounded by or contiguous to San Antonio . The
report refers to several jurisdictional problems relating to such physical
and health issues as congested thoroughfares, traffic bottlenecks,
inadequate sewerage and water facilities.
These four reasons for annexation, as cited by the San Antonio task
force, were similar to the reasons presented by the proannexation
advocates during hearings in the U.S. District Court of the District of
Columbia
Perhaps the only difference between the Richmond and San Antonio
annexations is the cultural composition of the competing bloc votes.
The fear of the white elite that precipitated Richmond's annexation is
mirrored in the statement by one of the San Antonio area judges when
he stated that "we've got to put a stop to this thing of minority groups
getting together and electing a man." 20 In 1971 with the combined
Mexican-American/black vote emerging as a new majority voice in San
Antonio, it was little wonder that San Antonio's relatively recent stated
goal of "using annexation as a rational tool of urban development''
would raise the ire and fear of both Mexican-Americans and blacks
who viewed massive annexations as attempts to dilute the growing
power of a growing minority voice. These fears were not unfounded
since Texas, like other Southern states, had engaged in policies that
excluded blacks and other minorities from the political process through
such practices as the all-white primary, literacy tests, the poll tax, and
the annual voter registration statute. 21 Thus, the political concerns of
Mexican-Americans and blacks focused on the diminishing minority
vote which would be inevitable under future annexations and the
concomitant decrease in the ability of any minority to gain power at the
local level under the at-large electoral system The issue in the 1970s,
therefore, ceased to be the right to vote, as it was under the previous

Introduction

19

exclusionary policies in the South. Rather, it was the issue of
representation.
Beginning in 1914, the nine members of the San Antonio city council
were elected at-large. Minority candidates labored under several disadvantages in this electoral system since winning at-large elections
depended upon access to an ample supply of campaign funds and on the
willingness of a white majority to cast its vote for minority candidates. 22
One of the groups that exercised inordinate power in the at-large process
was the Good Government League ( GG L) which consisted of professional and business men.23 This group's role in San Antonio paralleled
the role of Richmond Forward or the Team of Progress (TOP) in
Richmond It was almost impossible for minority candidates to win
elections without the support of GG L. There were three basic reasons
for GGL's power: (1) It possessed vast financial resources. From 1971
to 1975 it spent an average of$109,000 per election; (2) It represented
itself as a nonpartisan, public-minded "team." From 1965 to 1973, all
the black council members were affiliated with GGL; from 1959 to
197 3 of the twenty-three Mexican-Americans who won election,
seventeen were affiliated with GGL; (3) Since election to city council
required filing for a specific seat and receiving an electoral majority, the
successful candidate either had to outspend GGL or become a part of
its slate. 24 Thus, the at-large election was seen by blacks and MexicanAmericans as an obstacle to equal representation.
Simultaneous with the establishment of the task force to reexamine
the annexation issue, the opposition to annexation prompted San
Antonio in 197 3 to reexamine its city charter. Challenges to the atlarge elections were initiated in a redistricting suit which culminated in
a U.S. Supreme Court decision, White v. Regester, 1971. The high
court held that multimember districts in Dallas and Bexar Counties ( San
Antonio is in the latter) were unconstitutional in that they diluted the
black and Mexican-American votes. But the decision referred specifically to the electoral processes of the counties and the urban center was
yet untouched by the court's decision. As a result of the White
decision, there were pressures to make the ruling apply to cities as well
as counties. San Antonio's Charter Revision Commission proposed a
charter change that would expand the city council from nine members
to eleven, seven of whom would be elected from districts with the
mayor and the remaining three members elected at-large. At that time
the mayor was chosen from among the nine elected council members.25
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These recommendations were presented to voters in the November,
1974, election. Voters rejected the single-member district plan, but
approved the election of the mayor by at-large vote. Opposition to the
single member plan ran along racial and cultural lines with black and
Mexican-American communities voting for the plan and Anglo communities voting against it
Nevertheless, a single-member district system eventually replaced
the at-large system in San Antonio, but only after pressure was exerted
on the city from the U.S. Department of Justice. Citing provisions of
Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act, the Justice Department said that
some of the annexations which occurred from 1942 to 1972 had, in
fact, diluted the black and Mexican-American vote. 26 The Justice
Department recommended that San Antonio adopt single-member
councilmanic districts to insure that Mexican-Americans and blacks
have the opportunity to attain political representation commensurate
to their proportion of the total population. A single-member district
plan would render San Antonio's 1972 annexation unobjectionable and
thereby reduce the power of the Anglo voting bloc. As it did in the
Richmond case, the Justice Department reasoned that annexation was
impermissible if it increased the power of the white voting bloc while
simultaneously excluding other racial and cultural groups from city
council membership. San Antonio's city council accepted the Justice
Department's recommendation and placed the charter revision plan
before the voters in a special election in January, 1977. This new plan
called for an eleven-member councii ten of whom were to be elected
from single-member districts with the mayor to run at-large.27 This
charter revision was approved by voters, 31,530 to 29,857. As in the
previous charter revision election, voting went along racial and cultural
lines with Mexican-Americans and blacks endorsing the plan and the
more affluent Anglos opposing it Single-member district representation, however, did not insure equal representation in San Antonio. As
Ronnie Dugger stated: "Despite 'one man, one vote' court rulings, the
two poorest districts, which have only two councilmen, have a total
population of 161,000 compared to the 189,000 people in the three bestoff districts, which have three councilmen." 28
Ronnie Dugger' s statement notwithstanding, the first city elections in
San Antonio following the adoption of single-member districts saw the
emergence of a "minority-majority" council in which the heretofore
minority group now composed the majority with five Mexican-
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Americans and one black. Four Anglos were on the council 29 This new
"minority- majority'' came from areas of San Antonio that had been
largely unrepresented historically; thus, it represented groups with new
and different voices, interests, and needs. There were some noticeable
effects of the single-member district election:
( 1) Whereas six candidates in 197 3 and 1975 filed for each of the atlarge positions on the council, sixty-nine candidates and thirty-two
candidates filed for the newly created ten single-member districts in
1977 and 1979, respectively;
(2) Whereas 26.5 percent of all candidates during the years 1973-75
were Mexican-Americans, 40.6 percent of all candidates during the
years 1977-79 were Mexican-American;
(3) Whereas from 1955 to 1975, five of the six Mexican-American
candidates who ran for city council resided in predominately Anglo
areas, after the 1977 charter change, up to 85 percent of the MexicanAmericans resided in one of the six predominately Mexican-American
areas.
( 4) Whereas in at-large elections candidates had to campaign in an
area with a population of 700,000, candidates in single-member
districts generally had to appeal to populations of 75,000.
( 5) Whereas, the at-large elections were expensive and thus helped
to exclude minority racial and cultural groups, campaign expenses
declined in the single-member districts. 30
Houston
Houston has recently emerged as the nation's fifth largest city.31 Like
San Antonio's, Houston's present corporate boundaries have resulted
from massive and aggressive annexations begun at the tum of the
century but greatly accelerated after World War II. 32 Houston's
current 549 square miles resulted primarily from three annexation
waves, one in 1949, one in 1956, and the last from 1957 to 1963 which
increased the city area from seventy-four square miles in 1945 to 359
square miles in 1956. By early 1972 rapid annexations had increased
the city's size to 501 square miles. Finally, annexations in late 1972,
1973, 1974, 1975, 1976, and 1977 pushedthetotalareato549
square
miles.33
The suit filed against the city in 197 3 was addressed largely to
Houston's at-large electoral system and the manner in which it diluted
the black and Mexican-American vote. But this challenge, similar to
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the one directed earlier at the at-large system in San Antonio, was tw<>pronged in that, first, it questioned Houston's massive annexations ,
especially those beginning in 1972. Secondly, the challenge targeted
Houston's city charter. A brief review of the vast population increases
that accompanied Houston's geographical increases will serve to
highlight the concerns of blacks and Mexican-Americans.
The 1973 suit by blacks and Mexican-Americans argued that the net
effect of all the annexations throughout the 1970s was the dilution of
the minority vote. The city added 180,137 people to its population
during the 1970s: 24,809 blacks (13.8 percent), 14,148 MexicanAmericans (7.8 percent) and 141,180 whites (78.4 percent) . Had
Houston not annexed those areas throughout the 1970s the population
ratio would have been different blacks, 26.1 percent, Mexican-Americans, 14.2 percent, and whites, 59.7 percent 34 The annexations
of the 1970s, however, reduced the black percentage from 26.1 to 24.8,
and the Mexican-American percentage from 14.2 to 13.5. In contrast,
the white percentage increased from 59.7 to 61.7. The black and
Mexican-American populations had been reduced by 1.3 and 0.7 percentage points, respectively. Together these figures represented a total
minority population reduction of 2.0 percentage points. These reductions in the minority voting strength through annexations coupled with
an at-large voting system, black and Mexican-American plaintiffs
contended, had deprived minorities of present or future chances of ever
having minority representation in city government in porportion to
minority voting power. Though the annexations of the 1970s had
included areas in which blacks and Mexican-Americans lived, the ratio
of minority inclusion was never close to the percentage of whites who
lived in the areas annexed Blacks and Mexican-Americans feared that
if Houston continued to annex at the then present rate, it would soon
run out of black and Mexican-American areas to annex. Thus, the
result was the spectre of white percentage increases with minority
percentage decreases, further strengthening the voting power of the
white population. 35
In 195 5, Houston, by popular vote, amended its city charter to place
the city's administrative functions in the hands of the mayor, thereby
instituting a strong-mayor system. The voters also approved an amendment to change from the single-member system to an at-large system.
Under this system the nine-member Houston city council consists of a
mayor, who is also a council member, five council persons elected from
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districts in which they reside, and three persons who hold numbered
positions. A majority vote is required to win a citywide election. One of
the ironies of the vote to amend the city charter is that blacks endorsed
it, perhaps believing that the at-large system could possibly enhance
black voting strength. 36 But whatever advantages blacks may have
envisioned with the at-large system were quickly negated by the huge
inflow of whites due to a succession of annexations.
The Houston charter was still a source of debate shortly after it was
amended The city council appointed a charter revision commission in
1956; the commission recommended that the newly amended charter
provison of 1955 be rescinded and that the city return to a form of
single-member districts. More recently, in a 197 5 "straw vote,"
Houston citizens approved ( by a margin of 5 3 percent to 4 7 percent) a
plan to return to single-member districts. Despite these two pro-singlemember district recommendations, the Houston city council steadfastly
refused to reconsider the charter issue.37
In their class action suit, blacks and Mexican-Americans sought to
enjoin future Houston city council elections under the multidistrict
system They made two central claims against the city:
1. Houston's requirement of election by majority vote. This requirement worked against minority candidates since they had to receive over
50 percent of the vote in the first election or face a run-off which would
then pit them against a single white candidate. The majority system
prevented two blacks from being elected to the Houston city council
Both led in the first election but were overwhelmed by opposition white
candidates in the run-off. Both candidates would have been elected
under a plurality system. In the Graves v. Barnes decision, a case
involving at-large county elections, the United States District Court
decreed that "the majority system tends to strengthen the majority's
ability to submerge a political or racial minority in a multi-member
district" 38 This suppression of minority voting power may be even
more evident whenever there has been a history of racial stratification
and discrimination in a locality. To support this latter assertion, the
plaintiffs cited cases in which candidates in Houston election campaigns
appealed to racial prejudice. For example, they pointed to a case in
which a campaign flyer was passed out only in the white community, it
included the pictures of the two candidates-one white, the other
black. 39 The black candidate had led in the first election, but was later
badly beaten in the run-off. Under a single-member district plan, the
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plaintiffs reasoned, appeals to racial prejudice would have less impact
·
on election results.
blacks and Mexicanto
city
the
of
2. The unresponsiveness
Americans. The plaintiffs contended that at-large elections weakened
and almost nullified the minority vote. Elected officials did not,
therefore, feel an obligation to respond to minority needs since they
could generally win without the minority vote. Ergo, the greater the
majority voting-percentage became through the annexation of predominately white areas, the greater the potential unresponsiveness to
minority concerns. Plaintiffs discussed the city's unresponsiveness in
these areas: ( 1) employment in city agencies; (2) appointments to boards
and commissions; (3) support for low-income housing ; ( 4) lack of
adequate recreational facilities in minority areas; (5) the persistence of
police brutality toward minorites; and ( 6) lack of expenditures for the
development of minority neighborhoods.40 These and other problems
existed, plaintiffs argued, because multidistrict apportionment had
deprived the city of minority participation; hence, there were no
minority spokespersons who could address the specific concerns of
particular minority districts. Though under the present United States
electoral process there is no legislative seat reserved exclusively for
blacks or Mexican-Americans, the courts have reviewed the singlemember district system as a possible remedy to the underrepresentation
of minority citizens. 41
The United States District Court did not support the claim by
plaintiffs that at-large elections were constitutional violations. 42 In
Greater Houston Civic Council v. Mann, Judge Frank Mann ruled
that plaintiffs did not prove that ( 1) minorities were denied access to
the process of slating candidates; (2) Houston's multidistrict system
was racially motivated; (3) Houston had been unresponsive to the
needs of the minority community; (4) past discrimination limited
minority participation in the voting process; and (5) the at-large
electoral system diluted or negated minority voting strength.43 Unlike
Richmond, however, Houston was never confronted by plaintiffs
seeking to deannex those areas whose incorporation into the city led to
the dilution of minority voting strength. Rather, the Houston challengers
wanted a change to single-member districts. On September 21, 1979,
the Justice Department dropped its objection against Houston's
annexation when the city agreed to an electoral system in which nine

Introduction

25

councilpersons would be elected from single-member districts and five
council persons would be elected at-large.44
One of the added highlights of the Houston annexation dispute was
the spirited debate among Houston-based scholars over the issue of
racial polarization and the method by which an "index of polarization"
could be computed Polarization is, in generai a situation in which" the
electorate votes along racial lines." 45 This dispute was not, however,
trivial. Those who claimed little or no polarization between blacks and
whites supported the annexation and the at-large electoral system
Those who argued that polarization between blacks and whites was
high supported the single-member district plan. The polarization issue
loomed large in both the San Antonio and Houston cases because
polarization was seen by many as a major barrier to electoral success of
minority candidates. Given Texas's historic institutional racism which
was similar to the institutional racism found in the surrounding Southern
states, it was no wonder that blacks and Mexican-Americans interpreted
the massive and aggressive annexations of the 1960s and 1970s as
racially motivated In San Antonio the white population feared that it
would be swamped by the Mexican-American vote and hence lose
control of city government The recent Arpil 1981 mayoral election in
San Antonio must have confirmed the worst fears of Anglos in that city,
for San Antonio became the first major city to elect a Mexican-American mayor.46 The polarization between Anglos and Mexican-Americans b~came a major issue in the election, but the recent
population distribution which saw the rise of a Mexican-American
majority in the city was a factor that could not be rescinded on the
appeals to cultural chauvinism and discrimination. Accounts of a long
history of discrimination against blacks and Mexican-Americans in
both San Antonio and Houston gave credence to the claims of plaintiffs
in both cases that race, indeed, was central in the annexation policies of
the two cities. In both cases, as a result of litigation, the cities altered
their electoral systems. Each city settled the dispute without unreason-able delay by adopting the single-member district plan rather than
going the way of Richmond which fought its case to the U.S. Supreme
Court only to see its municipal elections suspended for a total of seven
years. Both cities offer interesting case studies in the politics and
sociology of ethnic voting and the politics of ethnic coalitions. The
ethnic make-up of both cities makes them different from most
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municipalities in other states of the "Old Confederacy'' in that the
traditional polarization characteristic of the latter localities was applicable only to blacks and whites. The emergence of the Mexica1r
American adds a new component, a new variegated cultural dimension
and its accompanying images of "brown power," an idea that
parallels the "black power'' concept of the late 60's and 70's. The
emergence of the Mexica1rAmerican majority in San Antonio with the
election of its first Mexican-American mayor ( the first ever in a major
city), provides us with an opportunity to analyze the dynamics of
Hispanic cultural styles on American urban politics. In the cases of
Houston and San Antonio, we are ·witnessing the diversification of
politics and the degree to which the black and Mexica1rAmerican
populations are able to forge a workable coalition that would offset the
predominate political and economic power of the cities' s white population. Now that future annexations seem less likely in the case of both
San Antonio and Houston, the very power whites sought to negate-the
black and Mexica1rAmerican vote-is a reality that must be sought
and, in many cases, courted if the large urban centers are to remain as
workable political and economic entities. Also, the emergence of
"Sunbelt power'' and the pivotal roles of Houston and San Antonio in
Sunbelt politics adds yet another dimension to the future of both cities as
regional and national urban centers.
Data Sources
The basic research for this study of the Richmond-Chesterfield
annexation covers the years 1961 to 1978 . Data were collected through
( 1) interviews, ( 2) court records, ( 3) election returns, ( 4) census
reports, (5) newspaper accounts, (6) government documents, and (7)
secondary materials. The authors conducted structured interviews with
most of the principal actors in the annexation dispute: former city
council members, leaders of major black organizations, officials of
Chesterfield County and other state and local political figures. Court
records were scrutinized in order to assess the rationale for the positions
taken by key disputants in the cases.
The use of election returns was essential in demonstrating the voting
strength of blacks and whites and enabled the authors to analyze the
city's voting trends, a crucial issue to each side of the racial conflict
Census data revealed population trends in the city and the surrounding
counties and provided the empirical support for the proannexation

Introduction

27

arguments. News coverage by local black and white newspapers was
analyzed in order to locate key personalities in the dispute as well as to
assess the tone and logic of the arguments presented for and against
annexation Government documents were examined because they
provided the legal framework and justifications for the antiannexation
suits. Finally, the social history of Richmond and Virginia was
researched by consulting books, articles, and monographs.
Summary of Subsequent Chapters
Chapter Two provides an overview of demographic and political change
in Richmond during the years following the Second World War.
Attention is also given to the political climate of Virginia during the
same period with particular emphasis placed on Massive Resistance
and the emergence of the Crusade for Voters. In addition, the chapter
explores the 1961 attempt by Richmond and Henrico officials to merge
the two jurisdictions. The racial implications of the merger campaign
are studied together with the move by the city to annex a portion of
Henrico and Chesterfield Counties after the merger effort failed.
Chapter Three is divided into two major sections with each section
focusing on the Richmond-Chesterfield annexation In the first section,
the Henrico annexation case is explored, including the reasons underlying the city's rejection of the annexation court award. Attention is
then drawn to the Chesterfield case and the initial slow pace of the suit
as Richmond and Chesterfield officials sought to settle the dispute out
of court As the black population continued to grow and as the Crusade
for Voters became more effective in registering blacks for elections, the
city's attempts to annex accelerated. The interconnection between state
and local oligarchs is analyzed as is the common cause made by local
and state officials to perpetuate a capital city controlled by the white
elite. Section two of the chapter begins with the year 1969, when the
Virginia General Assembly passed a proposal to amend the state
constitution that would empower the state to enlarge the capital city's
boundaries once every ten years, the negotiations between the mayor
and the Chesterfield County board chairman ( which led to the drawing
of the so-called "Homer-Bagley Line"), the decision of the Chesterfield
annexation court, and the appeal of the annexation decision to the
Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals . Finally, section two examines the
formation of a new political alliance, the Team of Progress, and
concludes with an analysis of the 1970 council election.
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Chapter Four charts the growing opposition to the Richmond
annexation in the federal courts. Charging that the annexation was
primarily racially motivated and designed ultimately to dilute the black
vote, grass roots organizer Curtis Holt, Sr., challenged the annexation
on the basis of the Fifteenth Amendment and the 1965 Voting Rights
Act This chapter also examines the city's efforts to acquire approval of
the annexation from the U.S. Department of Justice and its later move
to seek a declaratory judgment from the U.S. District court in
Washington, D.C. Considerable attention is given to the role of key
individuals and organizations in the litigation surrounding the annexation and the legal strategies fashioned by the city and its opponents .
Chapter Four concludes with an analysis of the ripple effects generated
by the annexation, including the shift from at-large to single-member
district representation, the 1977 councilmanic election resulting in the
election of the first majority black council and Richmond's first black
mayor, and the changes in state annexation law which stemmed in large
part from the 1970 annexation and the omnipresent acrimony between
Richmond and her neighboring jurisdictions . Attention is also focused
the racial conflict which continues to characterize Richmond politics
and the factionalism which is most pronounced on the Richmond City
council

II
Post-World War II Richmond:
Race, Politics, and City Expansionism
Richmond's desire to annex portions of the surrounding counties is
better understood when juxtaposed against population figures for blacks
and whites within the city and aggregate population figures for the two
surrounding counties (see Tables 2 and 3). According to Table 2,
Richmond's white population can be characterized as a population in
decline, whereas the city's black population growth has been steadily
increasing. The "suspended" population percentages for both blacks
and whites for 1940 and 1950 and for 1960 and 1970 can be explained
by the annexation by Richmond of portions of Henrico County in 1942
and of portions of Chesterfield County in 1970. Specifically, the 1950
figures include the increases from the 1942 Henrico County annexation;
the 1970 figures include the increases from the 1970 C~esterfield
County annexation Without the 1970 annexation figures, blacks
would have composed 52 percent of the city's population The
dramatic shift in the city's racial composition is clearly seen in the 10
percent decline of the white population between 1950 and 1960. The
black population, conversely, increased during the same period
Population gains for the surrounding counties were even more dramatic
than those gains experienced by blacks within the city. The sharp
increases in the counties' population were mainly at the expense of
Richmond and represented "white flight'' to the suburbs . 1 The
suburbanization of Richmond was taking place simultaneously with
that in areas surrounding major Northeast and Middle West cities.
Flight to Richmond's counties was consistent, therefore, with the
national city-to- suburb migration trek among whites. 2 The black
population, with minor exceptions, was still moving from the predominately rural South to the urban centers of the Northeast and
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TABLE 2
POPULATION OF RICHMOND, VIRGINIA, 1930-1975

Year of census

1930
1940
1950
1960
1965 ( estimate)
1968 ( estimate)
1970
1980

Total

White

White
Percentage

182,929
193,042
230,310
219,958
219,065
216,451
249,621
219,214

129,871
131,706
157,228
127,627
118,952
108,398
143,857
104,743

71
68
68
58
54
50
58
48

Nonwhite
Nonwhite Percentage

53,058
61,336
73,082
92,331
100,113
108,053
105,764
114,471

29
32
32
42
46
50
42
52

Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census.

TABLE 3
POPULATION OF HENRICO AND CHESTERFIELD COUNTIES , 1950-1970

1950
1960
1970
1980

Henrico

Chesterfield

51,650
111,269
143,812
177,000

31,970
61,762
68,012
140,000

Source: U. S. Bureau of the Census

Midwest 3 But as Richmond, Atlanta, Charleston, and other Southern
cities demonstrated, there was still a steady, and often heavy, flow of
blacks from the rural South to Southern urban centers; it might be
argued, as some have, that white flight can also be explained partially
as one of the results of planned governmental action, ( 1) the national
highway system, and (2) the low-interest housing market (FHA and
VA mortgage options were extra incentives). Even if the policies of the
national government made suburban housing easier to purchase in the
surrounding counties, and even if they paved the road ( highway) which
led from Richmond to Chesterfield and Henrico Counties, Richmond
could boast, during the postwar years, that it maintained one of the
strongest urban economies among large and medium-sized American
cities.4 Thus, the out-migrations were not examples of citizens fleeing
a fiscally crippled city. In fact, the city's balance of production and
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service industries enabled its citizens, especially its white citizens, to
avoid the ravages of high unemployment Black Richmonders did not
fare as well-the rate of unemployment was usually double that of whites,
and when employed, blacks were usually relegated to low-prestige and
low-paying jobs. 5 According to the latest data, a higher percentage of
whites were employed in the professional, managerial, and administrative areas. Conversely, blacks were concentrated in categories such as
service workers, operatives, and clerical and private household workers.6
Richmond's economic strength derived from several sources. It was ( and
is) a major center for tobacco and its products, metals, pharmaceuticals,
paints, food products, fertilizer, and wood products. It was also a
regional center for banking and insurance; many large companies had
their regional, national, or international headquarters in the city.7 The
city, therefore, maintained a fairly healthy economy prior to and during
the white exodus of the postwar period, and it is important to understand
these economic and demographic trends as major political events of the
1950s are explored
Massive Resistance Movement
The Massive Resistance movement, a response by Southern white
leaders to the 1954 Brown case, was intended to accomplish several
goals: ( 1) hold the South to an undeviating adherence to the caste system;
(2) reestablish a pre-Civil War concept of states' rights, and( 3) insulate
the South from the intrusion of new ideas and social practices. 8 The
opening shots for massive resistance were sounded by none other than
Senator Harry Flood Byrd on February 24, 1956, when he said: "Ifwe
can organize the Southern States for massive resistance to this order [of
the Supreme Court in the school segregation cases] I think that in time
the rest of the country will realize that racial integration is not going to be
accepted in the South." 9 Virginia's position within the Massive
Resistance movement took many Virginians and non-Virginians by
surprise since many viewed the state as harboring few of the excesses of
the Deep South or of the North. Moreover, many believed that Virginia
would never associate with a movement, and especially not lead one, that
had the support of" rabble- rousing and Negro-baiting'' states such as
Mississipp~ Georgia, or South Carolina But, Massive Resistance
demonstrated that Virginia had a greater affinity to these states than had
formerly been assumed; though she was geographically not as Southern
as the Deep Southern states, she was-ideologically and culturally-
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more Southern with respect to adhering to the "spirit of the Old
South." 10
Massive Resistance may be said to have deepened or sharpened
antiblack feelings among whites. The cornerstone of the resistance was
the belief in the myth of white supremacy. The ultimate failure of
Massive Resistance had nothing to do with any problack sentiment, nor
anything to do with any sudden awakening among whites of feelings of
brotherhood, justice and liberty. Rather, it had everything to do with
other factors that were important to whites who found themselves in the
eye of a social hurricane. These factors included: ( 1) the increasing
awareness by Governor J. Lindsey Almond that Massive Resistance
was legally doomed; (2) citizens' concern over the closing of public
schools; (3) the disapproval by the Virginia press of any prolonged
radical resistance; and ( 4) the opposition of businessmen who informed
Governor Almond that Massive Resistance was hurting the state's
reputation and undermining its development 11 The death knell for
Massive Resistance was sounded in Virginia in 1-959when the Virginia
Supreme Court of Appeals declared that both the school-closing and
public school fund cutoffs were illegal.12
Besides trying to circumvent school segregation, blacks were also
engaged in the debate concerning their" place" in the Richmond order;
though the black population may have been, as one black businessman
commented, "tranquilized," it was not dead 13 The population gains
were more than numerical increases. Inner dynamics may have accompanied these increases, dynamics that related to the psychosociological
dimensions of collective behavior. For example, an oppressed people
might gain greater confidence when they composed a sizable proportion
of a community in contrast to composing a small proportion. The
population gains of blacks in Richmond resulted in the emergence of a
variety of black organizations in the 1940s, chief among these being the
Richmond Civic Councii a loose confederation of civic, fraternal, and
religious organizations. 14 Prior to the 1948 city council election the
council led a parade through predominately black Jackson Ward and held
a series of"freedom rallies." These activities were designed to register
new black voters who, because of the disenfranchisement practices
operating in Richmond, only numbered 6,587.15 They were also
intended to gain support for Attorney Oliver Hill whose subsequent
election to city council in 1948 made him the first black to be elected to
that body since 1895. 16 His defeat in the 1950 council election made
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the council an all-white institution until the election of B. A Cephas in
1964. ( After the 1966 council election Cephas was joined by two other
black electees-Winfred Mundie and Henry L. Marsh, Ill.) Ironically,
Hill's election to the council in 1948 resulted from Richmond's reform
movement, which saw the enactment of a change in the city charter
that called for the abolition of the ward system and partisan elections in
favor of at-large elections and nonpartisan elections. 17 The Richmond
Citizens Association (RCA), a forerunner to Richmond Forward and
Team of Progress, spearheaded this charter change. The logic for the
change paralleled the logic of city officials in Houston who similarly
changed from the single-member district system to the at-large system
in 195 5. The ward system had become inefficient and, according to the
RCA, contributed to a council tom by personai party, regionai class,
and interest conflict 18
The old charter had a bicameral city council with a directly elected
mayor. The Common Council consisted of twenty members and a twelve
member Board of Aldermen Under the new charter the mayor's post
became largely ceremonial with administrative powers invested solely
in a city manager who was to be appointed by the new nine member
council The charter change was supported by the then major black
sociopolitical group, the Richmond Civic Council. It is important to
know that under the pre-1948 election system, the wards were so
gerrymandered by white officials as to prevent blacks from consolidating
their voting strength in any one ward 19 Before Hill's election no black
had yet joined the thirty-two member council The white leadership
endorsement .of Hill can be viewed perhaps as "payback" to blacks for
their support for the charter change. In any case, since blacks had not
been able to field any successful candidates under the gerrymandered
ward system, members of the Civic Councii no doubt, felt that there
was really nothing to lose and possibly something to gain from
cooperation with the local white leadership. 20 According to A. J.
Dickinson, black and white leaders supported interracial cooperation
for different reasons. Blacks viewed cooperation with the white power
structure as a means of breaking down the "physical and psychological
barrier" between the two groups-with the added incentive that if a
black were eventually elected to the council it "would be a symbol of
renewed aspirations and a focal point around which to arouse and rally
a segregated and politically apathetic community." 21 Many whites may
have reasoned that Richmond's business climate would be enhanced by
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"a reputation for good race relations." They also feared that the
"stifling and archaic tradition such as segregation" could prompt many
blacks to view any change as progress and thus "sanction change for
the sake of change." 22
The Crusade for Voters emerged out of this racially charged
environment It grew out of the Committee to Save Public Schools, an
ad hoc group formed in 1956 to challenge Massive Resistance by
campaigning against a special referendum on January 9, 1956. 23 The
referendum was intended to circumvent the 1954 Brown decision by
permitting localities to close schools rather than integrate them The
referendum passed Its passage sent a message to a newly emerging
segment of the black community-the professional class. By 1956, this
new class of blacks had begun to make its presence felt in the Richmond
black community. These younger blacks-some of whom were doctors,
lawyers, and university professors who taught at Virginia Union
University-were frustrated by the lack of political coordination within
the black community. They saw the need for a new sociopolitical
orientation, one that was more aggressive than the leadership heretofore
provided by the Richmond Civic Council. 24 These blacks contended
that the Civic Council had many weaknesses and therefore lacked the
elements that would serve as a catalyst for black advancement These
young turks, no doubt, rejected the posture of the black ministers who
generally set the policies for the Civic Councit they wanted a more
systematic approach to black politics, an approach that essentially
discouraged racial rhetoric and emphasized highly organized precinctlevel leadership. Speaking of the formation of the Crusade in 1956, Dr .
William Thornton, one of the founders and a graduate of Virginia Union
and the Ohio College of Podiatry, said, " We were originally the
revolutionaries. " 25 With the missionary zeal akin to W. E . B. DuBois's
conception of the" talented tenth," 26 these young professionals set out to
alter Richmond's political mosaic by first increasing the political
consciousness of blacks and then translating that consciousness into
voting power.
When she was asked about the success of the Crusade, Edwina Clay
Hali former president of the organization, replied that the Crusade had
made it possible for the number of registered black voters to increase
from 8,500 in 1956 to 32,500 in 1966. 27 The secret of this success
stemmed from the very structure of the Crusade. The organization was
tightly organized and governed by the officers and the executive board, a
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structure that permitted the Crusade to weather the storm of personal as
well as political itr-fighting. Its highly centralized structure, therefore,
permitted it to make quick decisions on important matters. On the grass
roots level, the Crusade operated as an effective umbrella group. Each
predominately black precinct was organized around a precinct "club"
which served as problem-solving agent for the precinct The prt}dominately black precincts elected representatives who sat on the
board of the Crusade. The Crusade also kept an updated list of all the
major black sociaL civic, fraternal, and religious groups and the leaders
of these groups. When major issues arose that required broad-based
community discussions, these individuals were contacted and asked to
attend public forums. The major decisions of the Crusade, however,
were not made by those groups included under the umbrella; rather,
they were made by the governing board, the chairman, and the group's
officers. For example, during elections, when tempers and political
jockeying were usually high, the question of whom to endorse was not
thrown open to the at-large membership. Instead, the chair appointed a
research committee composed of four members: the chair, the president,
and two at-large members. This committee evaluated each prospective
endorsee and then made a recommendation.· To maximize the Crusade's
political clout, the organization announced its approved slate the Sunday
prior to the election, usually in black churches. 28
Both the timing and the location of these announcements attest to the
Crusade's awareness of the position of the black church in black
communities and the necessity to not tip the organization's hand to
those who might attempt to penalize some persons endorsed The
decisive power of the Crusade is more clearly viewed when its activities
are analyzed later in this chapter.
The Richmond-Henrico Merger Attempt
In enumerating the racial factors that may have precipitated Richmond's
efforts to merge with Henrico County in 1960, we see these important
forces at work: racial population shifts within Richmond; the U.S.
Supreme Court's desegregation mandate of 1954 and 1955, Brown I
and Brown II; the emergence of black sociopolitical organizations, and
the increase in black voting strength. By the 1950s the black geographical and political presence had arisen phoenix- like from almost out of
nowhere. The white response to this emergence, given the image of
blacks in the mind of many whites, was one of terror. 29 Now the
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seemingly harmless quest by many Richmond white leaders for a
"greater Richmond" that would rival Atlanta, Charlotte, and New
Orleans as a regional economic, political and cultural center was
accompanied by and largely outdistanced by overt concern with the
politics of race whose importance was often cloaked in subtleties and
coded in nonracial terms. These code terms could, on the surface, be
viewed as virtues and, therefore, acceptable for those not yet initiated
into the art of racial coding.30
By 1960, the Richmond black population was already 42 percent of
the total population . Black voting registration rose from 12,486 in 1957
to 16,396 in 1961. With white flight already in high gear, and with
blacks exerting their political power at the polls, it was clear that the
latter had become a major force in the city's electoral politics. 31 The idea
to consolidate the governments of Richmond and Henrico County in
1961 came at a time when numerous other cities throughout the United
States were trying to induce their surrounding counties to merge.
Consolidation, the argument went, would" simplify the local government
structure, provide a more realistic framework for approaching common
problems, eliminate duplications of functions and services, facilitate the
establishment of uniform levels of services, provide a sound tax base ...
[ and] establish a governmental structure capable of coping with urban
development " 32
The Richmond-Henrico merger plan was designed and shaped by a
six-member joint Richmond and Henrico Consolidation committee
which met between August, 1960 and July, 1961. The agreement
reached by the Consolidation Committee called for the creation of a
five-borough system consisting of the county's four magisterial districts
plus the old city of Richmond The committee also proposed the
formation of an interim government to become effective on January 1,
1963. The interim city council would consist of eleven members with
four members elected from each of the four "county'' boroughs, four
elected at-large in the old city of Richmond, and three elected at-large
from the consolidated city. Following the five-and-a-half-year interim
period, the council membership would be reduced from eleven to nine,
all of whom would be elected at-large, though at least one councilperson would have to reside in each of four boroughs ( the four boroughs
consisted of the old magisterial districts whose boundaries were
extended into the old city since the old city no longer was to constitute a separate borough). 33 In addition, special provisions were
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made for the county area added to the city. For example, county real
estate would be assessed at 90 percent of market value and county tax
rates would gradually increase over fourteen years until they reached
the city rates. Also, county personneL including teachers and principals,
were assured of a job with Richmond at a pay rate no lower than the rate
then in use.
Christopher Silver's analysis of Richmond's effort to merge with
Henrico County points to the importance of race. According to Silver,
race "remained at the heart of the controversy over merger ." In subtle
tones consolidation supporters sought to convince county residents that
it was in their mutual interest to prevent a black takeover of Richmond 34
Silver cites a memorandum by the Richmond First Club in which race
was highlighted as a major factor underlying the consolidation effort
The memorandum emphasized the dramatic consequences of population
shifts during the 1950s: whites were fleeing the city in record numbers,
while the black population was steadily increasing. The report added
that the Richmond public school system was predominately black.
Finally, the report noted that the decline of the white population and the
increase in the black population jeopardized the city's tax base in that
"the city tax base is automatically lowered when the black population
increases." 35 The racial nexus became the unspoken theme and the
hidden agenda, and white leaders, while refraining from introducing
race as a topic for public discussion, understood the importance of
consolidation for its economic as well as its racial advantages to the
white political and business sectors.
On the other hand, there was very little support for consolidation
among Henrico County's residents. S. A. Burnette ( Chairman of the
Henrico Board of Supervisors), other Henrico officials, and many
Henrico citizens argued that the city was indeed pushing for merger
because it sought to exploit county lands and resources. 36 They
countered the city's claim that the county was unable to provide
adequate services for its citizens or that county residents would be equal
to city residents under the merger plan Opponents of merger also
attacked the Richmond business community which generally supported
the merger. The Merger Opposition Reporter, a periodical initiated to
spearhead opposition to the merger, informed its readers that all the
talk of gains for Henrico citizens was merely propaganda by Richmond's
business sector which wanted to use the county's resources in order to
further its own business interests. 37
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Case studies of consolidation attempts demonstrate that black
support for city-county mergers was basically situational. In unsuccessful merger attempts in St Louis, Cleveland, and Newark , blacks voted
overwhelmingly against the idea since black representation under the
existing city government was higher than it would have been under the
proposed consolidat ion government In cities where blacks supported
city-county merger, blacks either were not represented in the present
government or had minimal representation. Consequently , they felt
there was little chance of increased representation unles s some kind of
reform was instituted. It was explained earlier that Richmond blacks
had used a similar logic when they supported the 1948 charter change
from ward to at-large elections because the wards were gerrymandered
to insure that there would be no chance of a black' s winning ward
elections.
By the time the Richmond-Henrico consolidation issue came up for a
special vote in December of 1961 , the Richmond Crusade for Voters
had already begun formulating its political agenda for Richmond ' s
blacks. The new black profess ional class which founded the Crusade
had, in effect, staged a "double revolution" - one against the ministerled traditionalist group, the Richmond Civic Council, and the other
against the traditional black-white relationship in which the black
political leadership took its cues from the white leadership structure.
Now this well organized, highly educated, close-knit group was eager
to tackle more problems and demonstrate its political sophistication
and strength.
The Crusade, unlike the Civic Council, chose to participate in the
political process rather than merely engage in protest voting . This
meant that it had to enter alliances with white power brokers on certain
issues. In adopting this strategy the Crusade ran a grave risk: " [ The]
endorsement of a former white racist might lead some Negroes to label
them an ' Uncle Tom' or accommodationist leadership, thus undermining any prestige or influence they might have in the black
community." 38 This, in fact, was the case presented against the
Crusade years later by Curtis Holt after he failed to get the Crusade's
endorsement in an election he had lost On the other hand, the Crusade
reasoned that this possible negative reaction by the black community
could be offset by playing the political game and thus incurring
"political" debts which could be paid off with the enactment of
sympathetic legislation, the weakening of racial barriers and the
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procurement of better jobs in the city government 39 Using this logic, the
Crusade decided to support the Richmond-Henrico merger on several
conditions: The new consolidated government should include singlemember districts or wards rather than the at-large system; it should
retain the nine-member city council, as well as the city manager form of
government When it became clear to the Crusade that the most
important of these provisions was not going to be adopted, election of
council members by single-member district or ward elections, it decided
to oppose the consolidation effort since it knew that under at-large
elections the black vote would be greatly diluted and black political
leverage and participation greatly diminished Richmond city officials
sought to offset the arguments by blacks against the merger by appointing
five blacks to the steering committee of the Greater Richmond Committee
in July, 1961, but this did not reverse the black opposition to the merger
which was now viewed by the Crusade as an attempt to insure continued
white control in Richmond
When the votes were tallied for the consolidation referendum held on
December 12, 1961 , it was clear that the city was not able to persuade
the majority of Henrico voters to merge. County voters opposed the
merger 13,647 to 8,862. Only one district, Tuckahoe, voted in favor of
the merger. The City of Richmond supported the merger 15,051 to
6,700. 40 An analysis of voting precincts also showed that the city did not
convince its black citizens that consolidation was in their collective
political interest for 100 percent of the black voter precincts voted
overwhelmingly against the merger. Sixty-eight percent of the mixed
precincts voted against the merger, while 95. 7 percent of the white voter
precincts supported it Proconsolidation forces in the city, however, saw
a few bright spots in the county's response, namely the support which
was registered in Tuckahoe, the county's most affluent district 41 At least
these Henrico citizens, it was argued, recognized the long-standing
interdependence which existed between Richmond and the surrounding
counties and were willing to merge the two jurisdictions. Though this
argument kept the hopes of merger advocates alive and increased the
hopes for those wanting to annex the area, it was clear that the county as
a whole did not want merger and that the city would have to seek other
means to expand its boundaries.
Richmond's pro-merger vote delivered by its white voters meant
several things, not necessarily mutually exclusive. It meant that some
whites were now aware of the potential political threat posed by blacks
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and were now moving to offset that threat It meant that the subtle
racial messages had been received and the white elite were now acting
to preserve their special interests. The vote also demonstrated the
effectiveness of the "Crusade Machine" and its ease in getting its
message down to the precinct level on issues affecting blacks. Though
the black anti-merger vote was not enough to spell defeat for promerger forces in the city, it was another example to Richmond' s white
leadership of one of the grave consequences of black political power:
the inability of the white leadership to determine the policies and
direction of an independent black constituency. Silver noted that
Richmond's urban elite, however, did secure a victory from the merger
defeat they were able to forge a new consensus among Richmond's
white population on the elite' s perception of a "Greate r Richmond"
Whereas such projects in the 1950s as urban renewal and highway
construction had engendered much rancor and had caused splits among
whites, the merger attempt and the idea of a" Greater Richmond" were
less divisive.42
Henrico officials and those Henrico voters who opposed consolid&tion were elated over their victory. S. A Burnette, the Ch airman of the
Henrico Board of Supervisors who bitterly opposed the consolidation,
issued a conciliatory statement two days after the defeat of the
referendum He said that Henrico was "wide open so far as any
cooperation in support of the metropolitan area is concerned . . . [We]
would entertain any proposai but we are not in a position to instigate
one right now." 43 Acc<?rding to the Richmond Times-Dispatch,
Burnette had not squashed all future consolidation efforts, but merely
contended that "another and better consolidation plan was possible. " 44
Meanwhile a member of the Richmond Citizens Association ( RCA),
the organization that initiated the charter revision of 1948, probably
spoke for the pro-merger forces when he said that the anti-merger vote
showed that people had voted" with their hearts instead of their heads. " 4 5
Throughout the merger negotiations and the discussions leading up to
the December 12 vote, Richmond city officials kept an agenda that was
not so hidden. The city sought to convince county residents that
consolidation was the best option for Henrico. Failing a vote for
consolidation, Richmond officials had made it known that Richmond
would follow the annexation route.46 Indeed, just before the referendum, Richmond City Manager Horace H. Edwards advised Henricoans to vote for the merger lest they face a city-initiated annexation
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that would not require their consent According to several city and
county officials interviewed by the authors, while some county leaders
viewed the city threat as a bluff, practically all the leaders saw
Edwards' s efforts as counterproductive inasmuch as they created a
backlash among the county voters, thus increasing the number of
opposition votes to the consolidation. Nevertheless, as Edwards had
predicted, the city councii on December 26, 1961, passed two
annexation ordinances, one against Henrico County and one against
Chesterfield County .
The Henrico and Chesterfield Annexation Suits
With the defeat of the consolidation propos~ city officials thought it
best to move quickly with annexation. Thus, the day after the city
council passed the two annexation ordinances, the city filed the annexation suit against Henrico and asked the Virginia Surpreme Court of
Appeals to designate two judges to sit with one of the Henrico circuit
court judges on an annexation court 47 The following week a suit was
instituted against Chesterfield County. The city's speed in filing these
suits was prompted by the city's fears that the 1962 General Assembly
might enact legislation to make future annexations difficult City
officials thought that county members of the General Assembly might
make an effort to change the annexation laws in favor of counties. For
example, the Association of Virginia Counties favored a law that would
permit voters in the areas to be annexed to decide whether or not they
wanted to be annexed. This was in contrast to judicially determined
annexations. 48 Filing the suits under the existing annexation laws would
allow the city to gain its objectives without a long and protracted battle.
Also, city officials thought it better to proceed against Henrico and
Chesterfield simultaneously since its case in court might be hurt if it
tried to justify the annexation of adjacent land in Henrico without
including land from another adjoining area, Chesterfield The ordirr
ance directed at Henrico proposed to annex 152 square miles which
included a population of 115,000. This would leave Henrico with a land
area of only ninety square miles and a population of a little more than
two thousand By seeking such a large area from Henrico, Richmond
was actually seeking to acquire the entire county since "the latter area
[the ninety square miles] would hardly have sufficient population and
resources to support a county government and public schools." 49 The
city sought fifty-one square miles of Chesterfield County with a
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population of 40,000. By annexing territory from both counties, the
city's boundaries would expand from forty to 312 square miles and its
population increase from 219,000 to 376,000. With its increased square
miles, Richmond would become the sixth largest city in land area in
the country. ( The figures below depict Richmond's growth through
annexation )50
TABLE4
RICHMOND ANNEXATIONS , 1742-1942

Date

Population
Bef ore
Annexation

Area Annexed
(in Square
Miles)

Total Area
After
Annexa tion

1742
1769
1780
1793
1810
1867
1892
1906
1910
1914
1942

250
574
624
4,384
9,785
38,710
83,000
105,000
127,628
145,244
208,039

0.20
0.54
0.34
0.4 1
0.9 1
2.50
0.38
4.45
1.02
12.21
16.93

0.20
0.74
1.08
1.49
2.40
4.90
5.28
9.73
10.75
22.96
39.89

Source· The Richmond News Leader, June 10, 1959.

Richmond's annexation arguments were similar to its merger arguments, the chief among these being that a community of interest existed
between the city and its county suburbs. The annexation ordinances
declared that "Richmond must expand or decline." If the latter
occurred the entire metropolitan area would be affected since the city
was the community's economic, financial, cultural, educational, medical and recreational center. 51 Annexation, the ordinance continued,
would provide for a "political union" between the city and its suburbs,
and "present new opportunities for community progress." 52 Richmond
further contended that the counties could not economically and
adequately provide the necessary urban services. It cited the suburban
areas' dependence on Richmond for water and sewerage services. 53 The
city's annexation petition also cited the services in Richmond that were
crucial to the metropolitan area-city employment, postal facilities,
libraries, recreation facilities, parks, museums, hospitals, and cemeteries.
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The people in the territory designated for annexation, the city argued,
"make no substantial contribution to the cost of providing the municipal
services and the management and administrative functions necessary to
keep such institutions available for their weH-being, comfort, safety,
health, enjoyment and welfare." 54 Richmond's proposal to annex all of
Henrico county was unprecedented in Virginia's long tradition of
annexations. 55 While many of Richmond's administrative and legal
officials viewed the city's arguments as valid, many others, including
lawyers, were convinced that the annexation court would not permit
Richmond to annex an entire county.56 Henrico appealed to Richmond
to drop its annexation suit against it, but the city refused 57 The
Richmond business community, with the Chamber of Commerce and the
Central Richmond Association in the forefront, either sent letters to the
city council or appeared before the council in support of the annexation 58
Several council members opposed Richmond's annexation suit One
councilman, Robert C. Throckmorton, objected to what he considered
the" threatening manner in which the city was proceeding. " Comparing
Richmond's attempt to annex all of Henrico County to Indian Premier
Nehru's annexation of the Portuguese colony of Goa, he said: "We can't
pull a Nehru on the county." 59 He further contended that the city was
"seeking more territory than it could provide with municipal sevices." 60
As inadequate as county services may have been, Henrico was not then
over the barrel as it was when Richmond annexed portions of the county
in 1941. Then, when county residents complained about being annexed
Richmond simply "threatened to curtail public utilities and fire
protection " 61
Meanwhile, other legal manuevering took place. On January 30,
1962, W. Stirling King, a former Richmond mayor, filed a petition
before the state supreme court at the city's request, in a test case,
questioning whether Richmond was right in filing separate suits against
the counties or whether Richmond should have consolidated the suits.
Fearful that it might win the cases only to have them thrown out on
technical grounds, Richmond wanted the issue clarified before the case
went to court 62
The city was given some legislative encouragement when city officials
found out that the antiannexation legislation pending before the 1962
General Assembly "would be amended- if enacted at all-" so that the
city's suits against Henrico and Chesterfield counties would not be
affected The first bill would declare a tw(}-year moratorium on
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annexation pending a special study of the annexation issue; the second
bill would empower residents of the areas proposed for annexation to
approve or disapprove the annexation; the last bill would require the
annexing city to give conclusive proof that it could provide the area to
be annexed with the needed services. 6 3 These measures were all under
discussion in various committees , and there was talk that they might not
even emerge from their committees for consideratio n by the total
legislative body. In the meant ime, Richmond's annexa tion suit against
Chesterfield county was postponed on a motion by Ch esterfield
Commonwealth's Attorney Ernest Gate s. The postponement was
made in order to await the results of ·the King appeal which sought to
make a test case of the annexation procedure.64 Since the city had been
given assurances that it had nothing to fear from the annexation
legislation in the General Assembly, and since the Chesterfield circuit
court had postponed the Chesterfield suit, the city was in a position to
actively pursue the Henrico case while the Chesterfield case was on the
back burner. But each county was struggling to make sure tha t it would
not be the first to confront Richmond in the annexation court.
Chesterfield and Henrico filed separate appeals to the Virginia
Supreme Court of Appeals on March 12, 1962, but each used different
arguments to support its respective claims. In requesting the court to
force Richmond to proceed against the counties separately , Chesterfield
County officials believed that if Richmond succeeded in annexing
considerable territory from Henrico, the pressures on Chesterfield to
grant large land concessions to the city would abate. Lawyers for
Chesterfield also reasoned that Richmond, having annexed parts of
Henrico County, would find it difficult to prove that it needed yet more
land from Chesterfield County. 65 Since Richmond filed its annexation
suit against Henrico a week before it filed the suit against Chesterfield,
Chesterfield wanted the Henrico case to be the first on the docket
Henrico argued that the question of the single versus the consolidated
annexation suit should first go to the three judge annexation court, and,
therefore, sought to get the case dismissed on procedural grounds.66
Were this to happen, Richmond, according to Virginia's annexation law,
would be prohibited from resuming an annexation suit against Henrico
for five years. On June 11, 1962, the Virginia Surpreme Court rejected
the Henrico County petition which asked that both annexation cases be
dropped because of improper procedures. 67
The Henrico annexation trials convened in June, 1963. After ten
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months of arguments by each side the annexation court finally reached
a verdict The city's request for 152 square miles of the county was
denied. Instead, Richmond was awarded seventeen square miles and
45,000 people (98.5 percent of whom was white). 68 The land won by
Richmond did not include as much undeveloped and commercial land
as the city cited for its present and future needs. The city filed an appeal
to enlarge the area given in the award, but this motion was denied by the
annexation court 69 Ironically , the Richmond officials waited more than
a year before deciding to reject the award which they did on March 8,
1965 . In the meantime, the fact that the city received less than it
requested shifted the battleground to Chesterfield Chesterfield officials
reacted to the Henrico decision with some dismay, though they began
to refocus their arguments as a result of the Henrico award 70 Some
believed that Chesterfield County had a better case in fighting annexation by the city and they cited the differences between their county and
Henrico : Chesterfield had always been a more self-sustaining county,
less dependent upon the services of Richmond than Henrico. These
officials knew that they could not keep Richmond at bay forever. What
they really sought was more breathing space to enable them to sharpen
their arguments against the city.71
Municipal Elections 1960-1964
The Crusade had to contend with the major white political organization
that had long dominated electoral politics, the Richmond Citizens
Association ( RCA), the group that had played the leading role in the
charter reform movement of the late 1940s . Though there were other
groups such as the Harmony Efficiency Progress ( HEP) Organization
and the Civic Economy Association ( CEA), the Richmond Citizens
Association clearly exerted the primary influence in Richmond's
councilmanic elections. By the June 14, 1960 , election, there were
some 13,000 registered black voters in the city. 72 In an effort to
ascertain how council candidates felt about some issues vital to blacks,
the Crusade sent each candidate an eight-part questionnaire . Only one
of the twenty- two candidates for the nine council seats, Howard H.
Carwile, refused to answer the questionnaire .73 This refusal was strange
in light of the endorsements he had received from blacks in previous
elections. Most of the candidates approached the questions with
caution. One, Chandler A. Simpson, Jr., a member of the HEP ticket
responded to the Crusade's inquiry regarding a biracial commission to
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handle problems between blacks and whites by saying that he would be
in favor of such a commission if he could be assured that blacks would
approach the problems " fairly and intelligently, giving due consideration
to the full impact of recent decisions of the United States Supreme
Court on the civilization and culture of the people of Richmond and
Virginia" 74 Though there were no black candidates running for city
counciL the Crusade had agreed to recommend a full slate of nine white
candidates rather than continue its previous policy of using " the singleshot approach." The Crusade believed that the" single-shot," in which
blacks would be asked to vote for only one person, did not permit blacks
to play "balance of power'' politics. Even if nine thousand blacks cast
their votes for any one candidate, that would not be sufficient to elect
the candidate since a minimum of 14,000 votes was necessary for
election However, reasoned the Crusade, if these nine thousand votes
were cast for nine candidates ( each of whom got a minimum of five
thousand votes from whites), the nine thousand votes cast by blacks
would be decisive and act as a balance of power. Likewise, if all nine
thousand black votes were cast for the same nine candidates in a field of
twenty- two candidates, it would put these candidates ahead of the
thirteen others. 75
The Crusade's "full slate" strategy paid off at the polls. By playing
"balance of power'' politics, it was able to elect seven city council
candidates and to unseat two incumbents who had received unfavorable
ratings from the group. 76 The Richmond Afro-American noted that of
the three major groups which had recommended a slate of candidates,
the Crusade, the Richmond Citizen Association(RCA), and HarmonyEconomy-Progress (HEP), the Crusade received a .777 " batting
average" since seven of its nine candidates were elected; RCA received
a .666 average because six of its nine slate of candidates were elected;
and HEP acquired a .250 rating inasmuch as only two of its eight
candidates were elected 77 Opposition to the Crusade's slate emerged
from a group of black Richmonders. Calling their group the Human
Rights Crusade, four ministers and two physicians sought to influence
blacks to revert to the "one- shot vote" in order to elect Howard
Carwile who, because he refused to respond to the questionnaire sent
out by the Crusade for Voters, was not given its endorsement 78
Carwile was defeated
The 1960 election results clearly revealed the power of blacks at the
ballot Likewise, it demonstrated how a highly organized well-disciplined organization could effectively channel the black vote and thus

Post-World War II Richmond

47

.increase black political leverage in municipal elections.79 The Crusade's
awareness of its importance in Richmond electoral politics was
expressed by its president, then George A Pannell:
We . . . would like to thank the many organizations and individuals . . .
[who) made it possible for us to be a more potent force in our city
government The mere fact that seven of the nine persons recommended
by the Research Committee [of the Crusade] were elected is a high
tribute to all concerned The riddance of two of the foes of the Negro in
Richmond is a step in the direction of harmony. There were no deals
made with other organizations or individuals ... we shall not be deterred
by the theory that we are divided in our aims for first class citizenship....
Let those who say we are divided and are trying to divide us at the same
time-take heed The colored voters of today will not be long fooled by
anyone.80

On the eve of the June, 1962, councilmanic election, there were
some 11,000 black voters. When one of the councilmen supported the
Crusade's fair employment practices resolution presented before the
city council in May, 1962, he was accused of doing so to curry the
favor of the black vote. His response was: "Ninety thousand of our
citizens are Negroes, and we can only be fair with them as we are with
other citizens." 81 Such discussions were the order of the day as the
black vote became a potent force that could neither be denied nor
circumvented Prior to the 1962 councilmanic elections, the Crusade
made its concerns known. It announced support of ( 1) a compulsory
school attendance ordinance, (2) a local pupil assignment plan that
would divorce the Richmond School Board from the state Pupil
Placement Board, ( 3) a $1.15 minimum hourly wage, and ( 4) a change
in the term for which council members are elected from two to four
years. 82 The Crusade's role in electoral politics was recognized by its
friends and foes, but white politicians were wary of openly soliciting the
black vote. One commentor noted that whereas none of the white
political organizations would publicly seek the black vote because of
the possible reaction of white voters, "each accuses the other of making
secret deals with Negro political leaders." 83 The Crusade's petition to
the city council for equal job opportunities for blacks and its list of four
concerns were not the only areas that received its attention. It continued
to express its disapproval of any city-county merger plan that did not
assure the election of at least one black to the council of the consolidated
city. Likewise, it opposed the city's attempt to annex surrounding
84
county areas for fear that the black vote would be diluted
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Two blacks, Clarence Newsome, an attorney, and Mrs. Esther
Smith, a housewife, were among the twenty-five candidates who ran for
city council in 1962. Both lost, however. Only Newsome had the
support of the Crusade. Newsome's eleventh place position for one of
the nine council seats was attributed by the Richmond Afro-American
to the light voter tum-out which was partially blamed on the rain. 85 The
Crusade suffered only two losses in this election in that two of its nine
endorsees went down to defeat Even with these losses, however, the
Crusade was able to repeat its 1960s winning electoral rating of .777.
Three blacks entered the race for the 1964 council election. Two of
them, Ronald Charity and Nev erett Eggleston, Jr., ran on the slate of a
new black organization, The Voter's Voice. The third, B. A. Cephas ,
Jr., was endorsed by Richmond Forward and, unlike the other two, also
by the Crusade. By 1964, the Richmond Citizens Association ( RCA)
had disbanded and a new political organization, Richmond Forward,
(RF), had been formed Many whites, including vice-mayor Phil Bagley
and councilman Robert Heberl e, viewed the group as" anti-democratic
and controlled " Bagley said that the candidates put forward by the
group for the 1964 city elections were inexperienced and thus
susceptible to "political manipulation of the string pullers who think
Richmond begins and ends at Sixth and Broad Streets ." 86 There was
much infighting among white city officials as to the status of Richmond
Forward Many accused the organization of acting lil,cea political party
in that it was attempting to control city government through the election
of its candidates to office. This, critics said, was in violation of the 1948
city charter which banned political parties from participation in the
election of city councilmen. 87
The Crusade was also subjected to criticism from some blacks. Two
of the three losing black candidates for council seats, Eggleston and
Charity, attacked the Crusade for "working hand-in-glove with RF."
They accused the group of sacrificing two council incumbents, Herrink
and Smithers, on the altar of expediency. Also, the Crusade was
warned by a local black minister that other black organizations were
rising to challenge its power. 88 The Crusade was subjected to heavy
criticism from predominately black groups because it failed to back all of
the black candidates. Under the umbrella of the West End Council of
Leagues these groups included the Leagues of the 19th and 24th
precincts, the West End Improvement League, the West End Nonpartisan League, the Randolph Street Neighborhood Organization,
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and the PTA units of Amelia, Randolph, Maymont, and West End
Schools. 89 The Crusade had been aware of the challenge and kept
urging black voters to" keep our vote solid This is the only way we can
have political influence. Solidarity is more important than one election
or any candidate. We can always vote out a bad candidate, but we can't
do this if we don't keep our solidarity." 90
The Crusade again proved its strength at the polls in the 1964
elections. Eight of the nine persons on the Crusade's slate won council
seats. 91 The Richmond evening newspaper had seen the Crusade as
"the balance of power" in the campaign, and noted that all citizens
were eager to know the Crusade's slate. 92 After the election results were
known, the same press viewed the winners as the combination of dual
efforts by the "better-to-do white business community, centered in the
West End, and the Negro leadership." 93 It was also conceded that the
Crusade played a major role in determining the outcome of the
elections. Moreover, the election of B. A Cephas, a black real tor, was
viewed by a few whites as ushering in a new era of good relations
between the races. He was to be the first black to sit on city council
since Oliver Hill won election in 1948.
The annexation question had not been discussed publicly during the
1964 councilmanic election, but it was deemed important by a majority
of council candidates. The League of Women Voters sent a questionnaire to all twenty-one candidates prior to the June election. All seven
incumbents seeking reelection cited boundary expansion as the most
important issue facing city council in 1964. Five others mentioned
decisions and problems stemming from the Henrico annexation court's
decision to award seventeen square miles to Richmond and how such a
small award might pose a handicap to the city. 94

III
Action/Reaction:
Annexation and the Struggle for Power
Section 1.
The Chesterfield Drama and the Role of the Commonwealth
The year 1965 was one of transition. Richmond declined the award of
the Henrico annexation court that year, and the Chesterfield suit, which
had been held in abeyance while the city pressed its case against
Henrico, was activated the same year. The year was transitional in still
another sense. Since the inception of the annexation moves in 1961, the
dominant reasons for boundary expansion were largely economic,
administrative, and physical in nature, not that race was unimportant
Race was a factor, but it was clearly subordinate to the other factors. In
1965, however, the rationale for annexation, at least privately among
some politicians, began to change. Publicly, the city administrators and
planners continued to justify annexation on the basis of the city's lack of
vacant land, its declining tax base, and the rising costs of service
delivery. Yet, other city officials and some leaders in the business
community also began to view annexation as an effective tool for
maintaining the political status quo. One city official, not wanting to be
identified, noted in an interview that in 1965 "you could feel a political
change." 1 His comment was prompted by a request he received that
year from a member of the city council to prepare a "projection on
when the city would become fifty percent black." That request was not
an isolated incident It came the same year in which a series of highly
confidential meetings were initiated involving representatives from
Richmond and Chesterfield and during which increasing attention was
given to the city's changing population. In short, 1965 can well be
viewed as a turning point both in terms of the target of the annexation
50
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suits and the rationale for the annexations. In regard to the latter, the
race factor did not become paramount in the minds of some city
officials until after two very racially bitter council campaigns in 1966
and 1968; however, by 1965 race had ceased to be a peripheral issue.
Rejection of the Henrico Annexation Court A ward
In early 1965, Richmond and Henrico were at loggerheads over the
financial terms of the Henrico annexation court's 1964 decision
permitting the city to acquire seventeen square miles and approximately
45,000 people from the county. On January 20, 1965, the court arrived
at a compromise figure of $42 million. The $42 million included over
$12 million Richmond would have to pay Henrico for public improvements in the area to be annexed, about $15 million required of the city
over a five-year period to compensate the county for its loss of tax
revenue, and almost $15 million of the county's debt which the city
would have to assume. In addition, the court ruled that to accept the
award the city would have to initiate a five-year capital improvement
program in the annexed area that would cost over $13 million. In
summary, the bill for the annexation amounted to $55 million. 2
The city was in a bind If it rejected the award, state law prohibited it
from instituting another annexation suit against Henrico county for an
additional five years. That would be deferring gratification for too long a
period, during which time unforeseen circumstances might arise which
could make the need for boundary expansion even more pressing. Also,
by rejecting the award, the city would be responsible for paying the total
legal costs of the case, including those of the county's. Appealing the
decision to the Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals might result in a
reduction of the financial settlement, but it would also, in all likelihood,
delay the effective date of annexation from January 1, 1966, to January
1, 1967, since under state law annexations are effective at midnight on
December 31 of the year in which the order is finally issued Consequently, according to an editorial writer for the Richmond TimesDispatch, "for an additional year, Richmond would be without the tax
revenue from the 17-square mile area and without the talents and brains
of the 45,000 residents of that area" 3 Worse yet, as subsequent news
stories pointed out, the state supreme court could prescribe terms less
attractive than those of the annexation court 4 Under existing laws
governing annexation appeals, if the appeal were accepted by the high
court after the lower court issued a final order, the appealingjurisdiction
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had to accept the verdict of the supreme court with no option to reject 5
This prospect, plus the doubt over what gains, if any, the city might
achieve from an appeal, also prompted the city's annexation lawyers to
advise against such a move.
In many respects, the Times-Dispatch editorial echoed the sentiment
of many city officials. They, too, thought the $55 million bill was too
high In addition, they believed the seventeen square mile award itself
was inadequate, particularly given the fact that( 1) Richmond had sought
151 square miles of Henrico ( which represented about 62 percent of the
county) and (2) even indicated that it would accept the whole county if
the court awarded it To add insult to injury, the area contained
insufficient developable vacant land, one of the major reasons underlying the city council's 1961 initiative to seek annexation. Indeed , the
city administrators pointed out that only 10 percent of Richmond's land
was vacant and that the acquisition of the annexed area would have
increased the amount of vacant land to only about 13 percent 5 • Still
another obstacle was the city charter. Even if city officials had been
predisposed to accept the award, they would have had to overcome a
charter provision which prohibited the city from borrowing money to pay
the costs associated with annexation. Consequently, only money from
general revenues could be used and the costs of the Henrico award far
exceeded the funds available in the city's operating budget. ( In interviews with the authors, many of Richmond's leaders note that the charter
provision was not a stumbling block, that the city could have gotten the
money had it wanted to accept the award. Moreover, they indicated in
the interviews, as some did earlier in a federal district court, that had the
city sought in 1965 to annex white citizens of Henrico in an effort to
dilute city black votes, it would have accepted the Henrico award. Yet,
none of those interviewed explained how the city could have financed the
annexation without the power to float bonds. Raising taxes would have
· been politically infeasible. What is a matter of record, however, is that
later in its efforts to annex 50,000 from Chesterfield County, the city was
successful in guiding legislation through the Virginia General Assemby
enabling the city to float bonds" to defray the costs in the extension of the
boundaries of the city.") 5 b In addition to the problems of costs, lack of
vacant land, and charter restrictions, there was still another. Some
advisors argued that accepting the award would damage the city's case in
the Chesterfield suit, which had been put aside during the Henrico
hearings, and that the city should drop the Henrico award and pursue the
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.objective of acquiring a more favorable award from the Chesterfield
court Otherwise, accepting the Henrico award might prejudice the
Chesterfield court such that it, too, would grant a small award or else
none at all.
While many Richmond opinion makers agreed with the TimesDispatch that the price of the award was excessive, other individuals or
organizations ( such as members of the city council, City Manager
Horace H. Edwards, and even the afternoon newspaper, the Richmond
News Leader) did not share the position of the morning paper that
acceptance of the award was more desirable than the other two options.
The News Leader ran an editorial which argued that rejection was "the
best of the poor choices." 5c
On February 1, the same day as the News Leader editoriai the
Richmond city council unanimously agreed to reject the award After the
council meeting, Mayor Morrill M Crowe noted simply that "the
prevailing opinion was that the acreage awarded is not sufficient to justify
the price. " 6 Edwards used stronger language, commenting that to have
accepted the area would have been" an unconscionable thing to do." He
pointed out that newly annexed citizens would have been paying twice
for facilities and programs since as county residents they helped finance
those projects and as city residents they would be taxed to support the
city's payments to the county. 7, 7 •
In regard to the purpose of the Henrico annexation, insufficient
evidence of racial motive precludes one from associating that factor with
the annexation. Nevertheless, reporter Charles Houston did make one
telling statement Fallowing his observation that ( according to the
recollection of the lawyers) the rejection was the first one in a major suit
since 1902 when the revised state constitution called for judicial
determination of annexations, Houston also noted that the rejection
could lead to state action since:
City officials have disclosed no plans for future action, but feels
confident that the General Assembly will not allow the Capital City to be
eternally thwarted in its efforts to procure room to grow in.
The city has been losing population since the 1960 census, and the
proportion of Negro residents has increased substantially while the city 's
growth has taken place in the open areas beyond the boundaries. [ italics
added]8

In addition, the city official who had been asked to prepare a projection
on when the city would become 50 percent black noted privately in a
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March 1981 interview that if he had undertaken the projection before
would have annexed the seventeen square miles from Henrico.
Chesterfield County Annexation Suit Activated
Having refused the Henrico award, .the city turned to Chesterfield
County. Initially, the city sought to settle the case amicably, through
compromise, and thereby avoid an annexation court hearing. Barring
success at the negotiating table, however, the city was prepared to
activate its suit against the county and resolve the annexation question
through the courts. Accordingly, the city pursued both these routes.
Soon after the council rejected the Henrico award and before the
Chesterfield suit was officially activated, a few city representatives met
privately with some Chesterfield County officials in an effort to arrange a
peaceful settlement of the annexat ion issue. Andrew J. Brent, an
influential attorney who practiced law in the city, but who lived in
Henrico County, served as the mediator between the two jurisdictions.
Mayor Morrill M. Crowe and City Manager Edwards ( a former
Richmond mayor and city attorney) represented the city. The county
representatives were Irvin G. Horner and Melvin W. Burnett, the
Chairman of the Chesterfield Board of Supervisors and the Board's
Executive Secretary, respectively. In 1965, Horner had served seventeen years as the Clover Hill district representative on the board ( twelve
years as Board Chairman) . He retained a seat on the board until 1975
when he was defeated Burnett had served as Executive Secretary to the
Board since 1949 ( he retired in 1976 after twenty-seven years as the
county's top administrator). His reputation for having an encyclopedic
knowledge of the county's political labyrinths was widely established as
was his penchant for taking detailed and voluminous notes of the scores
of private meetings he attended
As Burnett recalled, the meeting "was more or less an exploratory
situation. They [the city representatives] wanted to see if we [Chesterfield representatives] were possibly in the mood to negotiate a settlement, more like a feeler type of meeting. " 9 The thrust of the testimony
taken several years later in federal court where the constitutionality of
the annexation was challenged was that the primary concern of the city
officials at the Brent meeting was people. The exchange between Burnett
and the plaintiffs attorney was particularly revealing:
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Question: What was the emphasis of the conference?
Answer: It was always people, the number of people.
Question: How much discussion was centered around land and
economics?
Answer: Very little, actually . . . Mr. Horner and I would talk about
schools and land, vacant land, for expansion, but Mr. Edwards
and Mr. Crowe would always come back eventually to the
number of people they needed
Question: What was significant about that, so I will get it straight, as
you understood it?
Answer: Well, it was common knowledge, Your Honor, that the City
of Richmond was going black.
Question: When you talk about people, you are talking about race?
Answer: Yes. It was common knowledge they were going black. The
city realized this. We realized it They claimed they had to
have people from Chesterfield to offset the growing black race
in the city. This was the basis of their negotiations as far as I
am concerned 10

Homer also testified about the meeting and simply noted who
attended and where the discussion occurred Beyond commenting that
the meeting was exploratory, Homer said little. Edwards, Crowe, and
Brent did not testify. (Edwards was one of the attorneys representing
the city in the federal courts following the annexation, a subject treated
in more detail in chapter 4.) Edwards could not recall the discussion at
the Brent meeting. Crowe, while recalling the meeting, did not
remember any mention of race per se in the negotiations, but did state
his concern that the city needed a better citizen mix.11 Speaking
generally about the need for annexation and not specifically about the
meeting, Crowe made the following comment
I expressed myself often when I was mayor that we did not have a proper
citizen mix for economic value in the community. Being an old core city,
we had a predominance of poor people who required, and properly so,
more municipal services than their taxes would pay for, plus some rich,
middle class people .... In our discussions, race was a very minor factor.
I say race in the sense that poor people were a factor. Now the fact that
most of the black citizens, or a much higher percentage of the black
citizens, were poor, you would have a right to say that race entered into it
because it, poverty, fell more heavily in the black community and, of
course, we were attempting to overcome a predominance of poverty
stricken people.12
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Andrew Brent, in a March 6, 1981, interview with one of the authors,
placed the emphasis of the meeting on still another subject Noting that
if the federal courts had asked him to testify about "thos e discussions
out there" [the meeting took place in a guest cottage behind Brent' s
home], he would have said that he "never heard the race issue raised
once. Never! It was primarily tax revenues and land that would be
available to create tax revenues and services, the kind of thing you would
expect to go in that kind of discussion."
The interpreta tion of what happened at the private session varied
among the participants . Wh at is clear, however, is that efforts were
undertaken to settle the Chesterfield annexation through private negotiation. Inasmuch as the county, to quote Horner , " naturally did not
want to give up anything," 1 3 the meeting, as did one other that summer
( also at Brent's home), ended without the jurisdictional differences
being resolved
In 1965, City Manager Edwards had requested the preparation of a
map, perhaps in conjunction with the Brent negotiations, which outlined
a compromise target area. Known as "the green line map," inasmuch
as George R Talcott (Richmond's Boundary Expansio n Coordina tor)
had used a green pen in demarcating the suggested compromise zone,
the map was available for the two meetings, but how much attention, if
any, was given to the map cannot be ascertained either from court
records or from interviews. 14
Given the city's willingness to resort to legal action, it was not
surprising that when the first negotiation effort proved unsuccessfu4 the
city council on July 19, 1965, voted unanimously to activate immediately the city's annexation suit against Chesterfield County .15 The
county responded quickly, stating its intention to fight the city by using
all possible means to delay or dismiss the case. The annexation court
itself ( consisting of Chief Judge William Old, Circuit Court Judge from
Chesterfield County, Circuit Judge Elliott Marshall of Front Roya4 and
Circuit Court Judge Vincent L. Sexton, Jr., of Bluefield) faced a
problem of docketing the case before the spring of 1966 since each of
the circuit court judges had full court calendars.
The Dismissal of the Chesterfield Suit
Almost four months after the council action, the annexation court held
its first session on November 6, 1965, to discuss dates and procedures
for trying the case. As expected, at the pretrial session Chesterfield
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County asked the court to dismiss the case. The county's lawyers
claimed that the ordinance passed by city council did not comply with
the provisions of the Virginia code in that the area sought for annexation
had not been properly described in terms of metes and bounds and that
the future uses of land in the area had not been properly established 16
Chesterfield's motion to dismiss the case was viewed as an action that
Virginia counties generally take in their defense. Indeed, Henrico
county had filed a similar motion before the Henrico annexation court
in 1962 and had used essentially the same arguments; namely, that the
city had not properly described the boundaries of the target area But in
the Henrico suit, the motion was denied Such was not the case in the
Chesterfield annexation, however.
On November 27, after hearing the arguments for and against
Chesterfield's motion, two of the three judges ( Judges Old and Sexton)
voted to accede to the county's request to dismiss the annexation suit
The annexation court ruled that Richmond "had made substantial
compliance" with code provisions requiring annexation ordinances to
describe the target area in metes and bounds . On the issue of future land
uses, however, the court opined that because the city had failed "to
state any possible future uses of the area, the city did not comply with
the mandatory requirements of the statute." 17 As a consequence, the
court asserted that it did not have jurisdiction in the case and, therefore,
had" no alternative other than to sustain the motion of the county and
dismiss the proceedings."
The dismissal of the suit was a serious blow to the city, prompting
one of the local state legislators, Delegate T. Coleman Andrews, Jr., to
suggest that, given the representation of urban areas in the General
Assembly due to reapportionment, the time was ripe for changing the
state's "antiquated annexation laws" since "the law is being used to
hamper the logical expansion of Virginia's cities." 18 Andrews's comments reflected the sentiments of most city leaders, but changing state
annexation laws would take time and the city had an immediate
problem on its hands-how to overcome the latest obstacle thrown up
by the annexation court Should the city appeal the decision to the
Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals, or, assuming that it was legally
permissible, should it institute a new suit against Chesterfield which
would target a larger area for annexation than that outlined in the
original suit? Pursuing the latter option depended on whether the state
law prescribing a five year waiting period before a city could institute a
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second suit against the same county was applicable in the Richmond/ Chesterfield situation. Lawyers for the city argued that the law
did not apply. They reasoned that since the court dismissed the case
due to a faulty annexation ordinance, and since the initiation of
annexation proceedings requires a legally correct ordinance, the city
was prevented from instituting annexation proceedings against Chesterfield and, therefore, not subject to the five year waiting period.
Given this opinion of the city's special annexation counsel, David J.
Mays and John S. Davenport, III, city council authorized the city attorney
to draw up a new annexation ordinance that did not include the flaw the
court noted in the initial ordinance . Before council could act on a new
ordinance, however, it had to wait on the annexation court to issue a final
order dismissing the suit-an order"properly'' worded which, in essence ,
declared that Richmond never officially instituted annexation proceedings
against Chesterfield since the city's annexation ordinance was faulty.
Judge Old had asked Chesterfield's chief defense lawyer, Commonwealth's Attorney Ernest P. Gates, to prepare the court's final order.
Naturally, this move triggered a new debate between the two jurisdictions
over the wording of the order. Unless the order were worded favorably,
Richmond would have to wait five years before instituting another
annexation suit against Chesterfield 19 Chesterfield, hoping to block the
city from instituting a new suit, wanted an order which stated that the
annexation proceeding was dismissed; whereas, the city held that the
court in its opinion ofNovember6, 1965, asserted that the court did not
have jurisdiction in the case and ordered that the annexation proceeding
be removed from the docket Several weeks lapsed before Richmond and
Chesterfield were able to agree on the wording. Through a compromise
that enabled the county to keep its word "dismissed" and enabled the
city to retain its position that the court removed the proceeding from the
docket, the adversaries suggested the following wording for the final
order: that the annexation proceeding "be dismissed and stricken from
the docket of this court" Whether this exercise in legal semantics
would accomplish the objectives of the city would be known only if the
city attempted to institute another suit against the county. Only then
could the city's interpretation of the Virginia code in light of the city's
understanding of the court's ruling be tested
The disagreement over the wording of the final order was only part of
the problem. Disagreement also ensued over the question of who would
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pay for the costs associated with the annexation proceedings. The city
argued that the court did not have jurisdiction to levy costs; the county
disagreed The city was fearful that if the court, because it had
dismissed the city's suit, mandated that the city pay the costs then the
city's attempt to immediately institute a new suit against the county
would be damaged since payment would suggest that annexation
proceedings had been instituted 20
Finally, on March 25, 1966, almost four months after the court
dismissed the suit, the court issued its final order. The order incorporated the compromise language that the proceeding "be dismissed and
stricken from the docket ... ," but added the phrase, "at the cost of the
City of Richmond .... 21 Now that the final order was in, the city had to
make a decision about its intentions. Not wanting to abandon its
annexation efforts, the city still retained the option of appealing the
court's decision or perhaps levying a second annexation suit against
Chesterfield The latter alternative, however, was a gamble inasmuch as
the compromise language of the final order and the fact that the city had
to pay the costs of the annexation proceedings placed Richmond in a
position vulnerable to attack from the county. Chesterfield officials had
already indicated their intent to challenge an attempt by the city to
institute new annexation proceedings. The county argument was simply
that the city, having initiated one annexation suit against Chesterfield,
would have to wait five years before moving to initiate a second suit
Appealing the annexation court's decisions also involved some risk.
The Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals might not accept the appeal or,
if it did, might simply affirm the decision of the lower court
Richmond took some comfort in the knowledge that the law of
averages was on its side. It was common for counties to move for the
dismissal of annexation proceedings on technical grounds, but it was
not common for the motions to be granted As noted earlier, Henrico
had undertaken an unsuccessful effort to squash Richmond's suit on
grounds similar to Chesterfield's 1965 dismissal motion. Of greater
importance was the fact that the decision by the Chesterfield annexation
court to approve the county's dismissal motion was not unanimous.
Judge Marshall had dissented and even wrote a dissenting opinion. In
short, the city was coming more to the position that it could successfully
appeal the decision of the court and that this alternative was less of a
gamble than the one involving a new suit
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Accordingly, on May 20, Richmond filed notice of appeal, with the
thrust of the appeal based largely on the argument outlined by Judge
Marshall in his dissenting opinion Two months later, the city's petition
of appeal was submitted to the clerk of the State Supreme Court of
Appeals. It was to be another three months during the October session of
the state supreme court before Richmond would know whether the high
court would accept the case. 22 Having done all it could legally to
continue its case against Chesterfield, the city had no choice but to
wait
Meanwhile, the local political environment was continuing to change.
It was becoming clearer that these changes were leading to the erosion
of the city's traditional power base and that nothing short of expanding
the base to include additional population was necessary to ensure the
continuity of the existing political leadership.
The 1966 Councilmanic Election
The most drastic change to occur since the poll tax was eliminated for
federal elections was that which came through a U.S. Supreme Court
decision Less than three months prior to the 1966 city council election,
the nation's high court ruled in Harper v. Virginia Board of Electors
that the state poll tax for state and local elections was unconstitutional. 23
The fears that the establishment whites had expressed after the
ratification of the Twenty-fourth Amendment were now becoming hard
realities, namely, the local rules of the game were changing such that
larger numbers of blacks who traditionally had been excluded from
participating in the political process were now faced with fewer
impediments.
The 1966 councilmanic election proved to be laden with racial
overtones. The polite references to race, characteristic of previous
elections, were quickly abandoned as the tension between Richmond
Forward and the Crusade for Voters increased After all, the black
population was continuing to grow and it was estimated that in 1966
blacks represented 48 percent of the population Only two years earlier,
blacks constituted 46 percent of the city's population. 24 Furthermore,
the number of black voter registrations swelled In 1964, 18,161 blacks
were registered to vote. By 1966, however, the number grew to
29,970-a 65 percent increase! White registrations during this two
year period rose from 52,179 to 58,827-only a 13 percent increase .
Put more dramatically, the proportion of black registered voters
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expanded from a little over one-fourth of the total number of registered
voters in 1964 to over a third in 1966. 25 It was obvious that while black
voting strength was not proportionate to the black population in the city,
it was increasing at a significant rate. Much, if not most, of the augmentation of black registrations could be attributed to the Supreme Court
decision, but the federal enforcement in Virginia of the Voting Rights Act
( enacted a year earlier in 1965), and the 1966 spring registration drive of
the Crusade for Voters, were also key factors. The Crusade, particularly
with its precinct-based organization, was proving most effective in
mobilizing the_!,lack community.
The Richmond establishment began preparing for the 1966 election
as early as the fall of 1965. The Legislative Committee of the
Richmond City Councii consisting of Henry R. Miller, III, Eleanor P.
Sheppard, and James C. Wheat, Jr., recommended a change in the
charter to replace the system of electing nine members of the council for
two year terms with a system of staggered terms. According to the plan,
the four candidates in the 1966 election receiving the highest number
of votes would serve four years and the five candidates with the next
highest votes would serve two years. From 1968, the five vacant seats
would be filled with the four candidates receiving the most votes serving
four years and the candidate placing fifth serving two years. 26 The
public rationale for the plan was that it would provide continuity on the
legislative body by having a mixture of newcomers and experienced
legislators each two years. Obviously, however, by having at-large
representation and reducing the vacancies on council from nine to five,
the proposed arrangement would better enable Richmond Forward to
retain control and, by the same token, make it more difficult for blacks
to acquire control
The committee's plan was adopted by city council on December 13,
1965, by a narrow five to four majority. Support for the plan was
registered by the Richmond Chamber of Commerce, the Richmond
Jaycees, the Richmond-First Club, and the Richmond Federation of
Parent-Teacher Associations. 27 Both the Times-Dispatch and News
Leader endorsed the idea in their editorials. 28 The black commnity,
viewing the plan as a technique to counter the rising black population
and its growing electoral power, opposed the plan. The Crusade for
-'
Voters, the NAACP, the Richmond Afro-American, even the People's '
Political and Civic League ( a conservative organization oriented toward
the Byrd machine) took a dim view of the proposal. 29
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Once the council endorsed the plan, the state legislature had to act on
the matter since legislative approval is necessary for charter revisions.
Normally, when a local delegation to the Virginia General Assembly is
solidly behind a local measure, the legislature defers to that delegation's
judgment and proceeds to grant the enabling legislation. In this case,
however, the delegation was not united The Richmond News Leader
ran an editorial on the subject and stated that the local members of the
Virginia House of Delegates "are balking, and ducking and bobbing
and weaving at the prospect of seeking enactment" of the bill since they
"fear retaliation from the city's Negro voters if they endorse the fouryear plan." 30 Another reason for the hesitance of the local delegation to
endorse the plan was that Richmond's eight members of the House also
represented Henrico County. Owing their election in large part to
constituents in the county who opposed merger with Richmond, and
perceiving the staggered term idea as an eventual aid in merger since
members of the Henrico County were elected for four year terms, they
were naturally concerned about being identified with any bill that might
damage their political future.
The strongest opponent in the House was Delegate J. Sargeant
Reynolds, a young liberal Democrat, son of Richard S. Reynolds, Jr.,
and heir to the aluminum empire. He sought a compromise and was
successful in getting majority support in the body for legislation that
would allow Richmond to hold a referendum on the proposed amendment Richmond Forward leaders were furious with Reyno lds.31 They
wanted the legislature to amend the charter without recourse to a
referendum 32 Reynolds, however, correctly sensed the political and
social climate and wrote a letter to the editor of the News Leader,
commenting that, if nothing else, the issue of staggered terms" brought to
the surface what may become a tragic lack of trust between the white
and Negro leadership of this city." 33 Perley A. Covey, an independent
candidate for city council and an endorsee of the Crusade for Voters,
noted during a candidates night sponsored by the North Side Civic
Association, a black neighborhood organization, that actually he was
the one who originated the idea for a referendum and he urged Delegate
Junie L. Bradshaw to push for it in the General Assembly. He also
pointed out that "Richmond Forward did everything they could to keep
you from having the right to vote." 34 While it is difficult to clearly
identify the one most responsible for the referendum, it is easy to
identify the group not responsible-Richmond Forward Nevertheless,
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once the bill calling for the referendum cleared the legislature and was
signed by the governor, candidates endorsed by Richmond Forward
lost little time in urging citizens to support staggered terms and, in
accordance with the provisions of the act, city councii on May 9,
passed a resolution requesting Hustings Court to schedule a referendum
for June 14 on the question: "Shall the members of the City Council
serve staggered terms?" 35 Richmond Forward itself, on June 4, ten
days before the councilmanic election, also formally embraced the
proposed amendment with RF President Carlton P. Moffatt, Jr.,
urging voters "to approve this charter amendment for staggered terms
on June 14." 36 The staggered term proposal officially became a part of
the ballot only after the Hustings Court authorized the referendum,
though no one seriously doubted that the court would rule otherwise.
The proposal was treated as a major issue throughout the councilmanic
campaign An NAACP attorney and Crusade candidate for city
councii Henry L. Marsh, III, asserted in a Crusade meeting that "this
is the most important election we've ever faced It takes a lot of nerve
for the RF candidates to tell us we should have four-year terms and that
we should elect their nine candidates; they are actively trying to put our
government into the hands of a small group.. .. " 37 Earlier when
speaking before council in December and before he declared his
candidacy for councii Marsh said that regardless of whether the
proposal was intended to dilute black votes, " certainly it would tend to
have that effect " 38 Crusade candidate Howard H. Carwile, speaking at
the same meeting, said that the question of overlapping terms was " the
gravest and most fundamental issue confronting the citizens of
Richmond" 39 and, at another gathering, charged that the proposal was
the "consummation of a conspiracy that began with abolition of the
ward system [ in 1948 when Richmond adopted the council-manager
government] and included the attempt to merge with or annex Henrico
county." 40 One retired black attending a forum for council candidates
may have best captured the sentiment of many black citizens who
opposed the plan when he responded to incumbent James C. Wheat,
Jr.'s defense of staggered terms. "Somebody looked down the road
when they changed the form of government [ from ward to at-large
representation] and saw something coming that they didn't like,"
observed Louis Robinson, Jr. "I wonder if they see another day coming
now and want to change it again. Every time we climb near the top it
seems like someone blocks the way." 41
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The two daily newspapers and Richmond Forward candidates denied
that racial motives prompted the attempt to change the term of office and
argued that nonracial factors, in addition to providing continuity, led to
the proposal. One editorial noted that reducing the number of people to
be elected to council during a single election would also reduce confusion
among the voters and would reduce the chances that a candidate with less
than a majority vote would be elected. It also pointed out that in every
county and virtually every other city in Virginia local legislators served
four-year terms, that four-year staggered terms were also recommended
by the National League of Cities, and that this reform measure would
still insure voters an opportunity every two years to elect a majority on
city council 418
Doubtless, the staggered term proposal was the single most important
issue in the councilmanic campaign. Boundary expansion was also an
important issue, though it did not get as much press attention as the
proposed amendment Some council candidates , all of them Richmond
Forward endorsed, said that the city's "need to expand is the top city
problem" 42 Whea t, in particular, discussed this matter. In a discussion
of city concerns at a meeting of the Richmond Junior Chamber of
Commerce, he urged the merger of Richmond area governments,
observing that" we are one and we will never reach our potential without
unification." 43 Little was said in the campaign about the Chesterfield
annexation case. One incumbent councilman running for reelection as
an independent, Robert C. Throckmorton, did voice his opinion that
Richmond would fail in its attempt to appeal the annexation court' s
decision to dismiss the case because it had not prepared a proper case. 44
The 1966 council election marked a change in Crusade strategy.
When the Crusade was formed, it urged that blacks drop the "single shot'' technique often employed by black voters whereby one or a few
candidates were singled out for support In the pre-Crusade days when
that tactic was used, single-shot candidates seldom won and those
elected owed no debt to black voters and, therefore, could safely ignore
black interests. The Crusade, from 1960 to 196 5, endorsed a full slate
of candidates. By endorsing the least objectionable whites, the Crusade
sought to become a political creditor with its endorsees incurring
political debts which could be cleared, assuming the endorsees were
elected, with the enactment of favorable legislation.45 Given the growth
of the black population and the increase of black voter registration, the
Crusade became a balance of power and was able to determine what
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· white candidates would be elected to city council Thus, it came as no
surprise when white politicians actually began to seek black support By
1966, the potential political strength of the black community had grown
tremendously as a result both of demographic change in the metropolitan
area and of the U.S. Supreme Court's action. Given these events and
given its effectiveness in mobilizing black voters, the Crusade decided
to depart somewhat from its previous practice of endorsing "safe"
whites and to endorse several "long shot" candidates, candidates
considered political activists and who the Crusade believed could be
elected largely through black votes. 46
Richmond Forward, meanwhile, knowing that it would be difficult to
maintain its crucial majority without support from the black community,
endorsed two blacks for council ( one of whom was an incumbent who
received RF suppport in 1964) and appointed a black as vice-chairman
of its organization. Both black endorsees, B. A. Cephas, Jr., and
Winfred Mundle, were businessmen who Raymond Boone, the editor
of the Richmond Afro-American, described as "nice, gentlemanly,
orderly ... the Negro leaders made by the white power structure." 47
While on councii Cephas was closely allied with Richmond Forward
and supported such municipal programs as inner city expressways and a
coliseum. One significant break with the business--oriented group,
however, was over the staggered term proposal Cephas opposed it when
council voted in December to recommend the charter amendment to
the General Assembly. Later, however, he did vote with other RF
members of council to support the resolution requesting Hustings court
to authorize a referendum on the matter. Winfred Mundle announced
his support of staggered terms when he announced his candidacy for
council Richmond Forward selected as its vice-chairman Dr. Allix B.
James, the vice-president of Virginia Union University and the dean of
the School of Religion. He was later elected president of the university.
Like Cephas and Mundle, James was viewed as a "responsible" black
who possessed the educational and business credentials that made him
compatible with the white business leaders in Richmond Forward
The campaign was bitter. Not only the staggered term issue, but also
the perception by Crusade leaders that the white leadership structure
was attempting to create confusion and disunity among black voters ( and
the perception of white leaders that the Crusade was arrogantly
attempting to treat the diverse black population as a monolithic bloc of
votes available to serve Crusade objectives) produced acrimonious
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disputes characterized by charges and counter-charges. Many political
factions emerged within the black community. The Crusade, the
People's Political and Civic League, the Baptist Ministers Conferen ce
(consisting of eighty-five black Baptist ministers), and the "Wes t
Enders" ( an organization which emerged within a black section of near
West End Richmond) all supported different slates of candidates. In
addition, a disagreement broke out between the Crusade and the Ea st
End Federation which led the Federation to withdraw its support of the
Crusade ticket To what extent this factionalism was the product of a
"divide and conquer'' strategy employed by the white command
structure or simply the product of a growing heterogeneity in the black
community is subject to debate, though a more accurate explanation
would involve a combination of these two factors. It is clear that
Richmond Forward needed black support and rather than deal directly
with the Crusade leaders, it established alliances with conservative
blacks. It is also clear that as the black population continued to grow,
the black community became increasingly pluralistic; the Crusade was
inevitably encountering greater problems maintaining a black voting
bloc.48
Meanwhile, racial tensions appeared to have increased as a result of
the newspapers' coverage of the election. For example, on June 9,
1966, the Times-Dispatch included an editorial entitled "A Message
to the Negro Voters of Richmond" which attempted to draw a sharp
contrast between the "public- spirited, responsible leadership of Riclr
mond Forward" and the "private-regarding, autocratically controlled
Crusade for Voters." The editorial read:
You are to be told Sunday again, in effect, not to use your own
intelligence in deciding how to vote. Forty-eight hours before Tuesday's
councilmanic election, a handful of persons who run the strongest
political organization in the Negro community will direct you how to
vote, if previous practice is followed ... You are apparently expected to
accept their recommendations without question You apparently are not
supposed to give any thought to the subject Simply vote as they tell you
to. Perhaps you may want to consider for yourself some of the charges
you are hearing about the powerfui self-serving Richmond Forward
groups. Who are these people who make up Richmond Forward? .. .
(They) have been publicly identified ... They are the people who work
for the best interest of this community in a hundred different ways ....
They are the people who give time, talents and financial resources to
more good causes than you can count . . . They are the people who
provide significant support for the Urban League and other community
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agencies. . . . They are the people to whom leaders in your community
turn when they want assistance in raising funds for predominantly
Negro institutions of higher learning . .. . 49 ( Italics added)

The editorial left little to the imagination Instead of driving a wedge
between the Crusade and its constituency, as intended, this statement,
plus the general racial tenor of the campaign, specifically RF' s efforts
to" reform" the council election procedures, proved counterproductive.
If anything, it reinforced black support of the Crusade. William S.
Thornton, Crusade's President Milton Randolf and Franklin Gayles,
both key strategists for the Crusade, responded to the Times-Dispatch
statement by writing the editor. Originally entitled "A Message to the
White Voters of Richmond," the letter was printed by the TimesDispatch under the heading, "Statement from the Crusade for Voters."
The Crusade representatives began the letter with the question, "Who
are the Richmond Newspapers?" They responded to their question with
the following statement
They are the champions of segregation. They cried: No, No, Never to
the U.S . Supreme Court Decision of 1954. They banned a Pogo comic
strip that ridiculed segregation. These are the papers that have repeatedly
attacked every organization that has fought for and gained Negro rights
. . . and the Negro leaders of the demonstrations that secured many of
these rights.. . . They attacked the NAACP; they attacked Martin
Luther King; they attacked James Meredith; now they are attacking the
Richmond Crusade for Voters . .. . (These newspapers) have repeatedly
used statistics on illegitimate births and crime in an attempt to show that
Negroes are inferior ... ( and) will not publish engagement announc~
ments or publish wedding notices for Negroes on an equal basis with
whites.

The letter concluded by noting:
Long before any other group cared, the Crusade fought alone for Negro
political rights in Richmond . . . Its leaders are persons who have
sacrificed time, money and effort in seeking to secure for Negroes a
measure of political participation. ... Why, Negro voters of Richmond,
have the supporters of Goldwater and the opponents of every civil rights
bill come to you with a message? They have come because you have
gained a measure of political power . . . . We the leaders of your Crusade
urge you to retain the power you have as you approach the threshold of
full political participation. . . . We are confident that you will stand up
behind your Crusade on June 14, 1966. 50

The election on June 14 set a voter turnout record, surpassing the
previous record established in 1964 by over five thousand votes. s I The
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vast increase was attributed to the abolition of the poll tax for state and
local elections, and the outpouring of black voters. Though there is no
precise way to determine how many blacks or whites voted in the 1966
election, according to one analysis of votes from predominately black
precincts, predominately white precincts, and the mixed precincts, it is
estimated that blacks represented 39 percent of the voters. What is
significant about the figure is that blacks represented 34 percent of the
total number of registrants in Richmond!52
The results of the election were as significant as the voter turnout
First, the staggered term proposal was defeated. Blacks voted
overwhelmingly against the proposed charter change. Eighty-seven
percent of the black voters in the predominately black precincts
registered their opposition at the polls. Conversely, 5 7 percent of the
voters in the predominately white precincts endorsed the proposal 53
Obviously, the majority of the white voters supporting the measure was
not large enough to override the large bloc of black voters opposing
staggered terms. Notwithstanding the arguments to the contrary, it
was clear that the black community had perceived the "reform" effort
as nothing more than a tactic to maintain a white majority on council.
The second significant result of the election was that five Crusade
candidates were elected including three blacks, Cephas, Mundie, and
Henry Marsh, III. The major point, however, is that the black vote was
primarily responsible for electing three members to council (Mundie,
Marsh, and Howard H. Carwile) and for defeating three candidates,
two of whom were incumbents who had received Crusade support in
1964-Henry R. Miller, III, and Robert C. Throckmorton. 54 Given the
endorsement of Cephas and Mundie by Richmond Forward and the
Crusade, it was not surprising that these two blacks were elected,
though their political fortunes were destined to change in the next
election as their close relationship with RF finally led to their loss of
Crusade support
What stunned Richmond Forward was the election of two Crusade
"long shot" candidates, Marsh and Carwile. Marsh was an articulate
young civil rights attorney whose commitments and constituency were
considerably different from the moneyed-class in Richmond Forward
Carwile was white. His campaigns were largely populist in tone. He
appealed to the white working class and blacks and attacked big
business, the aristocracy, and the oligarchic power structure of
Richmond He was a perennial candidate who before 1966 had run at
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various times since 1944 for the U.S. Senate, governor, the Virginia
House of Delegates, and the State Senate-and had lost on all eighteen
occasions.55 But in 1966, he won. Richmond Forward was clearly
worried The election results could have been worse for them, but the
lack of solidarity among black leaders and the tendency of many blacks
to still rely on single-shot voting were two factors which lessened
somewhat the effectiveness of the Crusade to deliver the vote for its
candidates. The fact remained that the Richmond elite was losing its
political grip on the city and its future depended on expanding its
electoral base. An article in the Norfolk Virginia-Pilot noted in rather
explicit terms that:
one hears whispers more and more these days that something must be
worked out before June 1968. The June 1968 deadline is ... the point,
according to computations by experts on population shifts, when
Richmond comes face to face with the possibility that Negroes could take
over control of the City Council This is the reason behind a hectic
search. now under way, for a means to re-establish a white majority in
the city's population 56

Indeed, shortly after the election, city officials began to discuss the
possibility of renewing merger negotiations with Henrico County. One
did not have to resort to the Norfolk paper for news accounts of the
racial implications of boundary expansion. Only five days after the
election, the Times-Dispatch ran a story which suggested that the
election results might encourage a revival of consolidation efforts. The
writer noted the following:
Some observers believe that unless that [sic] the two communities
merge within the next two or three years, they may never voluntarily
unite. They believe a new political force now moving into a position of
great power in Richmond may not favor such a union
This new force is the Negro voter.. . .
The councilmanic election demonstrated the growing strength of the
Negro voter ...
If present political trends continue in Richmond, Negro voters will
grow steadily stronger, and within a very few years they may be able to
elect a majority of Richmond's nine Councilmen
From a purely political viewpoint, it would be unreasonable to expect
a Negro-controlled Council to favor a Richmond-Henrico merger. For
such a union would bring thousands of new white voters into the city and
that would dilute the Negro's political strength. .. .57
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One Henrico official responded to the discussion about merger negotiations with this remark in a July 9, 1966, Times-Dispatch news story,
"There's no sense in kidding ourselves, a merger move coming right on
the heels of the city election would indicate to anyone that it is the
result of the large Negro vote. It would appear to me to be an attempt to
dilute the colored vote."
The discussion about renewing the merger effort never resulted in
substantive negotiations between the two jurisdictions, although it did
lead State Senator Edward E. Willey to introduce in the 1968 General
Assembly a bill that would have joined Richmond and Henrico through
unilateral action of the state. The bill did not pass. The need to expand
the corporate boundaries, however, could just as easily be met through
annexation.
The Resumption of the Chesterfield Case
While the city was waiting to hear whether its appeal of the annexation
court's dismissal decision would be accepted by the state supreme
court, Richmond officials began another round of highly confidential
meetings with county leaders as a means of settling the dispute. The
next meeting, following by almost a year the two conclaves at Andrew
Brent's home in 1965, was held in Farm ville, Virginia, sometime in the
summer of 1966. James C. Wheat, Jr., a Richmond councilman and
one of the most powerful members of the local power structure, called
the meeting at the home of his mother-in-law. Attended by Wheat,
John S. Davenport, III ( an attorney for the city), John H. Thornton ( an
attorney for the county), and Irvin G. Horner, the meeting was again
exploratory in nature. They conferred to determine whether it was
possible for the two opposing parties to settle their differences and to
eliminate the need for adversary proceedings. It was at this meeting,
according to Horner in testimony during a 1971 federal court hearing,
that Wheat allegedly said that the city" needed 44,000 leadership type
of white affluent people." 58 Both Wheat and Davenport, in interviews
with one of the authors, denied that the city was seeking additional
people to dilute the black vote, though Wheat in his court testimony and
in the interview did discuss the city's need for more advantaged people
and said, as weli that he could not recall exactly what he said in
Farmville. 59 Like the Brent meetings, the meeting in Farmville was
fruitless. But not all was lost
Good news came to the city during the October session of the
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Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals. The high court agreed to hear
Richmond's appeal The only problem was that, given the court's
crowded docket, the supreme court could not hear the case until spring
or early summer of 1967. The city did request the court to expedite a
hearing, but the request was denied Richmond, therefore, entered
1967 without expanded boundaries, having to wait once again for a
court decision.
The court did not hear arguments from the two jurisdictions until
June 14, 1967, and a decision was not reached until September 8,
1967. Months had passed and the city could do nothing until the court
acted, but when action came, the city was victorious. The court in a
unanimous vote reversed the annexation court's ruling and ordered the
reinstatement of the case against Chesterfield County. The wait had not
been in vain. The high court essentially agreed with the dissenting
opinion of annexation court Judge Elliott Marshall who asserted that
the provision of the state code calling for the inclusion of information
"deemed relevant" on future land uses in the target area was permissive,
not mandatory. Consequently, the court reasoned, the city's failure to
supply that information was not grounds for dismissing the case.
The roadblock to annexation had been removed, but the city could not
move immediately. The three annexation court judges had to find open
dates on their calendars and agree on a time when the case could be
rescheduled Moreover, two of Chesterfield's lawyers, Frederick T.
Gray and William F. Parkerson, Jr., were members of the Virginia
House of Delegates and Senate, respectively, and state law authorized
the suspension of litigation in which a state legislator was involved for
thirty days before, during, and after a session of the General Assembly.
In roughly four months, the 1968 Session of the General Assembly
would convene and even in the unlikely event that the annexation case
were to get underway during the fall of 1967, it would have to be
suspended shortly afterward to allow Chesterfield Delegate Gray and
Henrico Senator Parkerson to fulfill their legislative responsibilities.
Another irritant for the city's proannexation forces was the opposition
to the annexation voiced by one of the freshman members of city
counci~ Henry L. Marsh, III. Marsh was joined in challenging the
city's pursuit of annexation by Howard Carwile and while neither
posed a serious threat, they did air their views publicly, marking the
first time that a liberal challenge to boundary expansion surfaced on
council Marsh, in a reply to a letter sent to members of council by
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newly appointed City Manager Alan F. Kiepper and City Attorney
Conard B. Mattox, Jr., questioned the propriety of Kiepper's and
Mattox' s efforts to proceed expeditiously on the annexation. Marsh's
position was that even though the Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals
had reversed the lower court's decision, the Richmond City Council
should make a fresh decision regarding whether or not to pursue the
annexation case. "It seems clear that the 1961 council [which initiated
the suit] cannot bind the present counci~" Marsh wrote, "and equally
clear that the city manager and city attorney can only recommend a
course of action to the present council and, of course, execute any decision
that is made by the council " 60 The reporter who covered this story for
the News Leader was quick to point out the city's changing political
environment, noting that "Marsh's action appeared to be in line with
gradually developing anti-merger and anti-annexation sentiment in the
so-called 'activist' segment of the Negro community." 61 Kiepper,
however, believed that the 1961 ordinance was clear enough and that
unless the council should reverse the action it took six years earlier it was
proper to proceed with the annexation. 62 Inasmuch as Marsh and
Carwile were the only two legislators to call the continuation of the suit
into question, the council was not predisposed to reverse its action. ( It
should be noted that both Cephas and Mundie, the other blacks on
council in addition to Marsh, did support the annexation suit This
position, plus those taken by Cephas and Mundle on equally significant
issues, led to the Crusade's withdrawal of support for them in the 1968
councilmanic election.) Consequently, when Marsh called for a meeting
of council to discuss the annexation question, the mayor refused.63
A few days after the state supreme court decision, the Richmond
lawyers asked the annexation court to set an early date for a pretrial
conference to discuss the ground rules and procedures of the case, to
hear any pending motions, and to establish a date for the trial itself.
Though the upcoming session of the General Assembly was to delay
the start of the trial, the city did want to minimize the delay by
completing the necessary preliminaries for the trial before the state
legislature convened But it appeared that for every forward step the
city took to move the case along, it was pushed one step backwards. In
early October, 1967, Judge Vincent L. Sexton, Jr., of Bluefield
resigned from the annexation court for personal reasons and the city
had to wait for the Supreme Court of Appeals to appoint a successor
before any dates for pretrial conferences could be fixed. The high court
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acted quickly and within days the vacancy was filled by the appointment
of Pulaski Circuit Court Judge Alex M Harman. Before the end of the
month, the annexation court had also acted and set November 4 as the
date for the pretrial conference.
Unlike the 1965 pretrial conference between Richmond and Chesterfield, the 1967 pretrial session did not produce a motion from the
county to dismiss the suit Rather, the county indicated its desire to start
the trial on October 15, 1968. They city countered with the suggestion
that the trial date be set for May, 1968. The court's decision basically
split the difference with the trial to begin on August 5. 64
It was widely reported that the earliest the three judge court could
enter an annexation order was December, 1969. The problem, however,
was that even if the court ruled to award territory to the city, the court
decision could be appealed, thereby throwing the effective date of
annexation ( assuming the city won the appeal) into the 1970s. Such a
lon~range effective date was dangerous to the political elite given the
constantly growing black population and the "increasing militance" of
the Crusade for Voters. Again, soon after the court set the date for the
trial, the press began reporting that the 1968 council election might lead
to a sentiment on council to drop the suit Should blacks acquire a
council majority, most local political analysts believed that "it would
be highly unlikely that Richmond's Negroes would voluntarily yield
political control of the city by pursuing a policy which would add as
many as 50,000 white citizens to a city of 220,000 in which Negroes
are now a bare majority." 65
Another factor had also entered the picture by November, 1967. A
blue-ribbon panel was established by the 1966 General Assembly to
"make a comprehensive study of metropolitan area governmental prol>lems and to undertake to develop solutions to such problems. . . ." 66
Consisting of fifteen members appointed by the governor, the panel
was officially known as the Virginia Metropolitan Areas Study Commission and popularly called the "Hahn Commission," since Dr. T.
Marshall Hahn, the President of Virginia Polytechnic Institute, served
as chairman.67 For over a year, the Hahn commission had been
studying the growth of urban areas in Virginia and had devoted
considerable attention to the problems facing the state's cities and
suburbs, particularly problems associated with social and governmental
fragmentation, lack of regional planning, and annexation It appeared
that the commission was sufficiently concerned about annexation to
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propose a new system of city boundary expansion. Though the major
thrust of the commission dealt largely with the impact of urbanizat ion
on local governments and the role which state, regiona~ and local
jurisdictions should assume in responding to this phenomenon, the
commission did acknowledge that race, too, was an issue, at least in
those urban areas where the black population was rising. In fact, one
news story appearing in the Times-Dispatch noted that "it ' s no secret,
as the Virginia Metropolitan Areas Study Commission has been told,
that Richmond's growing majority of Negroes, now estimated at 52 %
of the total city population . . . is disturbing to the city power
structure. " 68 Moreover, in the first report the commission released,
Governing the Virginia Metropolitan Areas: An Assessment, the panel
examined, among other things, the government in each of six metropolitan areas and made this observation about Richmond:
Two major factors underlie the divisions and disagreements over policy
in the Richmond area First, the counties feel seriously threatened by
annexation, and all the local units calculate their policy choices in a large
measure on the basis of the probable effect of regional arrangements on
future annexation proceedings . Second, the steady concentration in the
city of Negroes, the disadvantaged, and low income groups is a major
concern not only to the city, but to the entire metropolitan area If the
governments of the Richmond area do not resolve this problem together,
the effects will damage not only the Richmond area but the State as a
whole. Any realistic approach to the problems of the Richmond SMSA
must take these often unexpressed factors into consideration. 69

The Crusade, upon reading the commission's report, responded with a
statement from its Merger Study Committee:
Our organization, though open to all people concerned about political
justice, is a predominately Negro organization; and we are sensitive to the
problems of the Negro communities. But we regret that this commission
chose to Jump the concentration of Negroes with the concentration of
disadvantaged and low income groups thus conveying the connotation
that Negro concentration is somehow inherently undesirable . ... 70

Yet beyond the commission's first report, a few news stories, and the
comments of one Henrico County Board Member, Mr. B. Earl Dunn
( who had indicated that, in his estimation, "the Hahn commission was
established solely for the purpose of helping the City of Richmond in its
racial situation" 71 ), little information exists to suggest that race was the
major subject of the panel's deliberations. When examined in the context
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' of the whole range of concerns addressed by the commission and the
emphasis it placed on the problems attendant to the delivery of public
services in governmentally fragmented metropolitan areas and the need
to develop more effective mechanisms for local service delivery and to
strengthen regional planning, then the concern about race might be
considered secondary. Indeed, one member of the commission, State
Senator FitzGerald Bemiss of Richmond, took a decidedly progressive
position on the subject of race by arguing that the commission should
give attention to the employment problems, housing problems, and the
political problems of minorities which give rise to racial tension. His
views, however, did not prevail The commission concentrated on
physical problems such as sewers, water, air pollution, and traffic
congestion, and on settling interjurisdictional conflict 72
Upon completion of its investigation, the Metropolitan Area Study
Commission presented its recommendations to Governor Mills E.
Godwin, Jr. One of the proposals was the creation of a Commission on
Local Government, a three member body appointed by the General
Assembly whose powers would vastly increase the role of the state in
local and regional affairs. One of the responsibilities which would be
given to the proposed Commission on Local Government, in addition
to approving or disapproving all incorporations of towns and cities,
special districts, and intergovernmental agreements, was to determine
annexations in metropolitan areas. In short, the commission would
replace the special annexation courts in Virginia's major population
centers. Another recommendation called for changes in existing consolidation procedures such that the state, through the Commission on
Local Government, could initiate a referendum on merger in areas
where consolidation might be beneficial or where local initiative did not
materialize. A third major proposal of the blue-ribbon panel was to
enable local jurisdictions to establish a new governmental unit called a
"service district" that would be a vehicle for delivering services on a
regional basis. Essentially, those jurisdictions within the same area
wishing to have regional service delivery would draw up a plan that
would be subject to a popular vote in each of the participating
localities.73
Obviously, the annexation, consolidation, and service district proposals of the Hahn Commission received considerable attention in the
Richmond metropolis given the state of jurisdictional relations within
the region and, specifically, the fact that Richmond and Chesterfield
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were involved in an annexation suit City officials were particularly
anxious to move ahead as quickly as possible with the suit since this
action could be Richmond's last opportunity to acquire land and people
from Chesterfield before new laws were approved by the state legislature. And, of course, as the city' s political environment became more
unpredictable, the city's search for an expeditious and successful
conclusion to the case became more resolute. Beyond their efforts to
force the county to promptly submit pretrial data to the city for their use
in preparing their case ( which proved successful inasmuch as the
annextion court mandated the submission by certain deadlines), Ric~
mond officials could do little else since the year was coming to a close
and the General Assembly was scheduled to convene in January, 1968. 74
The 1968 General Assembly
The 1968 General Assembly was perhaps more attuned to the unique
political needs of the capital city than any session of the state
legislature since Richmond initiated the Henrico/Chesterfield annexation moves in 1961. By 196 8 the shifts in the city's population and the
incursion of what many whites viewed as " less responsive" blacks into
white political sanctuaries had gained the attention of state officials.
State legislators across Virginia began to share the concern of Ric~
mond' s white elite that unless swift measures were taken the capital city
was in danger of falling into the control of blacks.
The capital city of any state usually enjoys a "first among equals"
status among a state's localities. Certainly that is the case in Virginia
Aside from the fact that Richmond is the state capital, Richmond was
the capital of the Confederacy. Richmond, therefore, represented to
Virginians a time on which the destiny of a nation depended and, though
history went awry when the Yankees stormed the gates, Richmond still
remained fixed in the minds and hearts of twentieth century Confederates as a proud city whose honor never faded Culturally, too, Richmond
was special As J. Harvie Wilkinson, III, noted in his description of
Richmond:
Behind its industry and trade lay a "land of gracious living" where the
old manners and the old leisure still remained Symbols of its golden age
graced the streets, as in stately leaf-laced Monument A venue where
equestrian statues of Confederate greats still stalked the land In central
Richmond stood the state Capitoi designed by Thomas Jefferson, the
White House of the Confederacy, and the homes of John Marshall and
Edgar Allan Poe.7 5
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In short, as Virginia's seat of power and as an exemplary reflection of the
commonwealth's traditions and culture, Richmond was clearly "first
among equals." Naturally, those Virginia politicans dedicated to the
preservation of Richmond as a repository of the state's political
traditions and as a symbol of "enlightened elitism" were prepared to
defend their capital city as they would their own home.
A major concern of many state legislators in 1968 was the significant
growth of the city's black population They also feared that the black
unrest in the nation's largest cities would spread to Virginia and into the
capital city. Unquestionably, the nation's "long hot summers," the
euphemism for the violence that erupted in such cities as Los Angeles,
Newark, and Detroit, formed a backdrop against which the deliberations
of the 1968 legislature occurred Some state representatives spoke of
these events and took the position that much of the urban disorder
reflected underlying social and economic problems. They counseled the
state to address these causal factors as a way of preventing violence in
Virginia's cities. 76 Other representatives, however, assumed a siege
mentality. They, too, were concerned about potential disorder in the
state and believed that Richmond, in particular, was vulnerable.
However, rather than work to change the circumstances leading to
bitterness and resentment among urban blacks, these officials assumed
a defensive posture with one state senator initiating legislation to
protect Richmond's symbols of the old order.
Word began circulating in the legislative halls that if blacks were to
acquire political control of Richmond they would proceed to destroy
the monuments to Civil War heroes located prominently along one of
the city's major boulevards. Accordingly, one of Richmond's state
senators, Edward E. Willey, introduced a bill to protect the monuments
should they be endangered. Declaring that it was policy of this
commonwealth "that the traditions and memorials of its history are in
the public interest of the people of the Commonwealth as a whole," the
bill vested with the attorney general the power of eminent domain to
acquire the monuments from the city should such action" appear to him
to be in the public interest." 77 The bill passed both houses, was signed
into law by the governor, and currently comprises a portion of the
Virginia code pertaining to Virginia historic landmarks. Asked about
the legislation during an interview with one of the authors, Senator
Willey discussed the bill's intent, saying that" there was a movement
to remove the Confederate generals' monuments from Monument
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A venue" inasmuch as they "were revolting to the black people of
Richmond ... " 78
This same Richmond senator also introduced Senate Bill Number 441
which provided for the merger of the City of Richmond with Henrico
County. 788 Under state consolidation laws, merger occurs only after
voters in each of the affected jurisdictions approve the move in a
referendum. Willey's bill, however, called for the union of the two
jurisdictions on July 1, 1970, through unilateral action of the state.
Though the bill died in committee, it did generate considerable discussion. All three black members of the Richmond City Council voted
against a resolution that supported the bil~ a significant action on the part
of the three since Cephas and Mundie often voted a fairly conservative
position with Marsh consistently taking the position the press characterized as "militant." Nevertheless, in this case, to quote the TimesDispatch, the vote "apparently reflected their fears that Willey's
measure was aimed at heading off an impending political dominance by
Negroes in the city." 78b
Another initiative assumed by Senator Willey in 1968 was a
successful effort to create another state blue-ribbon panel, but this one
was specifically charged with the responsibility of studying the capital
city's boundary expansion problems. Obviously referring to the protracted and still unsuccessful attempts by the city to expand its
boundaries either through annexation or merger, Senate Joint Resolution
71 read:
Whereas, serious questions have arisen concerning the expansion of
the boundaries of the city of Richmond; and
Whereas, the future of the capital city should be of vital interest to
every citizen of this Commonwealth, and a study should be made of the
problem; now, therefore, be it
Resolved by the Senate of Virginia, the House of Delegates concurring,
That a commission is hereby created to study the problem of expanding
the boundaries of the city of Richmond ... 79

Seven members were to be appointed to the commission and, with the
passage of the resolution in both houses, State Senator George S.
Aldhizer, II, of Harrisonburg, was appointed by the president of the
Senate as one of the two senate members and later selected by the other
commission members as the chairman. Accordingly, the commission
became known as the Aldhizer Commission. It was destined to play a
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leading role in the Richmond-Chesterfield annexation dispute and, as
federal court testimony as well as the debates and proceedings of the
1969 General Assembly make clear, the commission was also attuned
to the "political problem" of the city. The commission began its
deliberations following the adjournment of the General Assembly and
made its recommendation to the 1969 session of the state legislature in
the form of an amendment to the Constitution of Virginia.
Meanwhile, the Hahn Commission had presented its proposals to the
governor who, in turn, presented what he could support as an administrative bill to the 1968 General Assembly. The proposed commission
on Local Government, together with the recommended changes in the
state's consolidation laws, were not included in the legislative package
since the Commission on Local Government was not a popular idea
with local officials and since the proposed changes in merger laws could
not take effect without the new commission Moreover, with the
rejection of the state agency on local government, the existing annexation procedures would remain intact, thereby putting to rest any anxiety
which Richmond and Chesterfield officials may have had about the
effect of new annexation laws for metropolitan areas on the designs of
the other jurisdiction The service district concept was adopted by the
governor and included in his bill With the most controversial elements
of the Hahn recommendations removed, the administration bill was
approved by the state legislature.80
Finally, the 1968 General Assembly supported Richmond's request
to amend the city charter to enable the city to float bonds "to defray the
costs in the extension of the boundaries of the city." 81 One of the factors
that handicapped the city when it faced the decision of whether to accept
the Henrico annexation court award in 1965 was the fact that the charter
at that time prohibited the city from borrowing money to pay annexation
related costs. To remedy that problem, the city sought to amend its
charter so that in the future the government could resort to bonds if
necessary to pay for an annexation award
On balance Richmond fared well in the 1968 session of the state
legislature. While an effort to have the state force a merger between
Richmond and Henrico failed, efforts to create a special commission to
study the city's boundary expansion problems and to empower the city
to bond itself to cover the costs of annexation awards were successful
Also, the city faced a more certain future with the defeat of the Hahn
Commission's idea for a powerful state agency to replace annexation
courts in metropolitan areas and with state protection of its monuments.
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The 1968 Councilmanic Election
If annexation was an issue of the 1966 councilmanic election and

received some press attention during that election, then by 1968 it had
become perhaps the most important issue in the campaign and received
widespread press coverage. The concern, which Richmond Forwardendorsed candidates made explicit and which occupied the minds of
editorial writers for the two daily newspapers, was that the annexation
suit against Chesterfield would be dropped or at least delayed by a
council controlled by the Crusade and that every effort should be made
to maintain the political status quo. The Crusade and its candidates , on
the other hand, were just as forthright in their position on annexation
and the need to thwart what they perceived as a deliberate effort by the
white power structure to dilute black votes through annexation This
opposition was not unconditional, however. Annexation would be
acceptable only if the citizens in the county and the city voted favorably
for the move in separate referenda and provided the city adopted a
system of ward representation. Otherwise, Crusade leaders were
adamantly opposed to annexation Since neither condition could be met
without state approval and since state approval was highly unlikely, the
two sides were stalemated and posed for another direct confrontation
Whatever efforts either side may have once made to seek accommodation were quickly abandoned
By 1968, it appeared that black voter registration had increased
about 10 percent and that the proportion of black registered voters grew
from 34.1 percent in 1966 to 44 percent two years later. 82 This trend,
coupled with the fact that, based on the 1966 election results, a higher
percentage of registered blacks were voting in local elections than
registered whites, sent a clear signal to white political strategists. This
election year could be the one which analysts as early as 1965 had been
predicting could produce a black majority on council, or, if not a
majority, a four vote bloc which would have the power to defeat bond
ordinances, supplemental appropriations, special use permits, and efforts
to override certain Planning Commission decisions. ( The city charter
requires a six vote majority on these measures. 83 With the council
comprising nine people, naturally only four votes are necessary to defeat
such items.)
Accordingly, Richmond Forward mounted a precinct-based campaign designed to produce in predominately white sections of the city
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the same percentage of voter turnout as the Crusade in previous
elections produced in the largely black precincts. Teams of volunteers
manned telephones and each registered voter in the white precincts was
contacted, an effort which, according to one reporter covering the
election, "reached proportions seldom, if ever, undertaken . in a
Richmond political campaign." 84 This push was viewed by Richmond
Forward as warranted, given the growth of black voter registrations and
the political muscle of the Crusade, but the RF canvass was probably
given added impetus by the circulation in the black community two
weeks earlier of a slate of candidates called the "Poor People's Ticket''
which listed the names of five council aspirants, the same candidates
subsequently endorsed by the Crusade. The significance of the Poor
People's Ticket was that shortly before the slate was distributed Dr.
Martin Luther King, Jr., had been assassinated and the Poor People's
Campaign which Dr. King helped create had stopped briefly in
Richmond on its way to Washington. As the Executive Director of
Richmond Forward noted in his postelection analysis, "The obvious
suggestion was that persons supporting the Poor People's March and
Dr. King should support the Poor People's Ticket " 85 An editorial
appearing in the Richmond Afro-American lent credibility to the RF
Executive Director's analysis when, in endorsing the five candidates
whose names appeared on the Poor People's Ticket, it said:
What has happened is that Richmond Forward, backed and controlled
by the city's big money czars, has been so devoted to pushing its
individual and corporate pursuits that it has grossly neglected the needs of
the people, particularly the city's working man and disadvantaged . . .
In the terribly important area of human relations, the Richmond
Forward record would have been impressive in the '40's . But this is
1968, when identity with" safe" colored folk [ an obvious reference to B.
A. Cephas, Jr. , and Winfred Mundie], interracial cocktail parties and
mushy smiles by the mayor don't get il Today, what is needed is men
with the guts to take effective action to eradicate racism and injustices
which are about to destroy not only Richmond- but the nation. Richmond
Forward has been unwilling to act against oppression. As a matter of
fact, the record shows that it has sometimes tended to promote it All one
needs to do is recall Richmond Forward's race-baiting tactics on open
housing and annexation to see that ...
The continuation of the Richmond Forward regime can only breed
explosive conditions which the President's Riot Commission warns
against We do not want Richmond to turn into a Watts. We do not have
to let it happen.
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Fortunately we have a choice.
That choice, we believe, is represented in five of the independent
candidates. . . .86

The Richmond News Leader and the Times-Dispatch were just as
aggressive in their editorial positions and tended to harden the RF
defenses as much as the Afro strengthened the defenses of the Crusade.
The Times-Dispatch, calling election day "one of the most important
days in the history of Richmond," urged a heavy voter turnout since
"historically, less than half of the eligible votes in Richmond have
bothered to go the polls in councilmanic elections" and since voter
apathy could be tragic "if such indifference leads to the election of an
irresponsible, inexperienced council to govern Richmond over the next
two critical years." The editorial drew sharp contrasts between the
"able, experienced and responsible candidates" of Richmond Forward,
the organization which led the city in making" impressive and important
strides, symbolized by Richmond's designation as an All-American
City," and the less qualified independent [meaning not endorsed by
RF] candidates, several of whom "have indulged chiefly in namecalling harangues .... " 87 The News Leader, in an editorial highlighting
the candidacy of RF incumbent, James C. Wheat, Jr., also contrasted
the two major slates by focusing on Wheat's statements about
annexation:
Throughout the Council campaign, Mr. Wheat perhaps has hit hardest
at the issue of annexation If the city cannot merge or annex, he says,
"Richmond will become a permanent black ghetto, a happy hunting
ground for ambitious political opportunists." [italics added] He seeks" a
dynamic, bi-racial community with opportunities for all citizens." And
he vigorously denies the allegations of certain independent candidates
that Richmond Forward desires annexation only for racial purposes: He
argues that if that were so, he would not have led the fight to tum down the
award in the Henrico annexation decision. The area in Henrico that
Richmond could have annexed, he says, had no growing room and would
have been a financial drain on the city; in contrast, the land sought in
Chesterfield has commercial, residential, and industrial room for growth.
A group of the independent candidates, he says, is "perpetrating a
cruel, cruel hoax on the disadvantaged citizens of this city regarding the
issue of annexation The burden of boundary rigidity is going to fall
hardest on the disadvantaged The more affiuent have more mobility.
They can get out; the disadvantaged cannot Now, if this group for which
the broad base of the populace has little respect- takes control of
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Counci~ the normal exodus to the suburbs will accelerate. That will
leave a lower tax base for the disadvantaged in a time of increased need"
So, he concludes, annexation is in the interest of all the voters. 88

Other RF candidates followed Wheat's rationale for annexation.
Thomas J. Bliley, Jr., making his first bid for counciL was particularly
concerned about annexation and his arguments in support of the suit
mirrored those of Wheat Yet, at a meeting of the West End Catholic
Men's Association, veteran city hall reporter James E. Davis noted that
Bliley" said that adding white voters is not the only reason the city wants
to annex part of Chesterfield County. [ italics added]" Bliley indicated
that "we must have more land or else the city will stagnate ... " 89 Either
Bliley spoke with remarkable candor, given the sensitive nature of
annexation in 1968, made an unfortunate slip of the tongue, or else
James Davis inaccurately reported what Bliley said One fact does
emerge. Annexation was no longer a subject relegated to the board
rooms. It had become the central focus of the election.
The Crusade took long shots in the 1966 race when it endorsed
Henry Marsh, III, and Howard H. Carwile. It took even longer shots
in 1968 when it endorsed five candidates, all of whom were attuned to
the "grass roots interests" of the black community and two of whom
were white ( Carwile and Rev. James G. Carpenter), and when it failed
to endorse two blacks who in 1966 had received the blessings of the
Crusade-B. A Cephas and Winfred Mundie. The latter two continued
to receive support from Richmond Forward, Indeed, that was the
problem, at least for the Crusade. Cephas and Mundie, though black,
were too closely identified with Richmond Forward and, consequently,
tended to take more of a conservative approach to the major issues
facing the black population. Carwile and Carpenter, though white, were
clearly identified as liberals. Carwile, in fact, would later in 1969
receive the American Civil Liberties Union of Virginia's first Bill of
Rights award for doing "the most to advance the Bill of Rights in
Virginia over the past decade." 90 He was particularly noted for his civil
rights crusades and his efforts to reform penal institutions and mental
hospitals. Carwile' s views were problem enough for Richmond Forward,
but his style was also a factor that created in the business community a
visceral reaction to his presence on council and to his candidacy in
1968. He simply did not fit the mold of the Virginia gentleman. James
Carpenter was running for the first time as a candidate for public office,
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but as a Presbyterian minister of a predominately black congregation,
he had a sizable following among blacks and liberal whites. In response
to Phil Bagley' s statement before a group of citizens at a "meet the
candidates" rally that the city is a $77 million corporation and that
voters should exercise care in electing new" directors" for the corporation, Carpenter replied, "I believe we do not need corporation experts. I
am a man for the people. fm no expert, no corporation man . .. " 91 He
often talked of the need to build bridges between the rich and the poor,
blacks and whites, once saying that" building bridges of understanding
is an attempt to say politically what reconciliation says theologically.
This does not mean running from fights or equating conflict with evil." 92
The Crusade was now at the point that it was less interested in the
color of the candidate and more concerned about the candidate's
ideology. Allan S. Hammock, in a good account of black and white
leadership in Richmond, touched on the 1968 election and made this
observation, "If the Crusade endorsement was to mean anything, it
would have to show that blacks could reject black candidates who were
well-known incumbents (but not endorsed by the Crusade) and vote for
Crusade endorsed white candidates." 93 The election results proved the
point Cephas and Mundie were defeated Marsh, Carwile, and
Carpenter were elected What is particularly noteworthy is that in
virtually every black precinct, the voters overwhelmingly preferred the
Crusade-endorsed white candidates over the two black candidates not
endorsed by the Crusade. Hammock compiled a table that graphically
illustrated this phenomenon. The table indicates also that Walter
Kenny and Milton Randolph, two of the three blacks endorsed by the
Crusade, received strong support in the black precincts even though
they were defeated in the general election ( See Table 5). Obviously,
Marsh, Carwile, and Carpenter were elected because they received
more support in the white precincts than did Kenny and Randolph.
"Thus," observed Hammock, "a Crusade endorsement in and of itself
does not assure election ... the white vote must be taken into account
and the individual campaigns of the various candidates running for
office also must be considered" 94
After the election, it was apparent that the Crusade had not acquired a
majority of the seats on councii nor had it acquired the necessary four
seats to block those measures requiring six votes. Yet, while Richmond
Forward retained its controi three very important results did emerge.
First, Howard Carwile received more votes in the city than any of the
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TABLE 5
THE 1968 COUNCILMANIC ELECTION
II

White Candidates
Endorsed by
Precinct•
Crusade
Carpenter Carwile
I
84
!
69
I
4
68
91
I
5
63
79
64
6
86
18
67
94
19
67
92
24
69
89
I
46
67
86
i
86
55
I 78
79
62
93
i
I 63
I
73
94
64
92
I 77
65
62
92
66
69
87
67
90
I 79

I

Black Candidates
Blacks Not
Endorsed by
I Endorsed by
I
Crusade
Crusade
Kenny
Marsh Randolph Cephas Mundie
71
86
58
26
23
69
88
64
20
18
57
80
56
31
26
62
79
58
23
20
75
93
73
22
20
68
90
60
27
24
69
92
60
22
46
66
95
53
36
23
66
93
34
65
30
85
16
95
73
14
81
97
75
21
17
96
19
83
69
16
24
78
92
68
21
72
20
19
90
65
80
18
16
93
70

I
I

I
i

i

I

*Each of these precincts had at least 70 percent black voters. Collectively, they
represented 78 percent of the city's black voters.
Source: Allan Statton Hammock, " The Leadership Factor in Black Politics: The Case
of Richmond Virginia," (unpublished Ph.D . dissertation, University of Virginia,
1972).

sixteen candidates! That result stunned Richmond Forward and even
surprised the Crusade as well as Carwile himself. Until 1966 he had not
won any of his many attempts to acquire public office and in 1966 he
placed ninth among the nine elected to city council Even Carwile' s
critics had to concede that his dramatic jump from ninth place in 1966 to
first place in 1968 was no mean achievement His black support was
considerable, but Carwile' s backing from affiuent white voters was also
substantial, prompting Ed Grimsley of the Times-Dispatch to speculate
that:
... He [ Carwile] taunted Richmond Forward constantly, and it fought
back vigorously. Naturally, the Carwile-Richmond Forward debates
attracted a great deal of attention and probably gave Carwile more
exposure in the campaign than he would have otherwise received Also,
the Richmond Forward majority on council helped Carwile by not giving
him any committee assignments or important work to do. He complained
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about this throughout the campaign, and in the end many sympathetic
voters supported him because they thought he was being picked on.95

While not particularly erudite, the Grimsley analysis comes as close as
any in explaining what may have happened Clearly, the Carwile
landslide and his appeal even in the silk-stocking districts of the city was
a political anomaly.
A second significant result of the 1968 election was that while RF kept
its majority on councii the Crusade increased its voting bloc on council
from two to three. The seven-two split had now widened to six-three.
The third important dimension of the election related to the voter
turnout and the nature of the turnout The voter turnout record
established in 1966 was broken in 1968 when 44,880 citizens went to the
polls-approximately 8,600 more than the number voting two years
earlier. 96 John Ritchie, Jr., in his postelection analysis for Richmond
Forward indicated that while the number of white voters in councilmanic
elections had actually declined by six hundred from 1964 to 1966
( compared to an additional 5,320 black voters), it had increased by 4,574
from 1966 to 1968 ( compared to an increase of 4,058 blacks).
Moreover, Ritchie estimated that 44.2 percent of those voting in 1968
were black. 97 The proportion of black votes to the total was roughly the
same as the proportion of black registrants to the total The same was
true for whites in 1968, though in 1966 the percentage of white voters
was slightly less than the percentage of white registrants. The obvious
conclusion to his analysis was that Richmond Forward's precinct
canvassing program had achieved its goal of increasing white voter
turnout
In summary, the 1968 election contained mixed signals. Had the
Crusade endorsed Cephas and Mundie, they probably would have been
elected, along with Marsh, Carwile, and Carpenter, thus enabling the
Crusade to acquire a majority on council But the acquisition of a
majority with Cephas and Mundie would have been a Pyrrhic victory
inasmuch as the Crusade endorsees would have been internally split In
all likelihood Cephas and Mundie would have continued to side with
Richmond Forward on major social issues. At least with Marsh,
Carwile, and Carpenter the Crusade could rest assured that the
legislators elected largely by black voters would speak with one voice.
Clearly, the Crusade's effort to achieve a five seat majority with
committed liberal candidates failed But its goals to excommunicate
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two blacks with strong Richmond Forward sympathies and to strengthen
the liberal voice on council succeeded James E. Davis misread the
results and came to an erroneous conclusion when he said in a news
story following the election that the "results may spell the death of the
Richmond Crusade for Voters as a major power in the city political
structure." 98 Richmond Forward had won only by maintaining its
majority. It had not prevented the Crusade from acquiring another seat
Richmond Forward was still fighting a defensive action The Crusade
was still on the offensive and 1970 would lead to the real victory for
blacks unless the annexation occurred beforehand
The Renewal of Annexation Negotiations
and the Beginning of the Trial
The secret conclaves of the elite from the two embattled jurisdictions
began in earnest following the 1968 Session of the General Assembly
and the June 1968 councilmanic election The election was inducement
enough, but to add more incentive, the Aldhizer Commission was
beginning its deliberations and local officials anticipated a commission
recommendation that would resolve the city's boundary problems at the
state level The problem was that Richmond and Chesterfield officials
remained jealous of their local power and were not anxious for the state
to encroach on their prerogatives.
Just before the start of the 1968 General Assembly, the Chesterfield
County representative on the annexation court, Circuit Judge William
Old, died Before the court could resume its activities, the Virginia
Supreme Court of Appeals had to fill the Chesterfield seat on the court It
was not until after the 196 8 General Assembly elected a successor to
Judge Old that the high court made its appointment to the annexation
court since the other Chesterfield Circuit Judge, Ernest P. Gates, was
not a good choice for this delicate case since he had previously served
as Chesterfield Commonwealth's Attorney and had assisted in the
county's defense in the annexation suit 99 Once the state legislature
elected David Meade White to the Chesterfield Circuit Judgeship, the
Virginia supreme court appointed White to the annexation court Yet,
shortly after White's appointment, still another change in the composition of the court occurred Judge Alex M. Harman of Pulask~ who only
about six months earlier had been placed on the court, requested
release from the case given the pressure of his normal duties as a
circuit judge and because of his work as a member of the Virginia
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Commission on Constitutional Revision. So the state supreme court
relieved him of his responsibility on the annexation court and replaced
him with Smithfield Circuit Judge George F. Whitley, Jr. 100
At least for the moment, the annexation court had a full complement of
three judges. With the resumption of pretrial conferences following the
termination of the spring session of the state legislature, Judge White
suggested that Melvin W. Burnett, the Executive Secretary of the
Chesterfield Board of Supervisors, and Alan F. Kiepper, the Richmond
city manager, get together to seek grounds for establishing a compromise on the case. 101 The city was anxious to resolve the case
amicably, having sought in previous private meetings a compromise
agreement The clock was running and the city believed that a compromise could resolve the dispute more expeditiously than litigation.
The county was also amenable to private negotiation since an uncertain
trial was imminent ( a trial which could lead to a sizable award by the
court) and since the county was fearful of what the Aldhizer Commission might do. The county was willing to gamble and settle out of court on
an area smaller than the fifty-one square miles sought by the city.
The alternative was a court mandated settlement involving the entire
fifty-one square miles or even a larger area Accordingly, during the
summer of 1968, Burnett and Kiepper talked with each other about the
case on eight occasions. Detailed information about the meetings
( when the two men met, where they met, what they discussed) surfaced
several years later in federal district court following the annexation. As
noted earlier in this chapter, Burnett had the reputation for remembering
details, a reputation probably established because of his habit for
keeping written records. Scarcely a telephone conversation was completed without his making a notation of the communication. In an
interview with one of the authors, Burnett said that after each meeting
with Kiepper, he would return immediately to his Chesterfield office and
commit himself to writing the particulars of the negotiations. 102 Kiepper,
too, made typewritten notes which he retained in his files.
One would think that, given the importance of the subject and the
stakes involved, the two negotiators would have met in a quiet room in
some building where traditionally major decisions affecting government
were rumored to occur, namely, the Commonwealth Club( a fashionable
men's club located a few blocks away from the famous Civil War
monuments) or perhaps the Country Club of Virginia or even the Hotel
John Marshall in downtown Richmond Such was not the case.
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Wanting to meet in places where they would not be recognized, Burnett
and Kiepper got together in surroundings unsuggestive of summitry. On
July 16, 1968, they met at Mr. Donut, a coffee and donut shop at the
Circle Shopping Center located in Chesterfield County. Thirteen days
later they met at the Virginia Inn ( a motel then known as Schrafft' s
Virginia Inn and located off Interstate 95 near the city-Henrico County
boundary line), then twice at Burnett's house on Cogbill Road in
Chesterfield County on August 5 and again on August 12. They
returned to Mr. Donut where they met in Kiepper' s automobile for the
fifth session on August 21. Their sixth conference on August 26
consisted of a phone coversation and the next day they lunched
together at Schrafft' s for their seventh go-around Their eighth and final
meeting was about two weeks later on September 12 at Burnett's house
once more. 103 Burnett's penchant for details is revealed in his notes. His
notes ( like Kiepper' s) also clearly indicate that the dominant theme of
the discussions was people.
Monday, August 12, 1968 ... He [ Kiepper] gave me a map showing
City's request-34.7 sq. mi. and 56,540 people. I told him this was not
negotiating in good faith, that if this was the best the City could offer, then
we were both wasting time.
He seemed to want to continue negotiations but stated the City had to
have 50,000 people.
I said this was out of the question. If we had to give up this many, the
court would have to order it. He was adamant in his demands. (We bet
$10.00 on land and $10.00 on people-that the City would not get½ of
what they asked for.) 104

Land, both industrial and vacant, was also discussed, but according to
Burnett, land took a lesser priority.
Mon. Aug. 26- Kiepper called- City would need: People, ind. [industrial] vacant land in that order; city would negotiate further on a figure
between 36,000 and 50,000 . Wants to see what the County proposes.
Sat. Aug . 31- We met at 12:30 at Schrafft' s. Very pleasant.
I gave him map showing 21,358 people and said we could possibly find
another 3000 or 3300 more. Again pointed out the divided feelings on the
Board, that this was a hard- sell proposition, etc.
He said-City would never accept that few with present council and
lawyers. We had a frank discussion of things as they are .. . 3 members of
council have not been told[ italics added The three members were Marsh,
Carwile, and Carpenter.]
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I asked that City respond with a map showing what they would be
willing to take. Pointed out that we had virtually offered 25,000, that he
had agreed to come down to about 35,000-we weren't so far apart. He
said that he did not think the council would settle for 35,000 .... 105

Burnett testified in court that Kiepper' s concern for people was concern
for white people, although Burnett acknowledged that the city manager
never discussed explicitly the racial makeup of the population. However,
Burnett did say, "I discussed with him the composition of the people
around the city, that at least ... ninety-five percent of them was white,
five percent black, and that any percentage of people he would get out of
our county would be ninety-five percent white. So that race was not
necessarily mentioned at every meeting, but we both knew what we were
talking about." 106
Kiepper disagreed with where Burnett placed the emphasis when the
Executive Secretary recounted negotiations .
. . . Mr. Burnett made a number of references to the fact that we knew
what we were talking about I knew what I was talking about It was not
solely a matter of concern about race. It was a concern about balancing
the population and the need for vacant land and vacant industrial land in
particular. I think the note bears out the fact that we did discuss other
matters, and there was considerable emphasis on other matters .... 107

It should be pointed out that Kiepper believed that social and economic
considerations were inextricably tied, that the out-migration of white
middle to upper income taxpayers from the city to the suburbs and the
consequent growth of the city's low income, largely minority population
heavily dependent on public services led to an erosion of both the city's
tax base and its leadership base. To stem the erosion, Kiepper believed
that the annexation of a sizeable proportion of affiuent suburbanites
was essential. Moreover, the city's economic problems also could be
reduced by the acquisition of more open space suitable for development
In regard to the latter, Kiepper' s memoranda indicate that land was
discussed with Burnett Kiepper' s memo to file regarding the August 31
meeting reads, "I repeated to Mr. Burnett my previous statement to him
that the City would be willing to negotiate on something less than
50,000 provided that the area was a logical and sensible one and that
adequate provision was made for not only people, but vacant industrial
land and vacant land generally ." 108 (Seethe comment in note 127 about
Kiepper' s use of the figure 50,000 and the role of his deputy manager,
George R. Talcott, in the Burnett-Kiepper talks.)
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Burnett and Kiepper also disagreed about references to the 1970
councilmanic elections. When questioned about whether he discussed
the election with Kiepper, Burnett replied:
Yes, I think that during our discussions we pointed out that the council
would have an election in 1970, that it would be nice to settle this case
before January, 1970, so that [the area to be annexed] would go into the
city, which would help the city at that time. Everybody knew that in
1968 the elections were right close. We expected they would be much
closer in 1970, and I think that was the basis for all the negotiations, was
to get more people in so they could keep the council of the City of
Richmond white. 109

Kiepper' s version of what transpired differed, as the exchange between
one of the attorneys representing the city and Kiepper reveals:
Question: Did you make any statement to Mr. Burnett to the effect that
you wanted annexation effective on January 1, 1970, for the
benefit of control in the 1970 elections?
Answer: No, sir, -I did not
Question: Have you read his [Burnett's] notes that have been filed in
evidence?
Answer: I have. I would point out that we were talking in July and
August, 1968 . There had just been a council election in June of
that year. So that the next council election was almost two
years away. Discussions of council elections, from a common
sense standpoint, were not particularly appropriate. 110

Like the Farmville meeting and the even earlier Brent gatherings, the
Burnett-Kiepper talks concluded in stalemate. Simultaneous with the
"donut caucuses" were more private conclaves in the Chesterfield
School Board conference room. Irvin Horner, Frederick (Fritz) F.
Dietsch, a Chesterfield supervisor from Manchester District, Mayor
Phil J. Bagley, and James Wheat attended 111 Once again, according to
Horner' s court testimony, the emphasis was on people-44,000 on this
occasion. (The number of people which the city allegedly wanted
tended to vary from meeting to meeting, though the range remained
fixed between 36,000 to 50,000 with figures in the forty thousand
bracket most often surfacing.) As Horner remembers the meeting, the
engineering firm that the county had employed in the annexation case
had prepared a large jigsaw puzzle map which had been cut into
districts, each piece or district showing the number of square miles and
the number of people within the district Each piece of the map was
magnetized and could be moved around the map so that the negotiations
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about land and people could be facilitated Different combinations of
districts could be put together to equal the square miles and people
desired by the city. 112 Horner' s version of the proceedings is perhaps
best captured by the interaction several years later betweeen him and
the plaintiffs attorney during federal court hearings:
Question : Did you in fact discuss geography at this meeting?
Answer: No, to the best of my knowledge geography was not
discussed We had the map there available to be used To my
knowledge it was not used . . . We went to this meeting in this
frame of mind, trying to find out from the city, if you want
44,000 people, do you have in mind anywhere they should
come from.
Question : Did they have in mind where they should come from at this
first meeting? [ a subsequent meeting involving the same participants was held after the annexation trial began]
Answer: If they had it in mind they did not reveal it to us.
Question: Did they reveal to you how much vacant land they
wanted?
Answer: No, sir.
Question: Did they reveal how many schools they wanted?
Answer: No, sir.
Question: Or how many utility facilities they wanted?
Answer: No; sir.
Question: Or how many assessables they needed?
Answer: No, sir.
Question: What percentage of industrial land they needed?
Answer: No, sir.
Question: The whole basis was people?
Answer: We pressed them for where the people should come from.
They apparently were not prepared to answer it 113

Wheat, in his interaction with another one of the plaintiffs attorneys,
was not as definite about what transpired
Question: What about at this meeting? What was developed? Did
you talk about people, land, tax assessables, citizens?
Answer: I think at that particular meeting we were bound to have talked
about land and people. I do not recall any conversation of
specific numbers of lines. Again it was just trying to establish
communications in what we believed then in good faith was the
common interest of avoiding unnecessary expenses, avoiding
unnecessary disruptions and discord, and to try to arrive at
some equitable financial settlement But as to what the specifics
of that discussion was, I do not know because I didn't take any
notes at any of these meetings. 114
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According to Fritz Dietsch, "We were in a meeting in which the mayor
at that time, Bagley, made the statement that 'we don't want the city to
go to the niggers. We need 44,000 white bodies.' " When one of the
authors indicated to Mr. Dietsch that Bagley had denied making any
such statement, Dietsch said that he heard Bagley make the comment
and "he [Bagley] said he didn't, but you don't forget a remark like
that" 115 (This was not the only time that people reported Bagley using
the term" nigger'' when expressing his views about annexation Dietsch,
in an April 3, 1981, interview, said that the late B. Earl Dunn heard
Bagley make a remark similar to the one allegedly made at the school
board meeting. Dunn was a member of the Henrico County Board of
Supervisors and, according to Dietsch, heard Bagley' s comment at a
private meeting in Williamsburg involving members of the Aldhizer
Commission and representatives from Richmond, Chesterfield, and
Henrico. Dietsch also was in attendance and during a break Dunn
turned to Dietsch and said, "Did you hear Bagley make that statement?" On another occasion, Leland Bassett, in 1968 a member of the
Board of Directors of the Westlake Hills Civic Association and later a
member of the Executive Committee of the Team of Progress, the
successor organization to Richmond Forward, was sitting next to Mayor
Bagley at a football game in Charlottesville. Bassett had asked Bagley
to speak about the annexation at a meeting of the civic association and
it was during their conversation that Bagley, according to Bassett,
stated, "As long as I am the Mayor of the City of Richmond the
'niggers' won't take over this town" 116 On still another occasion,
Councilman James G. Carpenter noted that on September 12, 1971,
while he and Bagley were attending a meeting of the Virginia Municipal
League at Virginia Beach, the mayor drew him aside and at one point in
their conversation indicated that the "niggers" were not qualified to run
the city. 117 Bagley has consistently denied making these statements, 118
noting that" to the best of my knowledge, I have never met or talked with
this gentleman [Leland Bassett]." 119 Regarding the conversation
with Carpenter, who later resigned his seat on council to become a
Presbyterian missionary to Ecuador, Bagley questioned Carpenter's
credibility-" This gentleman has since resigned from city council
stating, 'I heard voices telling me to go elsewhere.' ") 120
A second meeting involving Homer, Dietsch, Bagley, and Wheat
was as unproductive as the first The city and the county could not break
the impasse and it appeared that only the annexation court, which had
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the authority to mandate a solution, was capable of resolving the
dispute.
The trial was to begin on September 24 rather than on August 5 as
had been originally planned The delay was due to the failure of the
parties in the case to meet previously established deadlines for providing
each other with technical information. Throughout the summer of
1968, numerous pretrial conferences were held with the opposing
lawyers and to hear summaries of testimony which expert witnesses
were expected to give later during the trial so as to reduce the
possibility of filibustering by the witnesses and thereby to expedite the
trial once it began.
The trial started on Tuesday, September 24, with a tour of the two
jurisdictions by the judges and lawyers. After the tour, which consumed
most of the first week, the courtroom battles began the following
Monday, September 30. The county had earlier objected to the city's
use of racial data and during the testimony of Richmond Planning
Director, A Howe Todd, who was discussing the correlation between a
rising low income population and a rising nonwhite population, the
court intervened and ruled against the use of racial statistics as evidence.
( The court did say, however, that the city could insert such information
into the official record for possible use by the appellate court, but only
later in the afternoon after the annexation court had adjourned for the
day. ) 121 But if the county won that point, the city got a favorable ruling on
another point The court ruled during the trial that the city could
informally seek more land than was requested originally in the 1961
annexation ordinance. The city had sought fifty-one square miles in
1961, but since that date the county had constructed a new high school
just to the west of the line demarcated in the ordinance. The city
indicated that the inclusion of the high school in any area awarded by
the court would make more sense than an award without the facility, but
which incorporated into the city additional school children living near
the school 122
The case was progressing rapidly. Witnesses for the city had completed their testimony, and county witnesses were well underway with
their presentations when Judge White entered the hospital on October
17 for diagnosis and treatment of a stomach ailment 123 The case was
suspended pending the presiding judge's return to the bench. The case
was rescheduled for December 9. During the interim, the county issued a
list of additional witnesses, a move which delayed the completion of the
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case even more. Already the city was uneasy with the knowledge that
the annexation judges had allotted only five days for the case during the
December session and that the possibilities were considerable that the
case would have to be resumed sometime in 1969. That potential delay
was bad enough, but to make matters worse, Governor Godwin had
indicated his intention of calling a special session of the General
Assembly for February, 1969, to consider the report of a commission
which had been studying the need for constitutional revision. If such a
session were called, it would lead to still another suspension of the case.
What had happened in 1968 was likely to occur in 1969 as well
Henrico Senator William F. Parkerson, Jr., and Chesterfield Delegate
Frederick T. Gray, two of the county's defense lawyers, were entitled
under state law to place a moratorium on all litigation in which they
were involved for the duration of the legislative session plus thirty days
prior to and thirty days following the session. 124 As a consequence, the
case could be shoved back to March or Apri~ 1969. Appeals by either
side could delay the effective date of annexation beyond 1970-too late
for the next councilmanic election.
The trial resumed on December 9. As expected, the annexation court
did not complete its work in the five days it had earlier scheduled for the
December session, and consequently, had to plan for a January session.
Before the year ended, however, one additional secret meeting was
convened Congregating in Melvin Burnett's family room at his home,
the Executive Secretary, Irvin G. Horner, Fritz Dietsch, and Mayor
Phil J. Bagley met just prior to Christmas to discuss once again the
feasibility of compromise. As on numerous prior occasions, the central
theme was people. Horner testified that the figure was 44,000, the same
number mentioned in the 1966 Farmville meeting and essentially the
midway point between Kiepper's low of 35,000 and high ofS0,000. In
unrebutted testimony, Horner indicated that the city never specified how
much land it needed, the number of schools desired, or the amount of
roadway sought 125 The meeting was simply another in a long series of
futile efforts to negotiate a settlement
The Mistrial and the Aldhizer Commission
The new year arrived and shortly thereafter, on January 7, the
annexation trial got underway once again. But on the first day of what
now was seen as a plagued case, Judge White ordered the city's
information and research director, D. Brickford Rider, to stop making
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copies of the official court transcript available to the press. At each
recess of the tria~ Rider had been bringing a copy of the transcript,
which the city had ordered and bought, to the press room located in one
of the two mobile office trailers rented by the city and parked on a lot
about a hundred yards behind the Chesterfield courthouse. When
informed of the Judge's intervention, Rider told the members of the
press that he could "no longer pick up the transcript" and that Judge
White had acted because the judge" had received complaints that I was
using the transcripts to plant news stories about the trial." White's ban
on the release of the official transcript triggered an editorial in the New s
Leader by Ross Mackenzie, stating:
It requires a special sort of petulance to do what Chesterfield Circuit
Court Judge David Meade White did yesterday . Judge White is chief of
three judges hearing the Richmond-Chesterfield
annexation case .
Yesterday, in a moment of excessive irrationality , he forbade the City ' s
information and research director, D . Brickford Rider, to make official
transcripts of the trial testimony available to the press.
This is a neat little bit of nastiness. During each day of the proceedings
since the annexation trial began, the City has supplied the news media with
an extra copy of the official trial transcript This has been a courtesy paid
for by the City so that the public might be kept current about the case. At
each recess in the proceedings, Mr . Rider would take a copy of the
transcript to the press trailer near the courthouse . This was especially
beneficial to afternoon newspapers such as The News Leader because
they could take verbatim quotations from the transcripts of the morning
proceedings in time to file their stories for the afternoon editions.
No more. Henceforth, Mr. Rider will have to keep his hands off and the
press will have to get its transcripts in some other way .... Judge White is
said to have told inquiring reporters that he considers it unseemly and
unethical for an information officer of the City to supply the press with
transcripts.
Now, if reports of what Judge White has said are correct, there are a lot
of things wrong with his reasoning. How on earth can an official transcript
be used to plant stories? Is Judge White implying that there is collusion
between the city and the press to slant news in favor of Richmond? And
how is it unseemly and unethical for a public information officer to give the
press what is, after ali manifestly public information? Does Judge White
consider it unseemly and unethical for a man to do his job? If Chesterfield
does not choose to buy an extra copy of the transcript for use by the press,
then that is all right, too. But thereby, Richmond's decision to provide a
copy for the press hardly can be construed as unethical
Now like Caesar's wife, judges should be above suspicion. We would
remind Judge White that as the Chesterfield jurist in this case he is in an
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especially delicate position. He must go out of his way to divorce himself
from any biases he might have- biases that might derive from his
association with Chesterfield That is the best way to encourage fair
treatment in the press. Yet we cannot help but suspect that with his
harassing order to Mr. Rider yesterday Judge White let his sympathies
show. If that is so, it was a shabby way to do it This is not a matter of law
that Judge White was pronouncing upon yesterday; it is a matter of
attitude and if Judge White's attitude is to control the news coming out of
the annexation triai then he should have gone all the way and ordered
the press to write not a word Then his edict would be recognized as the
censorship that it really is.126

When Judge White read the editorial, he reacted bitterly, disqualified
himself from the case, and declared a mistrial, saying that the editorial
"impugned" the integrity of the court 127 ( Actually attorneys for the city
had suggested earlier that Judge White resign inasmuch as he lived in
the area that Richmond had targeted for annexation.) Richmond and
Chesterfield officials were stunned Mackenzie, recalling the event in an
interview, asserted, "I was the most astounded person of all I didn't
expect that to happen. I don't think anybody did" 128 After seven years
of trying, Richmond still had not annexed territory and, in January,
1969, still faced another trial- unless, of course, a compromise settl~
ment were reached by the two jurisdictions. Shortly after Judge White
declared a mistrial, officials from the county and the city spoke of the
possibilities of renewing negotiations, although neither side made the
first move since previous efforts had ended in failure. It would take the
intervention of the Aldhizer Commission to bring the adversaries
together and even then the parties would be unable to produce an
agreement
Meanwhile, the most pressing concerns were the scheduling of a new
trial and the appointment of a successor to Judge White. The only other
Chesterfield circuit court judge available to represent the county was
Ernest P. Gates, but, as noted earlier, his appointment by the Chief
Justice of the Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals might have raised
serious questions. Gates had once served as the county's commonwealth
attorney and had acted as Chesterfield's chief defense counsel in the
annexation suit The only alternative would be to appoint a judge from
a remote circuit which would give Richmond an advantage that no other
city in an annexation suit had enjoyed for years. The Chief Justice,
faced with a no-win situation, conferred with his colleagues and
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decided to bypass Gates and select a circuit judge from outside
Chesterfield Accordingly, Judge Earl L. Abbott of Clifton Forge was
asked to join the three judge court The other two judges on the
annexation court, Elliott Marshall and George Whitley, had already
indicated their desire to begin a new trial on May 5 and when the
Virginia supreme court approached Abbott about filling the vacancy, it
asked him if he were available for a May 5 trial date. Abbott accepted
the appointment and proceeded to reschedule his circuit court docket to
clear space for the Richmond-Chesterfield annexation case. 129
The city faced mounting bills related to annexation and had to
appropriate additional funds to pay expenses and to provide for the
future prosecution of the suit By February, 1969, the total cost of the
annexation since the inception of the suit in the early 1960s, including
both city and county expenses, exceeded $1 million. However, with a
deeply divided city council, appropriating funds to cover annexation
expenses was becoming increasingly difficult A major battle ensued
between the Richmond Forward and the Crusade factions over a
$140,000 appropriation measure. Lacking the necessary six votes to
pass the supplemental appropriation (James Wheat had left the meeting
before the vote), Richmond Forward was unable to block the defeat of
the legislation. The reaction of the RF council-members was swift and
abrasive. Upon hearing of the vote, Wheat, who was clearly the
dominant figure among the RF legislators, exclaimed, "Apparently
they [the minority faction] are willing to see the city converted into a
black ghetto for their own purely political interests." 130 Nathan Forb,
who had been appointed in November, 1967, to fill the unexpired term
of Eleanor P. Sheppard ( she had been elected to the Virginia House of
Delegates) said essentially the same thing, commenting that" they have
chosen this avenue to attempt to thwart Richmond's expansion. With
present population trends and other indications, I fear Mr. Carpenter
and Mr. Marsh [ Carwile was absent from the meeting] might, if they are
successfuL achieve what they profess to abhor, a resegregated, almost
totally black capital city." 131 Marsh and Carpenter were just as quick to
reply. "If he [Wheat] had remained at the meeting, " Marsh retorted,
"he would have heard me request a delay in the voting until we could be
adequately briefed by the city manager. The manager indicated that a
two-week delay would do no harm. . . " Marsh continued by
expressing his concern about the secrecy surrounding the boundary
expansion effort and added, "I read in the newspapers that Richmond is
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supposed to send three representatives to a conference in Williamsburg
in a few days, but no member of council has discussed this matter with
me." 132 ( Marsh was referring to a meeting the Aldhizer Commission
had called involving city, Henrico, and Chesterfield representatives.)
Carpenter was equally disturbed, calling Wheat's remarks "false and
malicious." 133 Carpenter also called for a special meeting of the council
to discuss the annexation question, but Mayor Bagley denied the
request In so doing, Bagley observed that information discussed in
executive sessions often appeared in the next issue of the newspaper.
Moreover, he told Carpenter that the city attorney had cautioned city
officials against making any public statements concerning the suit
inasmuch as such statements could lead to another mistrial 134
The appropriation ordinance was not dead for long. Bagley had
voted with Marsh and Carpenter to defeat the ordinance, but only as a
tactical move. Knowing that with Wheat's absence the ordinance
would be defeated, Bagley voted with the prevailing side in order to
reserve the right to reintroduce the measure later-which he did in
March. The ordinance then passed by a vote of six to three. 135
If there were any doubts among the citizenry by this time about the
racial overtones of the annexation, they should have quickly vanished
when, between the two votes on the appropriations ordinance, TimesDispatch reporter James E. Davis ran a story with the headline,
"Racial Balance Held Key Issue in Annexation." The lead sentence
captured the gist of the story. "The current conflict among city council
members over annexation costs has brought sharply before the public
the real boundary expansion issue as several councilmen see it" 138 The
story then proceeded to review James Wheat's "black ghetto" statement, cited the attempted use of racial statistics in the Henrico and
Chesterfield trials as well as a consultants report prepared for Henrico
and Chesterfield counties in their presentation to the Hahn Commis-sion. The latter, known as the SUA Report, reinforced what the city
and the county had known a_llalong: namely, that the city was becoming
as heavily concentrated with blacks as the suburbs were with whites.
The SUA Report's statement that Richmond's racial imbalance was
worse than most other metropolitan areas in the State of Virginia had
not escaped the attention of the Aldhizer Commission. Indeed, some
legislators and legislative observers suggested that the capital city's
growing black population was one of the major reasons prompting the
creation of the commission. The commission convened for the first time
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on June 17, 1968, in Senate Room 3 of the State Capitol for an
organizational meeting. Richmond Senator Edward E . Willey and City
Attorney Conard B. Mattox, Jr., also attended the meeting, though
Mattox was later excused when the commission went into executive
session As a legislative courtesy to colleagues, Willey was allowed to
stay. It was at this meeting that the seven commissioners elected
Harrisonburg Senator George S. Aldhizer, II, as the Chairman, and
Delegate Donald G. Pendleton from Amherst as the Vice-Chairman 139
The rendition of what transpired at this meeting varies dramatically
between Aldizer and Pendleton According to Pendleton, the city
representatives brought to the commission's attention that, to quote
Pendleton, "i f certain elements in the City of Richmond were to take
over the city government they would tear down all the monuments on
Monument Avenue ....
" Moreover, Pendleton indicated that the
Richmond representatives were concerned about the 1970 councilmanic
election, concerned " that the city council races in 1970 would go all
black. " And as far as the purpose of the commission was concerned,
the Vice-Chairman believed that it was designed " to prevent the City of
Richmond from becoming another Washington," that is, a majority
black city. 138 Aldhizer denied that any such discussions occurred He
asserted that, at least in his presence, no comments were made about
race, the 1970 election, or the monuments. Regarding the latter,
Aldhizer said, "I like Monument A venue. If any statement had been
made I would have remembered it It is one of my favorite streets in the
world" When asked to explain the rationale for the commission,
Aldhizer said that the group was supposed to study and recommend a
solution to the capital city's need for land, its dwindling tax base, and
its rising educational and welfare expenditures. 139
The June meeting was devoted to the internal organization of the
commission and to a general discussion of the commission's charge.
Beyond these two items, however, the commission did not undertake
any substantive investigations. Not wanting to meet again while
Richmond and Chesterfield were involved in the annexation proceedings
lest such sessions might in some way negatively affect the activities of
the annexation court or the city's position in the suit, the Aldhizer
Commission did not reassemble until February 5, 1969. That proved to
be a good time since Judge White had declared a mistrial and since it
gave a month for the commission to complete its work by the deadline
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imposed by the authorizing resolution-March 1, 1969.
Between the June and February meetings, City Attorney Mattox
traveled to Harrisonburg and visited with Senator Aldhizer in his office.
Still later the two contacted the governor's office where the senator
sought advice on how and when to proceed with the commission's
investigation. 140 Mattox had supplied both Senator Aldhizer and the
governor's office with an updated version of a report which had been
prepared in 1959 by the Public Administration Service (PAS), a
Chicago based consulting firm, entitled A Plan of Government for the
Richmond Region: A Survey Report The report was also distributed
later to the seven members of the commission. The updated report
provided data regarding the government, population, land use, economic
development, and the nature of public service delivery in the Richmond
metropolitan area and provided a rationale for boundary expansion. [In
195 9 the PAS Report had included a recommendation calling for the
consolidation of Richmond and Henrico and the creation of a unified
governmental and service system] The section of the forty-one page
document focusing on the population of the central city included racial
information, specifically the changing racial ratios of the city's general
population and of school enrollments plus birth and death rates for
whites and nonwhites. 141
Congregating once again at the capitol, the commissioners, on
February 5, were briefed by their chairman on the state of the
Chesterfield annexation, notably Judge White's self-disqualification
and the scheduling of a new trial During the meeting, Mattox gave the
commissioners a twenty-five page report and read some of the report to
the panel The report included exhibits from the updated PAS study
and from still another document entitled" Expand Richmond's Boundaries." (The latter was distributed in its entirety to the commissioners
at their third meeting.) Again, racial data were used When discussing
metropolitan population characteristics, Mattox focused on the city's
population loss.
You will note that a vast majority of the population loss in the City is
between the ages of 24 and 50. These people are also the most
productive citizens. You will note also that while losing this productive
group of white citizens, the City's population was increased in every age
bracket on the Negro side. The more significant gains being in children
between the ages of 19 and below. Therefore the City is losing the more
active citizen and gaining more inactive citizens . ... 142
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The commission deliberated following Mattox' s presentation. There
appeared to be general consensus that the people best qualified to solve
the capital city's boundary expansion problems were the city and the
two counties. "With that in mind," Aldhizer remarked, "we decided we
would have a meeting, an executive meeting in Williamsburg to which
would be invited a small group from the City of Richmond, from
Chesterfield County and from Henrico County ." 143
The Williamsburg meeting on February 13 was strictly confidential,
although the press had heard that the meeting was to occur. Many of the
participants at the meeting, when interviewed, indicated that the
Aldhizer Commission did not want to be publicly identified as the sponsor of the negotiations and, therefore, the representatives from the three
jurisdictions, together with the seven commissioners, met under the
name of some fictitious organization. All of the local representatives
agreed that while the stated intent of the conference was to facilitate a
local settlement of Richmond's boundary expansion difficulties, the
actual purpose was to bring about what one of the conferees called a
"shotgun marriage." 144 In short, the Aldhizer Commission leaned
heavily on the local representatives to resolve the issue, noting that if the
localities could not formulate a compromise, then the state would solve
the problem for them Several of those attending, including ViceChairman Pendleton, were told by the city representatives that
Richmond was in trouble and needed more whites from one or both
counties. Pendleton claimed that while the city representatives discussed
Richmond's need for additional tax assessables and its growing welfare
rolls, they also discussed the city's growing black population and the
1970 election-with the basic issue involving power, "who is going to
run the city.... " 145 It was in Williamsburg, according to Fritz Dietsch,
one of the Chesterfield representatives, that B. Earl Dunn of the Henrico
County Board was told in rather crude terms ofBagley's resolve to keep
the city from falling to a black majority. 146 Aldhizer testified that such
subjects as "race," "the 1970 councilmanic election," or "white
controi" were never discussed while he was present though he did
concede that the meeting was informal and" people were going in and out
of the halls from the room in which we were meeting .... 147
Court testimony also reveals that the participants in the Williamsburg
negotiatons generally agreed that the commission preferred a merger of
all three jurisdictions, but knew that such an action was unrealistic.
Consequently, the commissioners looked, first, to the localities for
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determining how much territory the two counties would be willing to
relinquish to city control. During a lunch break, the members of the
panel told the local representatives to sit down and come to an
agreement Chesterfield and Henrico officials, knowing earlier that the
commission was to sponsor the negotiations, had received from their
respective boards authorization to present a maximum population
which the governing bodies would allow Richmond to take. The city
had indicated its need for a minimum population of 45,000, though this
need was never the subject of an official meeting of the Richmond city
council 148 ( The city's delegation did not include any of the three
"troublemakers," to use one participant's description of the Crusadeendorsed legislators-Carpenter, Carwile, and Marsh. 149 ) All three
localities had come to Williamsburg with maps in order to facilitate the
bargaining. The problem, however, was that the Virginia code treated
partial mergers as annexation and state law allowed annexation
proceedings to occur in one of three ways: ( 1) a city initiated suit; (2) a
petition requesting annexation brought to the county circuit court by 51
percent of the qualified voters living in territory adjacent to any city or
town; or ( 3) a petition brought by the governing body of the county in
which such territory was located or by the governing body of a town
desiring annexation by an adjacent city. 1 so Richmond, in February,
1969, was still under a moratorium on any annexation effort aimed at
Henrico . State law imposed a five year waiting period on cities starting
at the point of an annexation court's final order or a period of eight years
dating from the filing of the suit Either way, the city could not institute
another suit against that county, at least not until December, 1969, the
date when the eight year moratorium expired ( That date came earlier
than the one terminating the five year period. The latter was to end in
May, 1970.) Richmond, however, could use the Chesterfield annexation
court as a vehicle for implementing an agreement with its southern
neighbor. Also, it was impractical to think that Chesterfield and
Henrico citizens, given county residents' hostility toward the city in
1969, would petition the circuit court to seek annexation. Finally, it
was infeasible for the Board of Supervisors of either county to petition
for annexation( the moratoria did not apply to counties) since such an act
would be tantamount to committing political suicide.
The Williamsburg meeting concluded without a solution. A few days
later, local representatives and commissioners met a second time, on
this occasion at the Hotel Richmond across from the capitol. 1s 1 Again,
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the three jurisdictions presented maps and discussion ensued, but, again,
no politically feasible settlement was forthcoming. The Aldhizer Commission had no choice but to recommend to the General Assembly a
solution to the capital city's dilemma-which it proceeded to do at its
final meeting on February 25, 1969. 152 With the localities unable to find
an answer, they had to face the prospect of a state imposed plan.
The state legislature had been called into a special session by
Governor Godwin to consider the revision of the state constitution. It
was during this special session that the Aldhizer Commission made its
recommendation. The recommendation took the form of a constitutional
amendment since there was some question whether legislation pertaining
to only one locality by virtue of the locality meeting the narrowly
prescribed population requirements established in the legislation would
be constitutional The Aldhizer Commission, after checking with the
state attorney generai believed that while such legislation had been
sanctioned in Virginia by habit or custom, the constitutionality of the
legislation was still questionable and, therefore, subject to court challenge. Delegate Pendleton argued that special act legislation was
clearly prohibited by Section 126 of the existing constitution and the
use of population brackets in general legislation to focus only on one
locality could be considered a special act By amending the constitution,
therefore, the Aldhizer Commission could both provide a solution to
Richmond's boundary problems and, at the same time, circumvent the
legal problems which might arise over special legislation. 153
The proposed amendment read:
The Capitol of the Commonwealth of Virginia shall be located within
the city of Richmond or within any other city the General Assembly may
designate. The boundaries of the city in which the Capitol is located
may be enlarged from time to time in any manner the General Assembly
shall prescribe, and any and every adjacent county, city or town from
which any territory may at any time be taken to so enlarge such
boundaries shall be fairly and fully compensated therefor in such manner
and in accordance with such judicial procedure as the General Assembly
may prescribe.
The power herein granted to the General Assembly to enlarge the
boundaries of the capital city shall not be exercised more often than once
in every ten years. 154

Both the Richmond-Henrico state legislative delegation ( at that time
Richmond and Henrico shared representation in the Virginia House of
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Delegates) and a sizable number of city officials began an intensive
lobbying effort in behalf of the proposed amendment Delegate
Pendleton, who introduced the amendment on the House side and was
the floor leader during the discussions on the proposal, recalled seeing
the city attorney and five RF endorsed members of the Richmond city
council speaking with legislators about the measure. 155 Delegate Grady
W. Dalton from Richlands, Virginia, was one legislator approached by
a member of the Richmond-Henrico delegation. Responding in a letter
to a questionnaire used by the authors in their interviews, Dalton said,
"Someone from the Richmond delegation, I can't remember his name,
remarked that I didn't have their problem, that there were no Negroes
in my town of Richlands, Virginia, and very few in my legislative
district of Tazewell County." Dalton later voted in support of the
amendment, though he expressed sympathy "with the people of
Chesterfield and Henrico-that annexation provides no permanent
solution, just more nibbling in years to come."
Normally, verbatim proceedings of the General Assembly are not
printed, but since the 1969 convening of the General Assembly
constituted an extraordinary session to deal with major revisions to the
state constitution, the proceedings and debates were transcribed Co1r
sequently, the debates which ensued over the proposed Aldhizer
Amendment were made a part of the official record
Pendleton led off the debates, explaining the rationale for formulating
the recommendation as a constitutional amendment as opposed to a
special act and outlining the process by which the Aldhizer Commission
reached its conclusion to seek a constitutional remedy. 156 RichmondHenrico Delegate Edward E . Lane then spoke in support of the
amendment, noting that Richmond's boundary expansion problem was
long-standing and briefly tracing the protracted nature of the annexation
attempts. He brought the legislators to the present situation and
indicated that only a few weeks earlier there had been an effort to effect
a merger between Richmond and Henrico through state legislative
action. Lane was referring to a proposed bill by Richmond-Henrico
Delegate Thomas P. Bryan, Jr., to merge the two jurisdictions by action
of the General Assembly, a measure similar to Senator Willey's 1968
proposal The Bryan bill, however, never referred directly to Richmond
and Henrico, although, given the language of the bill, the two jurisdictions were the only ones actually addressed The bill would have added
a provision to the state code calling for the automatic consolidation of
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any city and adjacent county which contained a prescribed population
density. News about the Bryan initiative reached the Henrico County
Board of Supervisors and, as Lane noted in his floor speech, the
supervisors "became incensed and severely criticized the HenricoRichmond delegation." 157 In an effort to determine whether any
possibility existed for a compromise, Lane told his colleagues that the
local legislative delegation called a meeting between the H enrico Board
of Supervisors and the Richmond City Council Held on March 28,
1969, in the House Appropriations Committee Room, the meeting
ended in failure. "There was absolute ly no indication of any solution to
the problem by agreement," Lane said He stressed that every avenue
had been tried without success and, in closing, observed that while
members of the Richmond-Henrico delegation would be justified in
opposing the amendment since they were charged to represent both
areas, he believed that it was "imperative that this constitutional
amendment pass." 158
Actually, the first meeting between the two governing bodies to
discuss the Aldhizer and Bryan initiatives was three days earlier than
the meeting Lane discussed On March 25, 1969, the supervisors and
council members met at the Henrico County Board Room The meeting
was held shortly after news about the Bryan bill had surfaced The
purpose of the gathering, like the Aldhizer sponsored meeting in
Williamsburg, was to discuss possible areas of agreement so as to nullify
the need for any state action and to report the sentiments of supervisors
and council members regarding the Aldhizer Amendment and the
Bryan bill to the state legislature. Unlike the Williamsburg meeting,
however, the meeting on the 25th was not sponsored by the commission
and the three "dissident'' members of council were not excluded But
like the Williamsburg affair, the negotiations on the 25th terminated
with a stalemate. Henrico board members voiced strong objections to
the proposed amendment and the bill These sentiments, plus the anger
which supervisors expressed toward the local delegates who were
supporting the Bryan bill ( including threats by some supervisors to run
for the House of Delegates in the next election), and the questionable
constitutionality of the bill ( which some believed was comparable to
special act legislation) led Delegate Bryan to the point of never
officially introducing the bill before the General Assembly. 159
Richmond-Henrico Delegate Junie L. Bradshaw spoke in opposition

Annexation and the Struggle for Power

I 07

to the amendment during the special session of the state legislature and,
in so doing, made an observation that years later would prove to be
prophetic. He stated that the amendment, if passed, would enable the
state legislature to expand the capital city's boundaries and, thus, deny
"over 200,000 people in Henrico and Richmond their day in court, and
we all know the underlying motive behind such action If this is not a
prime question for our federal courts today, I do not know what is." 160
[italics added] Richmond-Henrico Delegate William Ferguson Reid, the
only black member of the 140 body state legislature, also spoke in
opposition, asserting that "the Commission was created to come back
with one idea, to do something to make Richmond larger so they could
get a larger population" 161 The strongest statement in opposition to the
amendment came from Chesterfield Delegate George Jones.
We have heard it said on the floor this morning that the problem is one
of economics. I am here to tell you it is not The city of Richmond is
interested in only one thing-white votes. Do not forget it They are
holding this resolution as a club over the head of the counties to force
merger. They are, in essence, telling the counties that if you do not merge
with Richmond, if something is not done, then the legislature is going to
act It is like sending a ball team on the field and telling them to go ahead
and play the game, we do not care what the score is. If you do not win we
will legislate the score for you at the end .. .
The city asked that the legislature take this up. I do not feel this is
legislative matter. But if it is a legislative matter, ladies and gentlemen,
then why do we not appoint the governing body of the city of Richmond?
We will set it up like Washington, D.C., if that is what they want We will
appoint the city council if they cannot manage the city of Richmond and
they need help from us. We will manage it for them
... As I said, they want white votes .... There is a group in Richmond
that would like to continue the stranglehold control that they have over
the city and the only way they can do it is to be sure they can keep more
registered white voters than Negro voters. 162

The supporters of the amendment did emphasize the city's economic
needs and the fact that the problem was deteriorating not only because of
the city's lack of asses sables, due partly to the large land holdings of
the state which were not subject to a local property tax, but also
because of the inability or failure of the city to expand its boundaries
since 1942. Richmond-Henrico Delegate Eleanor P. Sheppard took
particular exception to Delegate Jones' s comments.
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Disenfranchisement of the Negro? I deny that accusation. I believe
I can do that without fear of contradiction. As a legislator for fourteen
years, as a civic worker for many more, their interests and needs have
been those of any constituent or any friend In 1964 I campa igned with
and for the first Negro elected to the Richmond City Council (B. A
Cephas]; and in 1966 I helped elect the second [Winfred Mundie] and
was proud to serve with the third [Henry Marsh], also elected in 1966. In
1968 the first two were defeated, not by the white community of
Richmond but by their own people.... 163

Sheppard continued her statement by pointing out the economic and
cultural linkages between the city and the suburbs and the need to arrest
the physical and financial deterioration of the state's capital city.
The Senate debate on the Aldhizer Amendment followed the same
themes, although less was said explicitly about race. Senator Aldhizer
fulfilled the same role in the Senate as Pendleton in the House.
Aldhizer briefed his colleagues on the history of the commission, the
unsuccessful efforts to arrange a compromise among the three localities,
and the thrust of the amendment itself.164 Richmond Senator Edward
Willey, who supported the amendment, discussed the effect of changing
population trends on the city's economy. When he discussed the city's
loss of population, he left little room for class differences in the black
community, noting simply that "here in Richmond we have about
215,000 people left ... Of this population, 85,000 are white, 120,000
approximately are in the disadvantaged group." 165 That race was not a
subject often discussed openly should not mean that the subject was not
the underlying theme of a considerable portion of the debate. It was.
Senator Leslie D. Campbeli Jr., from Hanover County questioned,
"But what is truly before us today, gentlemen? Is it a question of
finance? Is it a question of financing the city of Richmond's government?
. . . I say to you that it is not a financial problem It is a problem of
imbalance; all of you down deep know exactly what the problem is." 166
Senator George Warren of Bristol touched on the same issue though,
unlike Campbeli Warren supported the amendment "My friend for
whom I have the greatest affection in the world . . . said that we all
understand the real reason for expanding Richmond's boundaries. I
understand it and think you do." Recognizing that a change in the
political composition of the Richmond City Council could alter the city's
position on the boundary expansion issue, Warren continued:
... the day may soon come when the Richmond city council itself would
not vote in favor of even submitting the issue of merger to the people.
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Wha t are you going to do then, gentlemen? Where is your problem then?
The problem is still there, and it has to be solved, and who is going to
solve it unless this General Assembly does? 167

War ren' s comment caught the attention of the press. News Leade r
reporter Bill Sauder simply noted that the Hanover senator alluded to
" the unspoken issue behind the boundary expans ion question." Lest the
reader was not informed, the reporter, following the Warren quote,
commented that " this was an apparent reference to rapidly growing
Negro voter strength in the city." 168
Senate efforts to weaken the amendment were defeated One
unsuccessful move was to restrict any General Assembly-prompted
boundary expansion to no more than 25 percent of any adjacent
county's population. Another effort was to exempt counties subject to
expansion by the capital city from annexation for ten years. And the
attempt to defeat the amendment itself was also unsuccessful 169 The
Senate voted twenty-five to thirteen to pass the amendment at this first
of the three stage process. 110 ( To amend the constitution, two successive
sessions of the General Assembly must approve a change which then is
subject to a statewide referendum) The House , too, considered floor
amendments to the proposal but the amendments failed Accordingly,
the House passed the measure with a large margin, sixty-two to twentynine.
In the final analysis, many state legislators supported the measure,
not because of their desire to dilute the black vote, but to assist
economically the capital city. And many of those who opposed the
amendment were either self-deceived or else grossly naive to suggest
that Richmond did not have financial problems. Some opponents argued
that the dual threats of annexation and legislative remedies were too
much of an obstacle to Henrico and Chesterfield counties, making it
difficult for the counties to plan when they faced such uncertainty.
Nevertheless, it is also clear that "the unspoken issue" guided the
behavior of many other state legislators, both supporters and opponents,
and that this issue was made explicit in the corridors of the capitol or
hotel rooms where lobbying could be undertaken more discreetly.
Moreover, it was also evident that with the action of the 1969 General
Assembly, the Commonwealth of Virginia was prepared to step into the
breach and resolve a matter which the two counties still preferred to
resolve locally.
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Section 2. The Homer-Bagley Line
The Compromise Agreement and the Annexation Court Decision
Irrespective of the first passage of the Aldhizer Amendment, the
Richmond power structure was still anxious. The 1970 councilmanic
election was approaching and a constitutional amendment would not be
in place, together with appropriate legislative action, prior to the
election. The Chesterfield annexation was the only effective short term
measure.
The new trial date had been set for May 5, but since the 1969 General
Assembly did not adjourn until April 25 and since legislative immunity
allowed the two county defense attorneys who were members of the
legislature to postpone any litigation until thirty days following the
adjournment of the General Assembly, the trial did not begin until later
in May. Technically, the trial could not begin until May 25, assuming
that the two legislators took advantage of their immunity, but Senator
Parkerson and Delegate Gray waived the full thirty day immunity
to enable the court hearings to get underway a few days earlier on
May 20. 171
Before the trial date, however, still more private meetings took place.
All of them involved only Richmond and Chesterfield officials and all
were convened with the intention of seeking a compromise settlement of
the annexation. Now that the state legislature had acted, the county was
more willing to discuss a compromise, knowing that it could better protect
its interests through a negotiated decision than if it left the settlement
strictly to the annexation court or, worse, to the General Assembly.
Certainly the latter was becoming a very possible alternative with the
1969 passage of the Aldhizer Amendment
The next meeting, involving James Wheat, Phil Bagley, and Irvin G.
Homer, was in late Aprii after Wheat had resigned from the council in
order to devote more time to his family and business. They met on the
initiative of E. Angus Poweli a resident of Henrico County whose
business was located in the city. ( Powell was the brother of a Richmonder who later was appointed to the U.S. Supreme Court, Lewis F.
Powell) These three men got together in Powell's office at Lea
Industries on a Sunday afternoon. Powell was playing the role of the
mediator as Andrew J. Brent had done at his home in the summer of
1965. Homer recalled that the session was an attempt to produce an
agreement "that would keep this case from going into what was to be a
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brand new retrial from scratch ... to see if the city had any different
thinking or we had any different thinking." 172 Evidently neither the city
nor the county exhibited much " different thinking'' since nothing of
significance resulted
A few days later, Bagley and Horner met together for lunch, but to no
avail 173 So it was, too, in early May, 1969, when the two came to
Horner' s office on Hull Street near Southside Plaza Shopping Center in
Chesterfield Both men brought maps. 174 Moreover, Melvin Burnett had
supplied Horner with technical information for the meeting, as he had
done for all of the Homer negotiations, and the city administration,
particularly George Talcott and city planner Dallis Oslin, had prepared
similar information for Bagley. Both negotiators, therefore, had information about schools, utilities, vacant land, population, and tax
assess ables. Yet, as Bagley and Horner both noted in court, the maps and
the technical information were seldom used Bagley justified his action
on the grounds that as real estate professionals " both of us are well
familiar with the whole metropolitan area " 175 Horner indicated that such
information as land use, drainage basins, utilities, and roads was not
necessary inasmuch as the major concern of Bagley was people, both
school children and adults. " In these private meetings, Phil Bagley was
much more bold and forward and not as coy as Jim Wheat and other
representatives had been at prior meetings," Horner wrote in an affidavit
" He made no bones that the City needed voters." 176 Chesterfield, neefr
ing to conclude the annexation through a negotiated settlement, was
attempting to meet the demands of the city without endangering the
county's large assets in DuPont and its utility and school systems. That it
had to do and still maintain credibility with the county voters, thus
making the negotiations difficult largely because Horner and the other
members of the Board of Supervisors could not sanction the loss of" an
unreasonable" number of Chesterfield citizens. The two men, however,
were much closer to reaching a settlement than had been the case only a
couple of weeks earlier at the Powell meeting and certainly closer than
Burnett and Kiepper during their series of conferences in 1968. But, as
close as they were getting, a final settlement continued to elude them.
The early May meeting ended with the boundary question still
unresolved
One more effort was made. The results were the same. Mayor Bagley
had phoned Homer on May 14 during a meeting of the county board to
inform him that that the council majority ( the Richmond Forward bloc)
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could not accept a settlement involving fewer than 48,000 people.
Having heard previously that the minimum figure was in the lower 40' s,
with 44,000 being the number most frequently mentioned ( an amount
still too high for the county), Horner"told him that we could not agree
and we may as well stop further talks." 177 The mayor was not dissuaded
and voiced his desire to continue the negotiations.
Meanwhile, valuable time had been lost It appeared that ifbounda.!)'
expansion were to occur soon it would have to come through a favorable
ruling of the annexation court The problem was that, beyond the
uncertainty of what the court might do, a ruling could be appealed, thus
delaying the effective date of the annexation and thereby jeopardizing the
political status quo since the 1970 councilmanic election would likely
precede the acquisition of additional citizens.
Suddenly, the breakthrough came. The results were as dramatic as
the precipitating event was undramatic. On May 15, the day after
Bagley had called Horner about the 48,000 minimum population,
Times-Dispatch reporter James E. Davis was talking with Phil Bagley
in the pressroom of City Hall. Davis recalled in an interview that it was
common for reporters and the mayor to "sit and chat . . . in a very
informal fashion" A reciprocal relationship had developed such that
the reporters would approach Bagley for stories and Bagley would
approach the reporters about matters he wanted in the papers. As Davis
remembered,
... we were chatting one day and it had occurred to me that I had talked
with the attorneys in the case about the possibilities of a compromise and
I had talked with Bagley about the possibility of compromise and he
suggested that it did not appear likely since Chesterfield, obviously, had
employed good counsel and they were going to the bitter end And it
occurred to me that the opportunity to talk with Irvin Horner might be
relished by Bagley on an informal basis. So I picked up the phone and
said, "Let me call a friend here," and I called Irvin Horner and happened to catch him in and chatted with him and said, "There's a gentleman here
who would like to talk with you about some very important matters." 178

Had there been little or no history of confidential bargaining between
Richmond and Chesterfield officials, the Davis initiative might not have
been so prosaic. But for four years numerous bilateral conferences had
been held in every conceivable environment and under the most pressing
of conditions. And, yet, it was not until a local newspaper reporter in a
casua~ almost spontaneous fashion connected Bagley and Horner on a
telephone line that a compromise began to take shape.
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Bagley talked with Horner on the phone and they proceeded to
establish an appointment for that evening at 8:00 in the mayor's City
Hall office. For several months prior to the phone conversation, Horner,
like Bagley, had been talking privately with his colleagues on the board
Unlike Bagley, however, Horner had included all the supervisors in his
discussions. Most Chesterfield officials had already come to the position
that the only way to break the stalemate and, at the same time, to diminish
the possibilities of an adverse court award which would exceed the fiftyone square mile request of the city and also to slow the momentum
which had carried the Aldhizer Amendment through the 1969 General
Assembly was to authorize a compromise. Given the consensus of the
board, Horner had reached the point where he was prepared to meet the
city's population demand in excess of 40,000 people, but only on the
condition that the schools, DuPont, and the utility network, particularly
the Falling Creek treatment plant and reservoir, were protected There
was still the danger of a political backlash among county residents who
would not agree to any out-of-court settlement, but Horner and the
majority of the other supervisors were realistic enough to realize that
they had to negotiate while they still retained some leverage with the city
lest with the passage of time they would have no choice but to accept the
consequence of others' decisions. County officials knew that timing for
the city was critical and that as long as the county could thwart a
January 1, 1970 annexation, either by refusing to bargain or by
appealing an unfavorable court ruling, it could still effectively defend its
interests by threatening delay while meeting the city's population
requirements.
Meanwhile, Bagley was not unaware of the pressures building on the
county and the necessity for Chesterfield to seek a negotiated settlement
He was reasonably sure he could acquire a settlement which included
the critical population figures. Also, Bagley, like his counterpart, was
not certain what the results of the trial would be. If there were an award, it
might be too small or too costly. He recalled the large price fixed to the
seventeen square mile territory awarded by the Henrico court in 1965.
Finally, Bagley figured that a compromise agreement, assuming it were
ratified by the court and made a part of the court award, would cancel
any possibility of an appeal by the county which could both delay the
effective date of the annexation and increase the legal costs to the city. 179
In short, while each side needed to compromise, each side was not
incapable of extracting concessions from the other. The time was ripe
for a solution.
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When Bagley and Homer met on the evening of the 15th, the mayor
produced a map which included a proposed target area encompassing
about 48,000 people. Homer reiterated the position of the county that
48,000 were too many and that" the Chesterfield Board would not go this
far." 180 Bagley then lowered the ante to a figure of 44,000, telling
Homer that he believed the council members with whom he had been
conferring would agree to the lowered minimum With that understanding, the area on Bagley' s map was altered somewhat with Homer
telling Bagley where to draw the line. "I said, ' Let me dictate a line to
you of an area that will encompass this many people [44,000]. You write
it down .. .' The mayor then wrote out the line as I dictated it . .. " 181
Needing verification that the adjusted boundaries included the necessary
population, Homer called Melvin Burnett that same evening from the
mayor's office and described to the Executive Secretary the boundaries
which Bagley and Homer had agreed upon Burnett confirmed the
population figures, telling Homer that based on 1968 estimates , the area
comprised 43,781 people. Upon request, Burnett also supplied Homer
with the number of school children in the area 184 With a confirmation
that the territory just negotiated met the minimum population and with
the understanding that the two jurisdictions would agree on a financial
settlement in subsequent meetings, the mayor initialed the map to register
his approval
The compromise area which Bagley and Homer negotiated was
similar to one of the city's proposals made in a meeting with the Aldhizer
Commission Consequently, the territory negotiated on May 15 was not
a complete surprise to the city, although it was surprising that Bagley did
not seek technical information from the city manager or other administration sources before agreeing to the line. Bagley did have Homer call
Burnett for verification of the territory's population, but the mayor relied
in this instance on Burnett's figures and did not seek information about
population from City Hall sources or information regarding other
matters from either Burnett or City Hall The following colloquy
between Homer and the questioning attorney was particularly revealing:
Question : Did he want to know how much vacant land was in that
area?
Answer: He only asked me to verify how many people were in the
area of the line that we drew.. ..
Question: Did the Mayor request for you to tell him anything about
utilities in that area?
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Answer: No .
Question : Roads?
Answer: No, only the number of people that were in this line. 183

Bagley testified that he relied on Homer's information about schools in
the area and the number of school children and that information
pertaining to utilities would be acquired later from technicians and
engineers. He said, " We did not go into detail on the school operation or
the utility operation or such. I don't think either one of us were qualified
to do that " When the attorney asked, " You did not know very much
else about what was in this line?" Bagley responded, "I certainly did I
am a realtor. I have pretty good knowledge of the Richmond metropolitan
area " 184
George Talcott, Richmond' s annexation expert who was responsible
for compiling much of the technical materials for the case, was not
informed of the line until eleven days later on May 26 when City
Attorney Mattox contacted him. The two men met that evening at
Talcott' s home and began preparing the financial conditions of the
agreement The mayor himself never approached Talcott directly for
information about the territory for another week and a half- twentythree days after the agreement! In response to the mayor's overture,
Talcott drafted a memorandum on June 7, dated June 9, which, in
Talcott' s words, was " an evaluation and comparison of general data of
the area sought [ in the 1961 annexation ordinance] and the compromise
area consisting of area, total population, nonwhite population, schoolage children, school capacity, total assessables, vacant land" The
memorandum also included an analysis of developed industrial, commercia~ and residential properties as well as sites suitable for development Finally, the document noted the racial ratios of the city as well as
the projected ratios of a new city comprising the original target area
and a city comprising the compromise area 185
Following the May 15 meeting between the mayor and the Chesterfield
board chairman, several sessions involving the city attorney, the city
manager, the county executive secretary, and one of the county
defense attorneys were convened to discuss a financial settlement On
June 11, Bagley phoned his counterpart and told Horner that the city
would make a final offer of $27 ,169,000 including a cash payment in
excess of $7,000,000 for the compromise territory. The county had
wanted a $44,000 ,000 settlement, but Bagley' s "final offer," which was
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$3 million more than the city had previously suggested, had the ring of a
take-it-or-leave-it proposition. Horner quickly convened a meeting of
the county board The board instructed Horner and defense attorney
John Thornton to talk with the mayor and whomever the mayor wished
to include from the city in an effort to determine if the city was serious in
wanting to settle the case by compromise and if it stood firmly behind its
money offer. Accordingly, the two county representatives met with
Bagley and John Davenport, one of Richmond's annextion lawyers, at
9: 30 p.m. in City Hall that same day, June 11. There, the mayor verified
the offer and stressed to Horner that "he had six councilmen [ all but
Marsh, Carpenter, and Carwile] committed to the proposition that if the
county accepted it, there was nothing further for him or me to do but the
lawyers would meet to work out the mechanics of settlement" 186 Bagley
also indicated that the city would agree to the compromise and the
financial settlement only if the county consented not to appeal and if the
annexation could be effective by January 1, 1970. The latter was
necessary so that the annexed citizens could vote in the 1970 councilmanic election. The city also suggested that the county officials use
their influence to dissuade intervenors in the suit from appealing. The
county lawyers said that the latter request was beyond their control and
that the city should not expect any assistance from the county on this
matter. 187 The county, however, did agree to inform Richmond of its
acceptance or rejection of the city's offer and conditions as soon as
possible.
The next day, June 12, the Chesterfield County Board of Supervisors
met and a majority of the legislators agreed to accept the city's offer and
to endorse the compromise agreement 188 Only Fritz Dietsch and A R
Martin dissented 189
The process by which Chesterfield supervisors reached their decision
differed considerably from that used by Richmond officials. Shortly
after the Homer-Bagley agreement had been struck on May 15, the
mayor called a meeting of the Richmond Forward bloc on council All
RF members attended, except Na than F orb who was ill They met at the
home of David L. Shepardson, the councilman appointed to fill the
vacancy created by James Wheat's resignation. 190 One of the participants at the meeting was Nell Pusey who had served a year on council
after having been elected in 1968. She admitted in a interview that
because she was relatively new to council she did not know as much
about the finer points of the annexation as others. Nevertheless, she did
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say that at the meeting they were not given many technical facts about the
compromise area 191 Another newcomer to counciL Thomas J. Bliley,
Jr., also stated that while the Shepardson meeting was called to acquire
the majority members' approval in principle of the compromise line, the
meeting did not generate answers to Bliley' s questions pertaining to such
items as the amount of vacant land and the number and kind of
improvements in the target area In response to the lawyer's query,
"Isn't it true that about the only definite fact you knew at this meeting was
that you could see the line and you knew the number of people?", Bliley
responded, "That is right " 192 Subsequent meetings were necessary to
obtain information which Bliley desired at the Shepardson conclave. Yet,
irrespective of incomplete data about the line, the Richmond Forward
group consented to the line. Furthermore, when Bagley said later that
" he had six councilmen committed to the proposition," he was referring
to a proposition which had been discussed and agreed upon in a private
meeting of council members exclusive of the three Crusade endorsed
legislators. Unlike Dietsch and Martin, who participated in the board
discussions and who registered their opposition to the compromise in the
context of a debate involving all supervisors, Carpenter, Marsh, and
Carwile knew nothing of the discussions at the Shepardson home and, in
fact, learned later about the compromise from reading the newspapers.
By June 25, 1969, all of the details surrounding the Homer-Bagley
line had been completed and, with each jurisdiction having agreed to the
financial arrangements and the conditions noted in previous meetings,
including the meeting of June 11 and another one on June 19 where the
no- appeal condition was stressed, the two parties formally signed the
agreement 193 Again, the three Crusade-endorsed council members were
confined to the periphery.
During the discussions that followed the May 15 drawing of the
Homer-Bagley line, the second annexation trial had begun, convening
on May 20 . On the first day of the triaL Delegate Gray, who was one of
Chesterfield's defense attorneys, argued for the dismissal of the case on
the grounds that the state legislature, through the Aldhizer Amendment,
"established in law that boundary expansion for the City of Richmond is
no longer a matter to be determined by court proceedings . . .. 194 Though
the motion was not granted by the court, arguing that the amendment
was not yet ratified, Gray's address to the three judge panel in support of
the motion was noteworthy because of the explicit reference he made
to the racial factor.
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The Legislature in dealing with this Aldhizer report heard a good deal
about the racial problems of the City of Richmond which this Court
determined at its last hearing was not a proper matter for determination in
annexation and yet, your Honor, we found out that it was almost like a
man talking to a friend of his who has just lost all of his hair overnight He
knows that the man knows that he knows he is bald and he knows that the
man knows that he knows he knows it, and we all sat here and and we went
through this case and we all wouldn't talk about it, wouldn't think about it,
and everybody knew that they knew that's what they were thinking about,
and they knew we knew that's what they were thinking about, and we all
knew that's what the Court knew we were thinking about
So it was like trying an iceberg, the 20 percent you could see we were
talking about and the 80 percent that was most harmful to us was down
there where you couldn't look at it But the Legislature had this in mind,
and that is just unavoidably tied up in this case and that is purely a political
question, and you can't ferret it out, you can't possibly separate that from
the considerations of the other matters which are going to come before
you.19s

Two additional motions were also raised Chesterfield attorneys and
lawyers for a group of civic associations located in the target area [the
original area as outlined in the 1961 ordinance], which had intervened in
the case, sought unsuccessfully to have Judges Marshall and Whitley
disqualify themselves from the case since they had heard most of the
previous testimony of the first trial Marshall and Whitley, however,
ruled that they did not hold a personal bias in the case and could continue
on the panel for the second trial. The second motion, like the other two,
an attempt to scrap or at least delay the triai was to have the court
declare a stay of judicial proceedings pending the determination of the
Aldhizer Amendment 196 Also like the other two motions, the third
motion was opposed by a unanimous court ruling.
The court began hearing testimony from city witnesses and during the
process ordered the city to share the background material included in the
Sartain Report with the county. The report was sponsored by the
Richmond School Board which used federal money to support a study
undertaken by five academicians of racial change in Northside schools.
The annexation court stipulated that the county could see the report on
the condition that the Chesterfield attorneys could not make notes from
the report, make any portion of the report public, or question any
witnesses about the report without acquiring approval from the three
judges meeting in chambers. 197 An editorial in the News Leader charged
the county was using the Sartain Report, which had recommended
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annexation as a means to reinstate racial balance in the city's schools
and which had also recommended the construction oflow income housing
throughout the city, "as a racial bugaboo to intimidate reason in the
annexation proceedings ." Taking a broadside against federally sponsored research, such as the Sartain study, and noting that the city "had
nothing whatever to do with the preparation of this . .. project" and that
the report's recommendations did not carry any official sanction from
the city, the editorial writer then asserted that the study was nothing more
than "an academic excursion into some liberal wonderland, where
complex racial problems and attitudes can be permanently resolved
through forced housing laws and the dispersal of slums throughout the
suburbs." The writer apparently believed that, after having delivered
such an attack on the federal government and the five professors
employed "to advance racial integration," that it was necessary to
remind his readers that" while it is now almost impossible anywhere in
America to contemplate public policy or change without considerations
of race, this is not the basic motivation behind Richmond's efforts to
break out of its strangling borders. 198 [ italics added]
It was while the county was presenting its witnesses and before the
testimony of the several intervenors in the case that word came to the
annexation court of the Homer-Bagely compromise. 199 Irvin Homer was
the person who made public the compromise agreement After taking
the stand, he informed the court of the settlement and chronologized the
initial meetings he held with Mayor Bagley as well as the subsequent
negotiations involving additional Chestefield and Richmond representatives. Of course, once Homer made the announcement, the story became
fair game for reporters . Until June 16, when Homer notified the judges
of the agreement, nothing about the compromise negotiations had been
mentioned in the press, although some reporters were aware that Homer
and Bagley were involved in private meetings and, in James Davis's
case, had actually participated in the instigation of the talks. Davis
justified the decision he and his colleagues had made to omit any
reference in news stories to the summitry on the basis that, given the
"very delicate situation," the meetings needed to be strictly confidential
Actually the judges had been notified of the compromise on June 16
before Homer took the stand In fact, it was agreed in a private
conversation among the judges and the county lawyers in the chambers
of Chief Judge Earl L. Abbott that Homer's role was to make the public
disclosure about the settlement, though Richmond counsel opposed the

120

The Politics of Annexation

settlement and objected then and later in open court to Horner' s testimony
since efforts to compromise "have never been admissable as evidence. " 200 Abbott, however, overruled the objection in chambers and
the city withdrew its objection later in court ( City lawyers had
been involved in the private negotiations over the Homer-Bagley line,
but Conard Mattox, David J. Mays, and Horace Edwards [former City
Manager Edwards had been retained by the city as its chief annexation
lawyer] had expressed uneasiness about the compromise efforts since,
they argued, their job was to represent the city in the suit and to continue
in that role until the conclusion of the suit) Everything that was agreed
upon in the judge's chambers was not shared in open court Indeed, the
conversation and the decisions made confidentially in chambers constitute some of the most intriguing dimensions of the long history of
annexatioIL
Judge Abbott Well, first, I would like to say that we are pleased that
you have gotten together and settled your differences. I think it might in
the end create good will and harmony between the people but I think
mechanics is a question to consider.
Now, you say you gentlemen have agreed Does that mean the Board of
Supervisors themselves will have to take formal action on it? And what
are we going to do about protestors? . ..
Just listening to what you have said this morning, it would be my
suggestion that we just proceed with the case and then when the evidence
is in, let us hear the Protestors and then you can tell us what your
agreement is and we can make our decision accordingly, and in that way
the Intervenors won't feel like they have been kicked around or left out
There would be no need for the City Council to have a meeting, it
wouldn't be necessary for the Board of Supervisors to have a meeting.
That would be a decision for the Court ...
Let us go ahead with the case and while we are hearing the Intervenors
let the City and the County present to the Court in writing which we will
hold here confidentially in the office when you have a proposition that you
all have agreed upon, and then when we consider the case we will have it
in mind ...
All right I am going to ask the reporter not to write this portion and ifhe
does write it up not to make it accessible where the press and the radio can
get it When you write it, just hand it to me instead of laying it on the desk
and I will give it to you gentlemen later on I just don't want the press
getting ahold of what we have been talking about in here because the
whole thing will just-it would be wrong. [italics added)
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Mr. Thornton ( representing Chesterfield County) : I think you are in an
area when~- I pledged my word and nobody in this room has done any
talking but already the newspapers have beat this thing to death, and I
think this has got to go into open court and the chips have got to fall where
they may.zo1

As the conversation reveals, the presiding judge intended to keep the
session in his chambers private and not part of the court record, although
what occurred privately proved decisive as far as the ultimate action
taken by the court was concerned Indeed, it is somewhat a mystery how
the court stenographer managed to slip into the chambers without one of
the judges or lawyers calling attention to the stenographer's presence
and politely excusing him or her. But not only did the court reporter
attend the session, the reporter proceeded to record everything that was
said and it appears that the only reason the discussions were later made
a part of the public record was that the press already knew about the
compromise and the court, therefore, had little choice but to release the
information.
As the conversation also reveals, the judges decided to proceed with
the case, although they were knowledgeable of the compromise settlement and had immediate access to the settlement ("which we will hold
here confidentially in the office" ) when the court was ready to make its
decision. While Judge Abbott said that the court would not "be bound
by" any agreement he also said "that chances are we are going to
approve it ... " and as the final outcome of the trial clearly showed the
compromise agreement and the court decision were one and the same. 202
It was obvious from the discussion in chambers that the presiding judge
was prepared, indeed anxious, to take the compromise and use it as the
basis for a court award By mandating the compromise as a decision of
the court, the jurist reasoned, it would be unnecessary for either local
governing board to act officially, although the Board of Supervisors, by
a vote of four to two, had already gone on record of supporting the
compromise. The Richmond City CounciL on the other hand, had never
taken an official stand regarding the compromise and, while the six
Richmond Forward legislators had agreed to the Homer-Bagley line,
their action was taken at a private meeting where Carpenter, Marsh, and
Carwile had been purposely excluded Nevertheless, Presiding Judge
Abbott and Elliott Marshall were influenced by the fact that a majority
of both governing bodies had approved the agreement Marshall said
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me in my decision. ... " 203 Moreover, Abbott and Marshall argued that
neither the city nor the county was authorized to compromise. The
decision to annex would be that of the annexation court and the court
alone. Consequently, according to Abbott, "We are not going to wait
on the city council to pass that ordinance [ a new annexation ordinance
spelling out the details of the compromise which, if passed, would
supercede the 1961 ordinance]. We are going on with the case." 204
Judge Whitley, however, voiced some reservations about the sentiments expressed in chambers. "Now, what do we do about the minority
of the counciV' asked Whitley, or "the minority of the Board of
Supervisors [ who] might not agree to this? I don't know what weight to
give to it That's what is troubling me." 205 City Attorney Conard Mattox
and city annexation lawyer Horace Edwards also were concerned about
any effort by the court to circumvent any official action by the council
"It can't be done," Edwards asserted "This would be an awfully unwise
thing to have .... 206 Mattox claimed that just because six people on
council agreed to compromise did not make the compromise a legal
agreement He stressed that the city council, acting officially, was the
only body that could give him instructions and while he had no quarrel
with the fact that the mayor had been involved in the negotiations, the
mayor remained simply one of nine councilmen. Abbott retorted, stating
that even though the six could not bind council, the court could mandate
the agreement, thereby obviating any role of council 207 Obviously such
action would insure that the three" dissident'' members of council would
not have an opportunity to review the Homer-Bagley compromise
before the court acted ( The best they could do was to read about the
compromise and the court activities in the newspapers.)
The presiding judge played an unusually aggressive role in the court
He apparently was not unduly bothered by legal technicalities or the
most fundamental principles of due process. It was clear that he and
others were quite willing to continue the case without seriously considering the testimony of additional witnesses who were yet to be heard
The scene in the judge's chambers hardly conforms to the textbook
image of an annexation court which hears debate between attorneys,
studies exhibits and documents, and gives attention to the examination
and cros&-examination of witnesses before rendering a decision based
on the merits of the case. Judge Abbott had already indicated his desire
to expedite the case and to reach a decision by July 1. In that light, what
occurred both in chambers and later in open court followed the script to
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the letter. When the Chesterfield civic associations, which had intervened
in opposition to annexation, presented their witnesses, Judge Abbott
told them to put an end to repetitious testimony. 208 While the county was
wedded to the compromise, as was evident when the county put Horner
on the witness stand to testify about the details surrounding the HornerBagley line, the civic associations were not (Neither was county defense
attorney Fred Gray who said that he was not a party to any compromise.) James Davis reported that the "civic groups were trying desperately, if somewhat awkwardly, to block any annexation." 209 Already
they had begun raising money to support an appeal of what everyone
agreed was a certainty- a court award
The expectation became reality when, again, according to script, the
annexation court rendered its decision on July 1, 196 9. The final order
was entered on July 12. The court adopted verbatim the compromise
settlement ( including the financial arrangements) negotiated by Irvin
Horner and Phil Bagley. For the first time in Virginia annexation history,
a compromise between the opposing parties in an annexation suit was
negotiated privately outside the court, introduced as evidence in an
annexation court, and then approved without variation by the court
Indeed, the court itself recognized this fact when, in Abbott's explanation
of the decision, the following observation was made:
So far as we can ascertain, a compromise between two governing
bodies in an annexation case is unprecedented While the City objected to
the admission of evidence of the agreement and moved to strike it at the
time of its presentation, the objection and motion were later withdrawn.
Both sides admit that the agreement is not binding upon the Court
After mature consideration, we feel that the agreement is entitled to
great weight It must be remembered that the parties to the agreement
performed the legislative functions of their governments as duly elected
representatives of the people. When they decide that their constituents
are benefited by an action, such a decision should not be treated lightly.
[ italics added]
Of course, it must not be overlooked that they have not acted officially
by ordinance or resolution. 210

The italicized portion of the statement is also important in that the court
obviously deferred to the political judgment of the majority members of
each governing board To suggest, however, that the "duly elected
representatives of the people" were performing their legitimate legislative
functions failed to take into account that the Richmond Forward
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representatives were meeting secretly in the home of a councilman when
they approved the line and that the representatives who were largely
accountable to the city black population, which stood in 1969 at about
52 percent of the population, were not privy to this or other strategic
meetings and, consequently, never had the opportunity to discuss the
compromise or participate in the decision relative to the agreement The
Richmond experience, in this regard, differed considerably from
Chesterfield's where the opponents to the compromise met with their
colleagues and expressed their dissent openly in the course of a board
meeting.
The court award, which, obviously, the city accepted, enclosed twentythree square miles containing a population of 44,000, 97 percent of
whom was white. (The 1970 census revealed that the area actually
comprised 47,262 people.) With this infusion of white suburbanites into
the city's population, the proportion of blacks in the community would
decline from 5 2 percent to 42 percent and the proportion of voting age
blacks would drop from 45 percent to 37 percent In the 1961 annexation
ordinance, Richmond had sought fifty-one square miles which contained
a 1969 population of approximately 73,000. The addition of the twentythree square miles, though less than half the area originally sought,
represented an area practically the size of the entire city prior to
Ricmond' s last annexation in 1942 when the city area was twenty-four
square miles.211 The problem, however, was that the area awarded by
the 1969 annexation court excluded such economic and physical assets
as large industry, water sources, and large areas of open space conducive
to industrial. commercial. or residential development DuPont was left
in Chesterfield DuPont had acquired counsel to fight the annexation in
the court and it was widely rumored that if DuPont were annexed the
industry would eventually close its Richmond operations and move
them outside the metropolitan area Most of those participants in the
annexation who were interviewed by the authors, however, claimed that
DuPont was bluffing and that it was very doubtful that the company
would have undertaken such an action since it would have been
financialy imprudent
A few years after the annexation of the twenty-three square miles, a
major regional shopping center ( Cloverleaf Mall) was constructed in the
county just a few yards away from the city line near the intersection of
Chippenham Parkway and Midlothian Turnpike. Finally, the HornerBagley line did not include a sufficient number of school buildings to
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house the number of children brought into the city and, as a consequence,
the court ordered the following:
( 1) County ... shall provide space and instruction on tuition basis not to
exceed net cost to the county ... for all school children in the annexation
area for whom the city is unable to .. . provide in 1960--70 and 1970--71
sessions;
(2) Chesterfield County . .. shall provide space and instruction on same
basis for all junior and senior high school students in the area from whom
the City is unable to so provide in the 1971- 72 session;
( 3) Chesterfield . . . shall acquire sites . . . to build three elementary
schools to city specifications . . . and turn them over to the city by
September 1, 1971. 21 2

In retrospect, many city officials today regret the compromise agreement In interviews with the authors, they indicate that had the city
proceeded into open court without having arranged a compromise , the
city would have probably received an award that would surely have
exceeded the twenty-three square miles and perhaps included an area
exceeding even the fifty-one square miles outlined in the 1961 annexation ordinance . After all, the city was in a rare position for municipalities
that had faced annexation courts in that not one of the three judges was a
judge from the affected county . Chesterfield Circuit Court Judge David
Meade White had been replaced with a circuit court judge from Clifton
Forge, Earl Abbott Conard B. Mattox, Jr., was perhaps the most
outspoken critic of the compromise when the authors conducted interviews with those who played a role in the annexation dispute .
I was extremely disappointed in the settlement I think it was the most
disappointing event of my entire legal career. I was just crushed I knew
nothing about it until it was too late [ that is, until Horner and Bagley had
drawn the line] . . . I knew that, at the minimum, the city was going to get
every damn inch of the land that it had asked for and, most likely, an area
. . . that we didn't even ask for.
From a pure technical point of view, the annexation line is an abortion.
It cuts across drainage areas . It's just bad, absolutely bad And no judge
in his right mind, Abbott certainly, could not have on his own taken all of
the evidence that was before him and draw the line in a way where that
line was actually drawn for him He would not have done it He's too
smart The line would have been somewhere else. 213

Why, then, given the negative sentiment expressed today( as well as in
1969) regarding the compromise, was the settlement approved by the
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council majority? Beyond the rationale that the six legislators could not
predict what the court might do was the concern for timing. The
annexation had to be effective no later than January 1, 1970; otherwise, a new council majority might emerge after the spring 1970 election
and call a halt to the entire process. There was an added fear for some.
An antiannexation majority on council was a euphemism for either a
majority black council or a council majority accountable to black
constituencies. To ward off such a possibility, the annexation had to be
accomplished immediately and the compromise was attractive since the
county, in agreeing to the Homer-Bagley line, also had to agree to a noappeal condition imposed by city politicians.
The Appeal
But just because the county had agreed not to appeal was no reason for
the intervenors to assume the same position. The Chesterfield civic
associations, which had fought the annexation in the three judge court,
viewed the county acceptance of the settlement as a betrayal of the
citizens living in the target area and saw the court ratification of the
agreement as a miscarriage of justice. The relationship between Homer
and one of the leading figures in the appeal, Chesterfield Delegate
George W. Jones, was bitter for a long while after the settlement Jones
now says that, after several years of reflection, he can "understand how
Homer and some of the others felt They believed that we could not win
the case in court so it was best to strike a deal that would minimize
Richmond's gains and minimize Chesterfield's loss." Moreover, he co~
tinued, "people just wanted to get this case behind them and move on
with their lives." 214 Prior to his reflection, Jones was indeed bitter. In a
rally held at the Southhampton Citizens' Association Center where
angry Chesterfield residents living in the target area gathered to hear
appeals for money to support a challenge to the court decision, Jones
denounced the compromise and the final court order, urging the citizens
to support an effort to thwart a January 1 annexation since "a city
council will be elected in June and it wouldn't bother me one way or the
other to see Richmond Forward lose control" 215 Jones also mentioned
that an effort would be undertaken soon to involve the federal courts.
"There's no doubt in my mind," Jones told the residents, "that the single
issue of the annexation trial was to dilute the Negro vote." 216 It was
important, he added, to not delay any effort to reach the federal courts
since an appeal to the Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals would likely
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push a final state decision regarding annexation near the end of the year.
If action had not been taken in federal courts by then, it might be too late
to block the January 1 annexation, assuming the state high court upheld
the decision of the annexation court
A steering committee comprised of representatives from the various
civic associations fighting annexation had been formed to coordinate the
associations' efforts. The committee's first action occurred prior to the
court decision when former state assistant attorney general Paul D.
Stotts was retained to represent the organizations as intervenors in the
suit Realistically, however, little could be done except for presenting
some testimony which, of course, proved futile. As pointed out previously, even before the court made its ruling, the civic associations had
begun raising money to support an appeal since Homer's June 16
disclosure of the agreement appeared to portend an award of some kind
After the trial, the civic groups acquired a copy of the transcripts and the
record of the confidential meeting in the judge's chambers was read
carefully whereupon the intervenors became convinced that in the words
of one civic association member, "a deal had, in fact, been struck and
that the defense [by the county] was nominal, the city being assured of a
perfunctory defense and no appeal on the basis that the city would cut its
demand for territory substantially." 217
Roger L. Tuttle was selected as the steering committee' s legal
coordinator . Tuttle approached attorney L. Paul Byrne to head the
appeal effort before the state supreme court In addition, Byrne and
Tuttle explored the possibilities of taking action in the U.S. District
Court in an attempt, under the 1965 Voting Rights Act, to enjoin the
annexation as a violation of civil rights. The problem, however, was that
they would need a black plaintiff. Tuttle's recollection of what transpired
is particularly interesting .
To this end, we(Byme, some of his associates, and me) met with Curtis
Holt to attempt to persuade him to lead a group of black citizens in an
action in [Federal District Court] Judge [Robert R.] Merhige's court
Why Curtis Holt? We, very frankly, did not trust the leadership of the
Crusade and felt that, among black citizens who had political clout, Curtis
Holt was the one black who could be trusted by the citizens of the
annexed area and who could work cooperatively with us without raising
the black/white confrontation issue. Unfortunately, you must remember
also we had a very severe time limitation. My recollection being that the
annexation court came down with its decision in the later summer/ early
fall of 1969 with the annexation date being January 1, 1970, and hence,
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we had to get to the [ state] supreme court on an accelerated basis. Also, we
had to pull together a civil rights suit, if we could, and get it filed and
perhaps be in such a position to request the federal district court for a
temporary restraining order or an injunction before January 1, 1970. For
reasons that I did not understand at the time, and certainly do not
understand today, although Holt met with us and gave us some encourag~
ment, he never would actually agree to lead a group of his supporters to
form the necessary class of disenfranchised black citizens to have standing
to file the federal civil rights action. And thus that concept died We were
then left with nothing more than the straight out appeal 218

According to Holt, the problem was that, in 1969, he was not sure
whether the civic associations were offering financial support for a class
action suit ( money in addition to that collected for supporting their own
appeal) or whether the overture involved only moral support and the
expectation that Holt would raise the money. Holt's income prevented
any investment on his part and he was not in a position to undertake a
fund raising drive of his own. As a consequence, given the uncertainty
surrounding the financing of a suit, Holt did not pursue the matter. 219
Later, however, well after the annexation became effective, Holt did file
suit against the city with some of the expenses borne by the annexed
area civic associations. Indeed, the litigation generated by the Holt
cases, as they came to be called, would lead to some of the most
complex court battles since the 1954 Brown decision of the U.S.
Supreme Court.
The Crusade for Voters was also asked about its interest in joining the
appeal to the state supreme court. Approached by Delegate George
Jones and Ronald P. Livingston ( an accountant active in the Broad
Rock Council of Civic Associations), 220 the Crusade leadership expressed interest in an appeal and it subsequently met with Paul Byrne to
explore the possibilities. 221 Dr. William S. Thornton and Philmore
Howlett talked with Byrne one evening at Thornton's home and, · as
Thornton recalled, "we left with the impression that he would call us.
We knew the deadline for intervening was close upon us, and I called
Mr. Byrne and reminded him that he was to have called members of the
Crusade for Voters. He said he would let us know. I heard nothing more
from Mr. Byrne after that" 222 Byrne, however, thought that the Crusade
was to get back to him. Byrne noted also that the Crusade indicated that
it did not have the money to support an appeal and he, in turn, informed
the Crusade that he could not represent both their interests and those of
the whites in the civic associations since they might come "to a fork in
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the road and you would have to choose which side you were going
dowrt " 223 There still is some uncertainty as to what happened, but
irrespective of the uncertainty the fact remains that, for whatever
reason, the Crusade never did appeal the annexation court decisiort
Virginia supreme court rules stipulate that appellants have sixty days
after a lower court decision to file a notice of appeal and assignment of
error. 224 On the fifty-ninth day, September 9, later in the afternoon,
attorney L. Paul Byrne filed the notice. Byrne noted four issues:
( 1) The Court was without jurisdiction to hear the case because insofar as
enlargement of the boundaries of the City of Richmond is concerned, the
matter is a legislative matter as a result of the adoption of the 1969
Special Session of the General Assembly of Senate Joint Resolution 28
(the so-called Aldhizer Amendment).
(2) A portion of the area included within the lines of annexation violates
the provisions of Sec. 15.1-1042 ( a) of the Code ofVirginia requiring that
the area annexed be" a reasonably compact body ofland" [The plaintiffs
contended that the annexation lines "were illogical" in that the portion of
the target area forming a peninsula lying between Huguenot Road and the
James River was an isolated appendage not connected with or contiguous
to the city boundary and was not compact in relation to the city.]
( 3) The decision was based, not upon an independent factual finding by the
court of"the necessity for and the expediency of annexation" as required
by Sec. 15.1-1041 (a) of the Code of Virginia,-but by arbitrary
adoption by the Court of an unenforceable compromise agreement
between the Mayor of the City of Richmond and the Chairman of the
Board of Supervisors of Chesterfield County .
( 4) Citizens of the area annexed were denied due process of law in that,
with knowledge and consent by the Court, they were deprived of the right
to effective representation by counsel in the case. [Byrne was referring to
the county's acquiescence to the compromise and, therefore, its failure to
mount a strong defense against annexation Also, he was referring to the
court's denial of a request by several additional civic associations to
intervene in the case after the trial had started )225

Following the filing of the appeal notice, Horner denounced both the
appeal and George Jones. Horner acknowledged that the Chesterfield
Board of Supervisors had considered an appeal but it ultimately decided
"to try to aid the court in arriving at a decision with which the county
could live, rather than gamble unsuccessfully on an appeal from a
decision that would have effectively killed the future of Chesterfield"
He also stressed that an appeal would lead in one of three directions: ( 1)
an affirmation of the annexation court ruling; ( 2) a return of the case to
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the annexation court for a retrial of part or all of the case; or ( 3) a ruling
which might alter that of the lower court The third alternative, Horner
noted, could lead to an award equal to or in excess of the fifty-one square
miles originally requested by the city. The high court could even award
the entire county. Finally, he suggested that if the state supreme court
were to grant a hearing to the appellants, assuming that the hearing were
scheduled for sometime in 1970, it" would greatly enhance the passage
by the 1970 General Assembly of the Aldhizer Amendment that would
ultimately have the effect of Richmond expanding its boundaries each
ten years." Horner also was highly critical of Jones, saying that Jones,
"either through ignorance or desire to capitalize on the unfortunate
position of those residing in the proposed annexation area, is misleading
the citizens for a politically motivated reason- to try to get elected to
the house of Delegates." 226
Jones shot back. He requested the Chesterfield Commonwealth's
attorney to investigate Horner' s role in the annexation negotiations and,
specifically, to determine whether "there is any conflict of interest on
Mr. Horner' s part when two elected officials, and both being land
developers, negotiate a jurisdictional line affecting property values."
Jones relayed to the commonwealth's attorney the reports that "both
elected officials-either personally or their families-own property in
the immediate vicinity of the negotiated line." 227 Jones pursued the
conflict of interest issue after one of Horner' s fellow board members,
Frederick F. Dietsch, had also raised the question and announced his
intention to contact the commonwealth's attorney.
The action-reaction sequence of events also involved Bagley who,
like Horner , responded to the charges. Horner said that "sixty to
seventy percent of my land assets were placed in the proposed annexation
area," and Bagley indicated that"while a relative of mine owns property
in the Old Gun area, the present annexation line in this section of
Chesterfield is the exact and same line established by the engineers in
1961 in the dual annexation suits against Henrico and Chesterfield " 228
Bagley then proceeded to counter Jones' s earlier remarks about the
racial angle of the annexation.
This is the same Mr. Jones who falsely alleged on the floor of the
legislature that Richmond boundary expansion efforts were only to
acquire white voters. When every knowledgeable person knows that if
Richmond's main objective was to acquire white voters, the city would
have accepted the verdict in the Henrico annexation case which awarded
Richmond 45,000 additional citizens .229
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During the debates among Homer, Bagley, Jones, and Dietsch, the
city was getting anxious about the appeal The concern had less to do
with the uncertainty surrounding any action of the state supreme court
than with the delay which the appeal was likely to create. Both the city
and the county, particularly the city and even more so the Richmond
Forward faction on city councii were committed to a January 1
annexation. Virginia supreme court rules in 1969 stipulated that appellants had four months from the date of the lower court's decision to file
their petition before the high court 230 The final order of the annexation
court came July 12, 1969. Given the four-month rule, the last day to
submit the petition was November 12. Furthermore, once an appeal was
filed, it generally took abo~t five months before the supreme court
determined whether or not to hear an appeal. To compound the
problem, the high court in the fall of 1969 had a very crowded docket
Cases the court had already accepted were being docketed as much as a
year later in October, 1970. News accounts indicated that supreme
court officials viewed the prospects of a final resolution of the appeal by
December 31 as" next to impossible." 231 The consequence, of course,
was that the effective date of annexation would be January 1, 1971, or
even January 1, 1972.
Obviously, the petitioners wanted to prolong the appeals process as
long as possible. It was not surprising, therefore, when they waited until
the last week to file their petition. Due no later than November 12, the
petition was submitted on November 7. The fifty page document which
Byrne filed explained each of the four points outlined in the assignment
of error and asked the supreme court to consider taking one of the
following steps: ( 1) to dismiss the city's petition for annexation; ( 2) to
reverse the decision of the annexation court and remand the case to the
lower court where the issue would be held in abeyance pending the
outcome of the proposed Aldhizer Amendment; or (3) to redraw the
annexation line to create a reasonably compact area or return the case
to the court with instructions to redraw the line and to permit the
appellants to intervene. 232
Under the supreme court rules, the city had fourteen days to file with
the tribunal a reply to the appellants. Pressed for time, however, the city
filed only five days later on November 12. When submitting its twenty
page reply brief, the city also urged that "in the public interest . .. a
prompt disposition be made of this petition." The city's position was that ·
the annexation court had properly denied some potential intervenors
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from entering the case after the trial had started since the court was
merely exercising its proper authority to establish a cut-off date. The
city also contended that the enactment of the Aldhizer Amendment did
not affect the jurisdiction of the annexation court and that the twentythree square mile target area conformed to the state code requirements
that the territory be reasonably compact Finally, the city argued that
court evidence suggested that the judges arrived at their decision
independently of an agreement between Richmond and Chesterffeld
officials and that county residents were effectively represented by
defense counsel in the closing states of the annexation, even after the
compromise agreement had been disclosed 233
Throughout the annexation case, certainly from the mid-sixties on,
the Commonwealth of Virginia had been watching the growing political
pressures in the city with concern and, therefore, began charting a course
which would reinforce the city's boundary expansion moves. All of the
efforts to pass legislation that would enable the capital city to expand into
the counties ran parallel to the annexation suit and by the end of the
decade there was little question that state legislators and other Virginians
holding high office were committed to preventing Richmond from
becoming another" Washington, D. C." While courts are more protected
from direct political pressures than are legislative bodies, courts remain
political institutions that interact with their political environments. This
is no less true for Virginia courts and the high court is no exception
among commonwealth courts. As one former member of the state
supreme court ( but who served during the annexation appeal) said in an
interview,
There are things that influence judges . Every judge is influenced by
things that are very strong and, yet, are not subjects for disqualification. A
person is bound to be influenced by his environment ... I rather suspect
that the race question was on the minds of lots of people even though it
had been ruled out as relevant, but how much, I can't say and, you see, it
never got to the test because they really settled the damn thing to the
extent that you can ever settle an annexation. ... Well, you know, you're
bound to know, that people in the City or Richmond, by and large, the
white population, was very much concerned that there might be a majority
of blacks in the city council. ...
I don't know to what extent that
prompted the bringing of the suit I really don't I don't know to what extent
that would have prompted the decision of the judges. 234

No definitive statement can be made regarding the degree to which
the supreme court was attuned to the capital city's political needs,
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No definitive statement can be made regarding the degree to which
the supreme court was attuned to the capital city's political needs,
though, to repeat, the judges were human and, therefore, subject to bias
and, as appointed officials serving on the state's highest court, not
immune to the opinions and aspirations of those elite occupying other
seats of power. What is very clear, however, is that the court was
amenable to the city's request to expedite the appeals process and what
appeared as "next to impossible" occurred with apparent ease. The
appellants submitted a written response to the city's brief on November
20; the next day the appeal court notified the lawyers that they were to
argue before the court on the following Monday afternoon. Following the
conclusion of the oral arguments that Monday, the court, only two days
later on Wednesday, _November 26, 1969, denied the petition to
appeal 235 Only six days transpired from the day when the last brief was
filed Only six days lapsed when normally five months were necesary
before the court even determined its position on hearing an appeal!
On December 19, 1969, the appellants filed before the Virginia Supreme
Court a request for a stay of the annexation decree until a decision
regarding an appeal could be made by the U.S. Supreme Court The
stay was denied the same day. 236 An application for a stay was then
submitted to the U.S. Supreme Court As Tuttle remembered," Working
frantically, we were able to get together the necessary petition and writ
and, with the cooperation of the clerk of the U.S. Supreme Court, went
first to the supervising justice of the 4th Circuit [Chief Justice Warrren
Burger] and this, I recal~ was during the Christmas holidays of 1969 ." 237
Burger was of no help in that he reportedly was in Florida on vacation.
Justice Thurgood Marshall acted in Burger's place and, on December
30, denied the stay. The petitioners were persistent, approaching Justice
William J. Brennan on the 30th and Justice William 0. Douglas on the
31st In both instances, the justices denied the stay. 238 Time had run out
Consequently, at midnight on December 31, in accordance with state
law, the Richmond-Chesterfield annexation became effective.
The 1970 Councilmanic Election
The 1970 councilmanic election was important because the eligible
residents in the annexed area could vote, but it was important for
another reason as well Richmond Forward dissolved and the leadership
core of RF, plus scme of the leaders in the coalition of civic associations
now in the newly annexed area, united to form a new organization which
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took the name of the south Richmond group, Team of Progress (TOP).
Roger L. Tuttle considered himself a pragmatist Although the civic
associations were continuing their fight by appealing to the U.S.
Supreme Court, Tuttle also believed that it was important to accept the
fact that, at least for the moment, the annexed area was a part of the city
and that the annexed citizens should maximize their political clout at the
ballot box. Accordingly, the leaders of the civic associations that had
been active in fighting the annexation came together to construct an
electoral organization that was designed to protect the interests of
annexed area residents through endorsing candidates for city council
The organization called itself the "Team of Progress." ( Some confusion
exists over who coined the term, " Team of Progress." George Jones
assumes credit and Roger Tuttle credits his wife.) 239
One of the first major decisions the new organization had to make was
whether it should seek alliance with another organization or proceed on
an independent course. To explore the merits of each option, the leaders
of the annexed area coalition decided to talk with representatives from
the Crusade for Voters and Richmond Forward On Friday, January 23,
1970, three leaders from the Team of Progress, Robert T. Fitzgerald,
Roger C. Griffin and Ronald P. Livingston, met with Dr. William
Thornton of the Crusade. Griffin compiled a report outlining the thrust
of the meeting and its conclusions. The report also contained a recommendation to the new organization. Griffin informed Dr. Thornton of
the composition of TOP and the alternatives that TOP was considering,
including an alliance with the Crusade . Following a general discussion
of the political realities facing both the Crusade and TOP, several
conclusions emerged There was a consensus that" neither TOP nor CV
[Crusade for Voters] would benefit from a formal alliance." The
representatives also agreed that" TOP should reach its decision [regarding the most appropriate course of action] on principle rather than
reasons of political expediency." Finally, both parties concurred that
"defeat at the polls is not necessarily a failure, for it can lead to greater
influence on those in office." From the report, it appeared that the
Crusade was particularly skittish about entering into an alliance with
any group since, according to Thornton, Richmond Forward had once
approached Crusade members and invited them to participate on a basis
similar to that offered by TOP. The Crusade, however, never found the
relationship with RF to be mutually benefitting; the Crusade, he
observed, was seldom on an equal footing. Accordingly, Griffin made
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the following recommendations: ( 1) that TOP maintain an informal
liaison with the Crusade while not establishing any formal ties; (2) that
no formal ties be established with Richmond Forward since "there are
no assurances that we could exert an effective influence which would be
of benefit to the people of the annexed area or the people of the city at
large"; and ( 3) that TOP chart an independent course. 240
Roger Tuttle, however, was less interested in charting an independent
course than in developing a relationship with Richmond Forward
To this end, I approached several of the leaders of the Richmond
Forward organization, principally Joseph C. Carter, Jr., managing partner
of the law firm Hunton and Williams, and Henry Valentine, Chief
Executive Officer of Davenport Company, a stock brokerage house, and
suggested to them that it might be to the best political interests of those
business and professional leaders of the Richmond community as well as
the citizens of the annexed area to form a new political organization
which would encompass the old Richmond Forward group and the
leadership of the civic associations in the annexed area, my argument
being that we already had built a viable political base in the annexation
legal battle and with this and the existing economic structure and voting
interest of Richmond Forward we could dominate city politics for a
considerable period of time. [italics added] This argument had interest to
Carter and Valentine and they discussed it with their colleagues who were
the leadership of the Richmond Forward organization. ... 241

As it had been with the Crusade, TOP also met with Richmond
Forward One of the most interesting meetings, at least one which
received considerable attention later in the federal courts, was one on
February 10, 1970, at the Willow Oaks Country Club. Included in the
TOP contingent were Tuttle, George Jones, Livingston, Griffin, and
Aubrey Thompson, the latter of whom was elected a few months later to
the Richmond city council. The Richmond Forward representatives
included several members of council plus a cadre ofleading businessmen,
among whom were Henry L. Valentine, II, the president of RF; William
Daniei president of Metropolitan National Bank(both he and Valentine
were also elected to council in the 1970 race); Thomas Bliley; and
Na than F orb; the latter two were already on council Bliley perhaps best
summarized the purpose of the meeting when he noted, "I specifically
remember discussing the point that they [TOP] had three options. One,
they could go it alone. Two, they could join forces with the Crusade, or
three, they could join forces with us." 242 Henry Valentine opened the
meeting. He told the TOP representatives that whether they liked it or
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not they were citizens of the city and, therefore, "the question became
where did they go from there, politically." Valentine, knowing that TOP
represented close to 20,000 registered voters, was anxious to unite the
two organizations and told annexed area leaders that, alone, they would
not be able to elect people to the city council and, consequently, they
"would have to pitch in with some other group." 243 Bliley acknowledged
that discussion ensued to the effect that if TOP did not join with
Richmond Forward then the Crusade could gain a majority on council 244
The unspoken fear, of course, was that an independent effort by TOP
might split the white vote, thereby throwing the election to the Crusade-this in spite of the annexation. Court testimony strongly suggests that
Richmond Forward leaders were eager to prove to their TOP counterparts that the RF incumbents controlled the Richmond City Council,
although several TOP participants at the meeting understood that
Richmond Forward controlled the council and, indeed the whole
government; that it was the" power behind the throne." Griffin, who took
notes at the meeting, indicated that the TOP representatives "wished to
have some evidence this group [RF] was capable of being influential in
the affairs of the city government" The proof, according to Griffin and
Livingston, was the assurance from the RF leaders at Willow Oaks that
several members of the TOP group would be appointed by the city
council to an advisory body comprising citizens from the annexed area
and the subsequent appointment of TOP participants ( including Griffin
and Livingston) to the advisory body. 245
Court testimony also indicates that the recent annexation was di~
cussed and, more particularly, the purpose of the annexation. Jones,
Griffin, and Livingston all said that several RF representatives, including
Henry Valentine, commented that the annexation was undertaken to
keep the city from going majority black and to keep political control
from slipping into the hands of blacks. 246 Valentine acknowledged in his
testimony that he may have made such a statement ... "I think that I
said that, and I don't mind saying again that I don't want to see Richmond
become an all-black city." Valentine claimed he was speaking primarily
in economic terms and that he equated blacks with the disadvantaged
The questioning attorney, however, asked if he were alone in holding
that opinion, specifically whether Valentine knew any blacks who felt the
same way. The answer was "Henry Marsh." 247 Once again, it appears
that Richmond and Washington, D. C. were discussed with the RF
leaders expressing fear that the former could become the latter. Valentine
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and Daniel both said that such comments were made. However, Daniel
added that when he spoke about Richmond and Washington, and the
"fear of the city going black ... I don't translate that to mean control of
council to meaning political control I mean I translate to the fear of the,
the economic fear that is involved for our city. [sic] And I would add,
beyond just economics, a cultural fear. This relates very much to the
present school crisis we have." 248
Following the Willow Oaks meeting, a major split occurred in the
Team of Progress leadership. The Board of Directors met at the Hotel
Jefferson to consider a merger with Richmond Forward Roger Tuttle
was desirous of uniting TOP with the Main Street group and when the
vote was taken on the merger question, Tuttle and seven other TOP board
members supported the union. Four others, however, including Robert
Fitzgerald, Ronald Livingston, George Jones, and Roger Griffin,
opposed the move. Upon learning of the vote, Richmond Forward
leaders were elated and decided to drop their name and adopt the name
of the south Richmond organization, T earn of Progress. Griffin and
Livingston, however, reacted angrily to the merger since they had earlier
recommended that TOP maintain an independent position relative to
both the Crusade and Richmond Forward Along with Fitzgerald, both
Griffin and Livingston resigned from the Board of Directors of TOP
and Jones, though never publicly resigning, quietly withdrew. Livingston,
in his letter of resignation to Tuttle ( the President of TOP), explained
his reason for initially joining TOP and then proceeded to explain his
reason for resigning:
... When I joined TOP, I was under the impression that this group
would seek to change the present power structure to allow for more
representative government by the people. As you know, I urged that we
work toward an independent slate of candidates, representing the whole
spectrum of the people, and, hence, worthy of their support The vote of ·
the majority of the Board of Directors for a merger of TOP with_
Richmond Forward works against both of these aims.
. . . I now feel that TOP . . . offers only a continuation of the present
power structure . I am opposed to government by an elite clique conducting the affairs of the city behind closed doors beyond the reach of the
public.
Just as we all abhorred the sellout of the citizens of the annexed area
by the infamous Homer-Bagley deai I cannot in good conscience
stomach a sellout of these same people by TOP, therefore, I must submit
my resignation as a Director of that organization. 249
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Griffin and Livingston were instrumental in creating another organization that would endorse a slate of candidates independent of TOP/RF .
Known as Richmond United, the group slated seven people for councii
including Carpenter, Marsh, and Carwile, the three Crusade-endorsed
members of council who had been consistently excluded from major
policy discussions among councilpersons and other city officials prior
to and following the drawing of the Homer-Bagley line.250 TOP, meanwhile, had endorsed a full slate of eight candidates among who were
F orb, Bliley, Valentine, Daniei Aubrey H. Thompson, and J. M
Orndorff, Jr. The latter two were members of the pre-merger TOP
Board of Directors. 251
True to form the newspapers began to editorialize in support of the
business oriented Team of Progress and, in so doing, attempted to
discredit the newly formed Richmond United The campaign itself was
not as racially divisive as those in 1966 and 1968, irrespective of a few
charges by independent candidates that TOP had injected racism into
the campaign and the fact that the large and varied field of twenty-nine
candidates contributed to a scrappy campaign that annoyed those Richmonders who preferred polite, statesmanlike debates. Essentially, the
election pitted two points of view against each other. The TOP candidates, as a rule, focused on the city's fiscal needs, particularly the need
for economic development, improved financial management, and the
need for greater state financial assistance. F orb proposed the formation
of a regional airport authority to own and operate Byrd Field, a move
that could save the city large sums of money each year. Valentine urged
the creation of a general management study commission, which would
be charged with the responsibility of finding areas where the city could
cut costs. Thompson called for the elimination of the city sergeant
position, an elective office, and the transfer of responsibility of the city
jail to the Richmond Bureau of Police. Other TOP candidates focused
on the need for supportive state legislation and for more intensive
lobbying at the state legislature in behalf of the commonwealth's urban
areas. Wayland W. Rennie, a prominent realtor also endorsed by TOP,
argued that the formula for determining the distribution of state sales
tax revenue should be changed to enable Richmod to acquire a larger
share. He also advocated a metropolitan area government as a possible
solution to the city's financial problems. 252
Meanwhile, candidates not endorsed by TOP, the candidates the press
consistently labeled "independent," ( although they were usually
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endorsed by an organization other than TOP) tended to stress" quality of
life" issues. Marsh and Carpenter, particularly, focused on these issues,
with Marsh calling for an effort to develop and utilize the human
potential of the city and Carpenter urging the construction of human
bridges of"care, concern and cooperation between the old and the new
citizens of Richmond" 253
Murel M. Jones, Jr., in an analysis of the 1970 election, notes that the
election partially involved a "re-examination of the question of the
efficacy of council-manager governance and at-large council elections
in Richmond Team of Progress candidate Thomas Bliley called for a
referendum on the questions of district representation, four-year councilmanic terms, and partisan elections for city council Richmond United
candidate, Howard H. Carwile, who later in the campaign was endorsed
by the Crusade, supported the return to an expanded council with a
popularly elected strong mayor form of government 254 ( In 1948,
Richmond eliminated the strong-mayor government with a bicameral
council and adopted the council-manager government)
In short, while the campaign was lively with the candidates discussing
a wide range of issues, the 1970 race did not reach the same level of
racial animosity characteristic of the sixties except perhaps toward the
closing when Crusade officials charged TOP with using scare tactics in
white areas to increase the white vote and dissuade whites from voting
for black candidates. 255 One reason may have been the defeat blacks
suffered when the city successfully engineered the annexation of 47,000
residents. Whites and blacks alike acknowledged that the annexation
was a serious blow to black power and, with the stakes already settled,
the sense of urgency that prevailed in 1966 and 1968 was not as evident
in 1970.
As always, the Crusade waited late in the campaign to make its
endorsements, though not as late in 1970 as it had in previous elections.
Ten days before election day, the Crusade announced a full slate of
nine candidates, including Carpenter, Carwile, and Marsh. In addition
to Marsh, two other blacks slated by the Crusade were Walter T. Kenny,
a postal employee who made an unsuccessful election attempt in 1968,
and Curtis Holt, Sr., the president of the Creighton Court Civic
AssociatioIL The slate was an obvious effort to appeal to annexed area
citizens inasmuch as a third of the endorsees were annexed area
residents, Robert E. Shiro, Ronald P. Livingston, and Oates
McCulleIL256
June 9 was election day. After the 51,408 votes were counted (of
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which approximately nine thousand votes represented annexed area
citizens), it became apparent that the Richmond power structure maintained its control of council.257 The balance of power did not change
from the 1968 election when Richmond Forward won six seats and the
Crusade won three. Ironically, however, the three candidates receiving
the most votes were Howard Carwile, Henry Marsh, and James
Carpenter with their occupying the first, second, and third place
positions, respectively. The Crusade elected only three of its nine
endorsees; whereas, TOP elected six of its eight Richmond United
elected three of its seven-Carwile, Marsh, and Carpenter. Clearly, the
Crusade' s efforts to appeal to annexed area voters by endorsing three
annexed residents were not successfui though the Richmond UnitedCrusade cross-endorsements of Carpenter, Marsh, and Carwile were
one factor leading to their strong electoral support 258 In fact, the latter
led. one editorial writer to say:
.. . a quick analysis of the returns shows that Carwile, Marsh and even
Carpenter can attribute their impressive showing in yesterday's election
to "negative" votes they received from an alliance of Negro "antis" in
the old city and white" antis" in the newly annexed area Negroes voted
against TOP candidates because they represented the community power
structure, the "establishment" Many whites in the newly annexed area
showed their resentment at having been acquired by the city by voting
against TOP candidates and for Carwile, Marsh, and Carpenter ... .259

The effect of the annexation on the 1970 vote is evident both in terms
of the black percentage of the total vote and the election results. Without
the annexed area, it is estimated that blacks represented approximately
42 percent of the total vote ( as compared with 44.2 percent in 1968).
With the annexed area, however, the black percent of the total vote was
reduced to 34.5 percent 260 Of course, no one can predict what the
results would have been without the annexation Had the Crusade been
able to elect a fourth candidate to councii the Crusade bloc, while not
an absolute majority, would have been able to defeat any measure
requiring an extraordinary majority of six votes. To reiterate, to predict
with complete assurance how many seats each of the two major competing campaign organizations would have won had annexation not
occurred is impossible. Nevertheless, it is a fact that the percent of
black residents, the percent of black eligible voters, the percent of black
registered voters, and the percent of blacks who actually cast a ballot in
the 1970 election were all depressed by the annexation
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The Defeat of the Aldhizer Amendment
Nothing of consequence was said in the campaign about the Aldhizer
Amendment, which had to be discussed and acted upon by the 1970
General Assembly meeting in regular session Councilmen Nathan J.
Forb and James G. Carpenter did make brief statements before the
campaign became serious. F orb expressed his support for the amendment and Carpenter regarded the amendment as "massive resistance in
1970 form" because of the dilutive effect the proposal would have on
black population and voting power. 261 The city power structure continued to urge its adoption However, the amendment never went far in
the 1970 session City Attorney Conard B. Mattox, Jr., said that the
measure was killed in the House committee by a coalition comprised of
Henrico, Chesterfield, and the rural interests in the state. 262 Most other
observers claim that, with the successful annexation, state legislators
saw the Aldhizer initiative as moot and no longer necessary. What the
amendment sought to achieve had been accomplished by the annexation
of about 4 7 ,000 whites.
The Aldhizer Amendment was not the only unsuccessful venture. So,
too, was the appeal by the civic associations to the U.S. Supreme Court
Like the Aldhizer Amendment, the appeal of the annexation court
decision died a quick death. On April 20, 1970, the nation's high court
turned down the writ without comment 263

IV
Litigation and its Aftermath
Curtis Holt Versus the City
One of the defeated candidates in the 1970 councilmanic election was
Curtis Holt, Sr. He argued that he would have won a seat on city
council had Richmond not annexed the 4 7,000 residents from Chesterfield County . However, by eliminating the eight candidates who lived in
the annexed area and redistributing the votes which they received
among the other twenty-one candidates, and by throwing out the ballots
of the nine thousand voters in the annexed area, it is doubtful that Holt
would have been among the top nine candidates . Nevertheless, it was
clear to Holt and other Richmonders that the annexation had depressed
black voting strength and it was that factor which prompted Holt's
challenge to the boundary expansion
In many ways, Holt was an unlikely challenger. He did not have the
backing of a civil rights organization to support his efforts. He was not
embraced by the black legal establishment and neither was he a favorite
of the city's white liberals. He was not formally schooled in the law or
the political process and he was not especially gifted as a public speaker.
Rather, Holt was an unemployed high school dropout who lived on a
social security disability pension after he was injured in 1941 while
working at Virginia Union University as a member of a construction
crew. The accident left him unconscious for almost a year and hospitalized for two years. Later, Holt and his family moved into a city
public housing project run by the Richmond Redevelopment and Housing
Authority. It was there that Holt gained a following among the residents
and a reputation among city officials. He organized the tenants and
established the Creighton Court Civic Association, although the task
was not easy.
After this successful undertaking, Holt turned to the surrounding
public housing projects and began enlisting the residents in voter
143
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registration drives. In 1966, he and his supporters registered over three
thousand new voters and proceeded to endorse candidates for the 1966
councilmanic election, including Henry Marsh and Howard Carwile. 1
Following the 1970 annexation, Holt turned first to the state branch
of the NAACP, but the organization was unresponsive, as were the
black lawyers to whom he next appealed "They gave me the runaround,"
he said "You know, 'they're all so busy,' they said Some didn't even
return my calls." 2 Holt was a deeply religious man and his statement
about what next occurred is poignant:
I just felt so frustrated I didn't know which way to tum Then one day I
was walking home from a meeting, and I asked the Lord to help me, to
show me the way to move with this problem. And right then something
told me to go home and simply go down the list of lawyers in the yellow
pages of the phone directory. Wel4 I did that. By the time I got to the letter
"G," all of the lawyers had turned me down. but a couple of them had
urged me to contact a young lawyer named Venable. I had never heard of
him before and was hesitant to take such a big case to an unknown
lawyer. Wel4 I did contact Venable [W. H. C.]; we had a meeting in his
office. He agreed to take the case without pay. Of course, I didn't have
any money to give. He and I then agreed ... 3

Cabell Venable was a young lawyer, just getting started in his law
practice shortly after he had served as a law clerk with federal district
court judge Robert R . Merhige, Jr. In some respects, Venable was as
unlikely a counsel for Holt as Holt was a challenger of the annexation.
Coming from an old line Virginia family and having worked in the 1966
and 1970 campaigns of U.S. Senator Harry F . Byrd, Jr. ( whose father
created what came to be known in Virginia as "the organization" and
nationally as the "Byrd machine"), Venable was not the typical antiestablishment lawyer bent on social and political reform. 4 Indeed, just
before Holt approached him, Venable had been retained by some
southside Virginians associated with the KKK to represent a group of
Richmonders charged under the state truancy laws for pulling their
children out of school. 5 ( Richmond schools, in the early seventies, were
under a federal district court order mandating a unitary school system
and involving crosstown busing .)6 A combination of legal responsibility
and an eye for a case that had the potential for launching his legal career
attracted him to Holt Venable has talked openly about both interests.
He wanted visibility and, at the same time, he noted the responsibility
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for lawyers to accept cases which promised little financial reward "I
don't want to sound like fm on a soapbox," he once remarked, "but the
legal profession has a duty to the community . . . to help the little guy at
the bottom of the pyramid ... I thought the black people of Virginia had
played by the rules and now the law was depriving them .... " 7
As it turned out, an unlikely plaintiff and an unlikely lawyer united in
a fight that, perhaps as no other, constituted a frontal assault on the
city's established center of power. Both men were shunned by the elite
of their respective communities, Holt by the middle-class blacks who
traditionally provided the leadership for the Crusade and Venable by the
upper income whites who traditionally held the reins of political and
economic power of the capital city.
Holt I and the City's Appeal to the Justice Department
Before Holt took action, the U.S. Supreme Court, on January 14, 1971,
made a decision that had a direct bearing on the Richmond annexation.
Ruling in Perkins v. Matthews, the Supreme Court said that municipal
annexations fall under the provisions of Section 5 of the 1965 Voting
Rights Act 8 The Voting Rights Act was designed by the Congress to
strengthen its powers to monitor voting discrimination and thereby to
more effectively enforce the Fifteenth Amendment which proscribes the
denial of the vote "on account of race, color, or previous condition of
servitude." 9 Section 5 stipulated that designated states, including
Virginia, must receive federal clearance before they can implement any
voting related change. The affected states, or political subdivisons of a
state, are those which maintained any discriminatory voting test or
device on November 1, 1964, and where less than 50 percent of the
voting age population was registered to vote on November 1, 1964, or
where" less than 50 per centum of such persons voted in the presidential
election of November 1964." 10 Specifically, Section 5 requires the state
to submit any change in voting" standard, practice, or procedure" to the
U.S. Attorney General for approval and, barring his approval, to permit
the state to institute an action before the three judge U.S. District Court
in Washington, D.C., "for a declaratory judgment that such qualification,
prerequisite, standard, practice, or procedure does not have the purpose
and will not have the effect of denying or abridging the right to vote on
account of race or color .... " 11 Given the Perkins decision, it is
necessary for any local jurisdiction in a designated state to acquire
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approval of a municipal annexation from the attorney general or, if
necessary, to seek a declaratory judgment from the Washington district
court that the annexation is not discriminatory in purpose or effect
Richmond had not sought approval from the Justice Department
when it annexed the Chesterfield territory and the question, therefore,
was what the city would do since the Supreme Court had rendered the
Perkins decision City Attorney Conard B. Mattox, Jr., was quoted in
the press on the day following the high court ruling that the decision
" ... should have no bearing on our recent Chesterfield annexation" 12 A
few days later he still seemed relatively unaffected by the court's action,
saying, "I don't intend to take any action; it is a state matter, it seems to
me." 13 Virginia Attorney General Andrew P. Miller had stated earlier
that he intended to file suit, as outlined in the Voting Rights Act, in an
effort to seek removal of Virginia from special coverage of the act 14
(Two years later, in 1973, the Virginia General Assembly passed a
resolution directing the state's attorney general to do what was necessary
to have the commonwealth exempted from the 1965 act Accordingly,
Attorney General Miller, in behalf of Virginia, filed a suit before the
federal district court in Washington, D.C., making the commonwealth
the first state to seek exemption from the Voting Rights Act The court
refused to exempt Virginia, declaring that Virginia blacks still suffered
from the effects of past discrimination and that the state's inferior system
of public education for blacks was indirectly responsible for their having
higher illiteracy and lower voter registration than the state's whites. The
U.S. Supreme Court upheld the decision in Virginia v. United States. ) 15
Given the Perkins ruling, however, Miller had also said that it was his
belief that the 1970 Richmond annexation was a matter subject to
federal approval Meanwhile, after having carefully reviewed the Perkins
case and considered its implications, Mattox decided to clear the air
about the 1970 annexation by writing U.S. Attorney General John N.
Mitchell on January 28, 1971, to inform him of the annexation and to
determine "whether the [Perkins] decision has a retroactive effect
upon annexation cases that have become final prior to the Supreme
Court's decision" 16 Over three months would transpire before Matttox
would receive a reply to his letter. ( Actually, the Voting Rights Act
requires the U.S. attorney general to either approve or reject a voting
change within sixty days. Although Mattox mailed his letter on January
28th, which was received on the 29th, the Justice Department asked the
city attorney for additional information Having received the additional
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material on March 8th, the Justice Department, therefore, considered
that the sixty day period for making a decision began on March 8th with
the decision to be made no later than May 8th. 17 )
While Mattox waited, two significant events occurred First, the city
sought to annex all of Henrico County and a sizable portion of
Chesterfield County. This move was in response to efforts by the two
counties to seek city charters in the 1971 General Assembly. Obviously,
by incorporating, the counties would no longer have to worry about
future annexations. Also knowing that to be the case, Richmond took
the offensive. State annexation law permitted the city to institute
annexation proceedings against a county only after eight years had
passed since the municipality had filed suit against the same county. The
city had filed suits against Chesterfield on December 27, 1961, and
against Henrico on January 2, 1962, so by 1971 the eight year waiting
period had concluded The state legislature was caught between the
opposing factions and rather than side with one faction or the other, it
took a middle course and declared a five year moratorium on annexation
and the granting of city charters to counties only in those areas where
counties adjoined cities having a population of more than 125,000.
Inasmuch as only four cities had 1970 populations exceeding 125,000
and since two of them (Norfolk and Virginia Beach) could not annex
because they were surrounded by other incorporated areas and since
annexation/ incorporation issues were not involved in another area
(Newport News), the legislation pertained only to the Richmond metropolitan area The legislation calling for a moratorium until January 1,
1976, also created the Commission on City-County Relationships,
better known as the Stuart Commission since it was headed by Delegate
G. R C. Stuart from Washington County. Though the Stuart Commission was established to explore the status of relations between Virginia's
cities and counties and to specifically consider such items as the utility
of annexation as a means of adding territory to cities and towns, possible
changes in the state's annexation laws, the value of granting counties the
right to incorporate, and the value of modifying or abolishing the state's
system of independent cities, the commission was particularly concerned about the interjurisdictional warfare which had broken out in the
Richmond metropolis. When establishing the panel, the General
Assembly expressed its concern regarding" the situation currently confronting the Commonwealth involving the counties of Henrico and
Chesterfield and the city of Richmond ... " and charged the commission
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to "give particular consideration to the complexities and essential
implications of the Henrico-Chesterfield-Richmond
county-city
problem . . ." 18
The second major event occurring between Mattox' s letter to the
Justice Department and its reply was set in motion by Curtis Holt On
February 24, 1971, Holt filed a class action suit in the U.S. District
Court in Richmond which contested the 1970 annexation on constitU:tional grounds. He charged that the addition of large numbers of white
citizens from Chesterfield County to the city's population diluted the
black vote and thus violated Section I of the Fifteenth Amendment
Moreover, Holt argued that the annexation constituted a violation of his
due process rights protected by Section I of the Fourteenth Amendment
His objective, therefore, was to have the court( I) declare the annexation
null and void; (2) void the 1970 councilmanic election and order new
elections which excluded the participation of annexed area residents;
(3) declare "the present City Government of the City of Richmond
unconstitutionally convened and place all affairs of said government
into the care of a receivor appointed by this Court to manage the affairs
of the City till a constitutionally elected body can be secured to assume
such responsibilities"; and ( 4) enjoin the city from exercising any
authority over the annexed area 19
Before Holt filed his suit, Chesterfield County had requested the
reconvening of the three judge annexation court to consider two items.
( State law required annexation courts to remain in existence for five
years following the effective date of an annexation order or the date of
any decision of the state supreme court affirming such an order. On
motion of the court, city, county, or fifty freeholders, the court could be
reconvened) 2° First, Chesterfield officials contended that Richmond
owed the county money for school tuition and related fees. Since the
annexed area did not include a sufficient number of schools to accommodate the number of additional school children brought into the city,
the county had to provide the education with the city paying the tuition.
Second, county leaders claimed that the city was not complying with the
provision of the annexation decree that ordered the city to construct three
schools in the annexed area Richmond denied that it had failed to pay
the proper tuition and said that it was unable to construct the schools
because the city was under a federal court order not to undertake school
planning or school construction in the annexed area 21 ( The latter was in
reference to court desegregation initiatives.) But at the pretrial conference
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designed to establish the scope of the trial and to schedule a trial date,
Chief Judge Earl L. Abbott announced that hearings would be postponed
"until court litigation now pending in the city of Richmond has been
determined one way or the other. " 22 Abbott was referring to the Holt suit
Chesterfield was elated by the action, with County Executive Secretary
Melvin W. Burnett and Board Chairman Irvin G . Horner interpreting
the postponement as an indication that the annexed area might be
"de annexed"
Attention to the Holt suit was growing. Following a request by the
city that U.S . District Court Judge Robert R. Merhige, Jr ., dismiss the
case on the grounds that the court lacked jurisdiction, 24 the South
Richmond Council of Civic Associations sponsored a" mass meeting"
of annexed area residents. The featured speaker was Holt's attorney,
W. H C. Venable. He had been contacted earlier by the council's president, Arthur R. Cloey, Jr., who had informed Venable that the South
Richmond Council of Civic Associations and the Broad Rock Council
of Civic Associations had voted to provide financial support for the suit
In his letter to Venable, Cloey noted that "thousands of annexed
citizens ... are dedicated to fight this undesired annexation." Moreover,
he wrote, "we recognize the expense of litigation and are prepared to
underwrite the cost ... Stating on behalf of the Councils, 'WE WANT
DE-ANNEXATION.' " 25 Actually, the civic associations had originally wanted Venable to file a suit in their behalf before the federal district
court, but Venable had been approached earlier by Holt and, consequently, told the annexed area representatives that he already had a
client 26 On May 3, 1971, at Huguenot High Schooi between eight
hundred and a thousand citizens living in the annexed area attended the
meeting called by the coalition of civic associations. Venable explained
the deannexation suit as well as a petition he had filed in the Chesterfield
Circuit Court and directed to the annexation court on behalf of seventytwo property owners requesting the creation of an escrow account for
taxes collected by the city from annexed area residents. As Venable
phrased it, the tax money would be held in escrow "till it can be
determined who owns you." Venable expressed his confidence that Holt
would prevail and, in reference to the Justice Department review of the
annexation, the lawyer said he was not informed what action the U.S.
attorney general might take, "but ifl were a betting man," he added, "I
wouldn't put any bets on the city of Richmond" 27
Venable should have placed his bets because on May 7, 1971, the

150

The Politics of Annexation

Justice Department objected to the annexation Prior to the decision,
representatives from the city and from the annexed area had traveled to
Washington to speak with lawyers in the Justice Department City
officials, including City Attorney Mattox, met first with the Justice
Department, elaborated upon the materials submitted earlier and provided a rationale for the attorney general to approve the 1970 action
against the county. Having heard that Richmond officials had spoken
with people in the U.S. attorney general's office, Roger Griffin and Ronald
Livingston also went to Washington and talked with David L. Norman,
the Acting Assistant Attorney General in the Civil Rights Division, and
outlined the general course of events leading up to the annexation and
the reasons why the federal government should not affirm the boundary
expansion 28 Venable, too, had talked with and supplied information to
the Washington lawyers. Obviously, when the Justice Department
reached its decision, the civic associations and the county were jubilant
The city was stunned It was the first setback the city had suffered since
the compromise efforts began in earnest in the spring of 1969. The State
of Virginia had supported the city's move throughout the ordeal and, in
fact, had considered amending its constitution to accommodate the
city. But the U.S. Justice Department, on the other hand, was not
supportive. Its position was even more significant when one considers
that its chief officers were appointed by President Nixon, who had made
many statements about the need to curb the "interference" of an overly
zealous national government in state and local affairs. Indeed, his
personal friend and confidant, John N. Mitcheii headed the Department
The letter written by David L. Norman to Conard Mattox began by
noting the Perkins decision and then proceeded to point out that while
Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act is not addressed to annexations per
se, it is concerned with the voting changes produced by an annexation
Thus, given Richmond's system of at-large representation and its
population" approximately evenly divided between whites and blacks,"
the annexation's addition of eligible white voters "inevitably tends to
dilute the voting strength of black voters." Accordingly, the letter
indicated, "the Attorney General must interpose an objection to the
voting change which results from the annexation" 29 In terms of what
eventually occurred in Richmond, the last paragraph of Norman's letter
was particularly noteworthy:
You may, of course, wish to consider means of accomplishing annexation which would avoid producing an impermissible adverse racial impact
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on voting, including such techniques as single-member districts . ..
Moreover, section 5 permits seeking approval of voting changes by the
United States District Court for the District of Columbia irrespective of
any previous submission of the Attorney General 30 [ italics added]

The Justice Department ruling was announced the same day as its ruling
on the state's legislative reapportionment plan The latter also fell under
the provisions of the 1965 Voting Rights Act and, like the Richmond
annexation, was opposed by the U.S. attorney general. Speaking at a
hastily arranged news conference once he had received word from
Washington about the denial of the reapportionment plan, Virginia
Governor Linwood Holton addressed both the reapportionment and the
annexation issues. He noted that he had discussed the annexation decision with Assistant U.S. Attorney General J erris Leonard and, based on
the conversation, Holton urged" caution against optimism" by annexed
area residents. He opined that deannexation would be unreasonable
since the boundary expansion had occurred over a year earlier and laws
had been passed on the basis of the annexation He concluded by saying
that he did not believe "the egg will be unscrambled" 31
The question that arose immediately after the Justice Department's
decision was whether the 1970 annexation was null and void Mattox
did not believe it was, commenting at a city council meeting held a few
days after the ruling that the attorney general's objection was "not self.
executing." " His objection," Mattox continued, "by no means should
be considered as voiding the annexation court's decree of July 12, 1969,
nor affecting the obligations imposed upon the city.. . ." 32 Mattox also
suggested that a possible remedy to the city's annexation dilemma
might be a ward system of representation as noted in the Justice
Department's letter to Mattox . It was obvious, however, that Mattox
could not definitively answer questions pertaining to the annexation or
the attorney general's objection without further clarification from the
Justice Department Accordingly, Mattox and five members of the
Richmond City Council (Mayor Thomas Bliley, Vice-Mayor Henry
Marsh, Howard Carwile, James Carpenter, and Aubrey Thompson)
traveled to Washington to discuss the finer points surrounding the action
of the Justice Department ( Council members attended at the insistence
of Marsh.) Following the meeting with David Norman, Aubrey
Thompson said that his main question, "Does the annexation stand?"
was answered affirmatively by Norman But, it appeared that the city
could maintain its current boundaries only by amending the city charter,
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which required the approval of the state legislature, and adopting a ward
system of representation to minimize the dilution of black votes. 33
Chesterfield County officials also conferred with Justice Department
representatives and were told that should the U.S. District Court in
Richmond ( which would be hearing the Holt suit) rule that the annexation
was racially motivated, such a decision, according to Commonwealth's
Attorney Oliver D. Rudy, "would raise serious questions and would,
perhaps, lead to a deannexation" 34 From the Chesterfield contacts with
Washington, it was clear that the Justice Department would be watching
the Holt suit very carefully.
Richmond officials began preparing ward plans, including a particularly popular plan that called for five wards and four at-large seats on
council And, once again, they met with representatives from the
Department of Justice to discuss the plans and the possibilities of a
charter change. At roughly the same time, U.S. District Court Judge
Robert Merhige denied the motions by the city to dismiss the Holt suit
and proceeded to set September 20, 1971, for the court hearings. 35 And
in Chesterfield County, the annexation court convened upon request of
county officials. Given the U.S. attorney general's ruling, Chesterfield
officials wanted the annexation court to determine whether the city or
the county should provide services in the annexed area. County
supervisors also wanted the court to take measures for protecting the
taxpayers living in the annexed area and to make a determination of the
annexed area residents' voting status. 36 The court, however, proved
uncooperative. Judge Earl Abbott ruled that" annexation entered by this
court is in full force and effect, and wiHcontinue until some court has the
proper jurisdiction" to override the annexation court Moreover, the
annexation court denied a petition which Holt's attorney, W. H. C.
Venable, had filed to establish an escrow account for the taxes collected
from annexed area residents. 37
The city's preparations for instituting a change in its electoral system
were temporarily suspended once Richmond learned of the U.S.
Supreme Court decision, Whitcomb v. Chavis. When the Justice
Department objected to the annexation, David Norman noted in his
letter to City Attorney Mattox that the city might consider singlemember districts as a remedial measure. In so doing, Norman pointed to
an Indiana federal district court ruling that inner-city blacks of Indianapolis were the victims of racial gerrymandering in the creation of
multimember state legislative seats and that, as a consequence, they
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were entitled under their Fourteenth Amendment rights to their own
single-member district The multimember district included a large
number of whites, thereby diluting the voting effectiveness of ghetto
blacks. The decision of the federal district court was appealed, however,
and after Norman wrote Mattox , the U.S. Supreme Court overturned the
ruling of the lower court Justice Byron R. White, writing for the
majority, acknowledged the findings of the lower court that the proportion
of legislators residing within the concentrated black population of the
multimember district was not commensurate with the districts' black
population or with the proportion of legislators which blacks could have
elected with single-member district s. But, White opined that these
findings did not constitute "inv idious discrimination." " The mere fact
that one interest group or another concerned with the outcome of
Marion County [Indianapo lis] elections have found themselves outvoted
and without legislative seats of its own," White wrote, "provides no
basis for invoking constitutional remedies." 38
City officials were anxious to know whether the Whitcomb decision
would have any bearing on the Justice Department's position relative to
the Richmond annexation and its suggested remedy. Traveling again to
Washington and conferring with Justice officials, Mattox got his answer
and notified Mayor Bliley from Washington that the attorney general's
office stood firm and that it could accept nothing less than a nine ward
plan, meaning, of course, that the combinat ion ward/ at-large plan that
the majority of the Richmond City Council had come to favor was not
acceptable . 39 Yet, the ·city had to move fast if it intended to amend its
charter. The Virginia state legislature was in special session grappling
with the redistricting plan also disapproved by the Justice Department
and Richmond had to acquire legislative authorization for any charter
change before the legislature adjourned However, because the city
attorney and other city leaders wanted to explore the implications of the
Whitcomb ruling more closely, the Richmond City Council, on June 28,
1971, voted to keep open all of its options and asked the General
Assembly to change the city charter so that it would permit the council
to adopt an at-large system, a combination at-large/ward system, or a
nine ward system of representation. 40 Richmond's efforts, though, were
for naught Richmond Senator Edward E . Willey was to have introduced
the bill in the General Assembly but abandoned his attempts when it
became clear that the House of Delegates was not predisposed to pass a
charter change which was so ope~ended Yet, Richmond's plight,
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which had already captured the attention of Governor Holton, was now
at the point where the governor intervened ( at Mayor Bliley' s request)
and arranged a meeting between Attorney General Mitchell and city
officials to determine exactly what course of action the city should
take. 41
Prior to the meeting in Washington on August 2, Mattox again wrote
John Mitchell, resubmitting to the Attorney General "on behalf of the
City of Richmond the City's request for approval of the election of
councilmen for the City-at-large." It was becoming clearer that at least
seven members of the Richmond City Council preferred at-large representation to wards. (Marsh and Carpenter, however, still were holding
out for a nine ward system.) Since the Justice Department had removed
the option of any modified ward plan which involved some at-large
seats, the city attorney was arguing strongly for the retention of the
at-large system. Mattox based his appeal on the Whitcomb case, noting
as well that the multimember state legislative districts of Hampton,
Newport News, Portsmouth and Richmond which had earlier been
opposed by the Justice Department were now acceptable to the attorney
general Mattox quoted Mitch elf s June 10th telegram to Governor
Holton:
In accordance with your request, we have reconsidered our objection to
the multi-member aspects of the plan of reapportionment of the Virginia
House of Delegates. Inasmuch as our objection was based on the decision
of the United States Supreme Court in Whitcomb v. Chavis, and that
decision was reversed on June 7, 1971, by the Supreme Court, our
objection to the House multi-member district is hereby withdrawn. 42

Accordingly, Mattox reasoned, "it does not seem that there should be
an objection to the election of nine councilmen from the same geographical area . .. " 43
The meeting between Justice and Richmond officials took place in
John Mitchell's office on August 4, 1971. Representing the city were
Mayor Thomas Bliley, City Attorney Conard Mattox, Charles Ryne
( special Washington counsel for the city) and, most interesting, Lewis
F. Powell, Jr., a well-known Richmond attorney who, at that time, was a
Nixon nominee to the U.S. Supreme Court Powell defended the 1970
annexation on economic grounds, stating that the boundary expansion
was not prompted by racial motives.44 He also elaborated upon the
points raised in Mattox's August 2nd letter to Mitchell and, after the
session with Mitchell, wrote a nineteen-page memorandum to the
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attorney general in still another effort to persuade the Justice
Department to approve the annexation with at-large elections. Powell
stressed that he was" not acting as counsel for the City of Richmond, but
as an interested citizen and as the former Chairman of the Special
Commission which proposed the city manager form of government
( including elections' at large') adopted by Richmond in 1948." Included
in the memorandum was a section which dealt with the need for at-large
representation and another which addressed black political participation. In the latter section, Powell said, among other things, that
It is unrealistic to suggest that black participation will not continue to
be strong and effective following the Chesterfield annexation The relatively small shift in black-white ratio will still leave the black population
possessing the single most cohesive and influential 'block' [ sic) of voters
within the city. No politican could-even ifhe desired-afford to ignore
their views or their welfare.
It is understood that some black leaders now prefer a ward system, or a
hybrid system with wards plus some at-large representation Whether this
would result in some short-term political advantage to blacks is not clear.
It is more likely to have adverse consequences, as any type of ward
system tends to divide-not unite-a municipal population Greater
racial divisiveness is the last thing any city needs at this troubled time in
our history.45 [ italics added]

The Washington meeting between Mitchell and Richmond leaders
was reported in the press, thus informing the opponents of the annexation
and opponents to at-large elections. Consequently, they too, arranged
through the governor's office a meeting with Mitchell Included in the
contingent opposing the city were Venable, Vice-Mayor Marsh, Crusade
representative Dr. Philmore Howlett, civil rights attorney Armand
Derfner, Roger Griffin, and Roger Livingston.46 They presented their
reasons why the Justice Department should affirm the decision. They
also spelled out their arguments in a letter that Marsh and Derfner
addressed to Mitchell on the same day as the meeting ( August 16th). In
the letter, they reminded the attorney general that under Section 5, the
burden of proof that the annexation did not have a discriminatory
purpose or effect was not on the plaintiff, but on the defendant, in this
case, the city. Moreover, they argued that the Whitcomb case did not
apply to the issues of district representation in postannexation Richmond
since the Indiana situation involved the election of only a portion of the
state legislature from multimember districts, whereas "the situation
here involves electing the entire governing body of a large city in one
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grand multi-member, winner-take-all election." "The Supreme Court
has never upheld such a system where possible discrimination was an
issue," they contended," nor has it said anything in any case to imply that
multi-member districts are to be as much tolerated in situations like this
as they are in state legislatures." Quoting from another Supreme Court
decision ( Burns v. Richardson), the two writers suggested that the" allpervading, at-large system" in Richmond fits all three criteria used by the
high court in the Burns case to determine whether at-large representation
was discriminatory. The relevant portion of Burns to which Marsh and
Derfner referred reads:
It may be that this invidious effect can more easily be shown if .. .
districts are large in relation to the total number of legislators, if districts
are not appropriately subdistricted to assure distribution of legislators
that are resident over the entire district, or if such districts characterize
both houses of a bicameral legislature rather than one.47

Again, the parties waited for the Justice Department's decision. On
this occasion, however, they did not have to wait as long. Just over a
month from the August 16th meeting with the city's opposition, on the
very day when the Holt suit began to be heard in the U.S. District Court,
Assistant Attorney General for Civil Rights, David L. Norman, wrote
Mattox to inform him that "we find no basis for withdrawing our
objection" Norman indicated again that the Justice Department's
ruling pertained only to the electoral dimensions of the annexation and,
therefore, did not necessarily invalidate the entire annexation. He also
reiterated the attorney general's suggestion that" one means of minimizing the racial effect of the annexation and still allowing for the city's
growth and expansion would be to adopt a system of single-member,
nonracially drawn councilmanic districts in place of at-large voting." 48
The City of Richmond was not finding the national government as
compliant as the State of Virginia, at least in regards to annexation. To
make matters worse, the city faced Holt's constitutional challenge in the
federal courts and the object of this effort was nothing less than deannexation! Given the ruling of the Justice Department, the city officials were
no longer viewing the Holt initiative as a frivolous action. Rather, the suit
took on a new dimension and what was once dismissed lightly as
"frivolous" was now being considered as a serious threat
The federal district court hearings involved all of the major participants
in the events of the 1960s leading up to the January 1, 1970, annexation,
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as well as those involved in the formation of TOP. City administrative
officials, members of the Richmond City Council, state legislators,
Chesterfield leaders and annexed area citizens testified about their role
in the annexation. It was this testimony which produced much of the
information used earlier in this book about the secret meetings that took
place from 1965 to 1971 between city and county officials and between
Richmond Forward and Team of Progress representatives.
After five days of testimony, Judge Robert R. Merhige, Jr., issued his
findings on September 29, 1971, though his legal conclusions were to
come later. He found that the 1970 annexation did violate the voting
rights of Richmond blacks. More specifically, he stated that while the
initial annexation moves against Henrico and Chesterfield Counties
were not essentially racially motivated, racial motivation was a major
factor underlying the later stages of the Chesterfield annexation. The
compromise agreement, in particular, was engineered out of a fear that
blacks might assume control of Richmond Given the judge's findings,
the city was obviously now fighting a rear guard action. As far as the city
was concerned, the only salvation to Merhige' s comments was that he
expressed a hesitancy to use deannexation as a remedy and, in fact,
indicated his desire to explore any other legal means of providing relief to
Richmond's black community. 49
Two days after Merhige' s announcement from the bench, the Richmond City Council, on a seven-two vote, approved a modified ward system
calling for five single-member districts and four at-large seats and
proceeded to seek approval of the plan from the U.S. District Court
Vice-Mayor Marsh and Councilman James G. Carpenter were the two
voting against the move since they were supportive only of nine singlemember districts. so The council majority, however, did express a preference for a nine ward plan over deannexation and instructed the city's
lawyers to continue their fight against de annexation. The council's
arguments were bolstered by a nineteen-page report prepared by City
Manager Alan F. Kiepper entitled" The Problems Posed by De annexation," which concentrated on the financial and planning dimensions of
deannexation. 51 W. H. C. Venable, on the other hand, stressed to the
court that deannexation was the only effective remedy to olack voter
dilution created by the annexation and that the problem of deannexation
was no more complicated than that faced by any Virginia county whose
property is essentially deannexed when an adjoining city expands its
boundaries.
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With all of the new information converging on the court in the wake of
Merhige' s findings, and upon request of the city to present more
evidence, the federal judge scheduled additional hearings. Meanwhile,
the Chesterfield County Board of Supervisors authorized the county's
executive secretary, Melvin W. Burnett, to testify during the hearings
that Chesterfield was "capable of assuming any legal obligations"
accruing as a result of de annexation and that the county "would
welcome the opportunity to reassumejurisdiction of the annexed area" 52
On the final day of the hearings, and before Merhige rendered his
decision, Merhige told Richmond lawyers that he was unimpressed with
either the modified ward plan or the full ward plan offered by the city as
possible remedies; however, he stopped short of suggesting what the
solution of annexation-induced voter dilution might be. Roughly the
same time as Merhige's comments, Sa'ad El-amin, a black lawyer, (ne
JeRoyd W. Greene), filed a motion to enter the case as a friend of the
court Greene had developed an alternative to either of the city's two
remedies, namely a seven-two plan whereby seven members of the city
council would be elected at-large in the old city and two would be elected
at-large from the annexed area His proposal had been shared with the city
council and was greeted by Councilman Aubrey Thompson, the only
council member who lived in the annexed area, with less than enthusiasm,
calling the plan" stupid and asinine." El-amin' s position was that another
proposal needed to be aired since deannexation, in his estimation, was
unacceptable and since the city's two plans had not received much
support from the court In his motion, which was approved by the court,
Greene said that'' as a citizen, taxpayer and an appointed official of this
city'' (he was a member of the Richmond Commission on Human
Relations), he had a duty"to file this amicus brief in order to bring to the
attention of this court a plan which has not yet been presented" 53
Finally, on November 23, 1971, Judge Robert Merhige made his
decision. His ruling that the annexation had infringed upon the constitutional rights of blacks was not surprising since he had earlier presented
his findings. But his order was a surprise---to the city as well as Holt!
Judge Merhige did not mandate deannexation or either of the two
remedies devised by the city. Rather, he ordered a special councilmanic
election ( subsequently x;alled for January 25, 1972) based on Elamin' s seven-two plan involving the at-large election of seven candidates from the old city and the election of two candidates from the
annexed area ( actually the annexed area plus a small portion of the old
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city near the Deepwater Terminal in South Richmond). Both daily
newspapers criticized the remedy, the Times-Dispatch noting that
"possibly its worst feature is the adverse psychological impact it is
certain to have upon unification of the old and new areas of Richmond,"
and the News Leader commenting that "few people are going to be
ecstatic about the Greene Plan" and that perhaps El-amin and Judge
Merhige may be "the only two persons in Richmond who honestly
believe this jerry-built rig can get off the ground" 54 The city reacted
immediately and sought a stay of the election from the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit The appeals court, on December 6,
1971, granted the city's request and the stay was ordered The U.S.
Supreme Court later affirmed the stay. Meanwhile, both Holt and the
city appealed the district court decision to the Fourth Circuit 55 The city
appealed because of its dismay over Merhige' s contention that the
annexation was racially motivated Holt appealed because ofMerhige's
refusal to order deannexation.
Holt II and the City's Suit
In the meantime, Holt had brought another suit against the city. This
suit ( Holt II) was based, not on constitutional law as was the case in the
first suit ( Holt I), but on statutory law, namely Section 5 of the 1965
Voting Rights Act In accordance with Section 5, which stipulated that
"any action under this section shall be heard and determined by a court
of three judges ... ," the second suit ( Holt II) was filed before a special
three judge federal district court in Richmond 56 Holt sought to declare
Richmond's annexation invalid since the city had not acquired the
necessary approval for the annexation as set forth in Section 5. 57 Like
Holt I, Holt II was designed to return the twenty-three square miles to
Chesterfield County and to enjoin the city from exercising any jurisdiction over the annexed area For the moment, however, Holt II was not
the city's chief concern since Richmond already had been charged with
instituting an annexation on racial grounds and was facing a possible
change in its electoral system in order to keep the annexed area Holt,
too, was concentrating on the appeal since, irrespective of Merhige' s
findings of racial motive for the annexation, deannexation had not been
, ordered It was no disappointment to either party, therefore, when Holt
II was stayed pending the appeal of Holt I.
The Fourth Circuit held hearings on the appeal in February and on
May 3, 1971, the court sided with the city. In a split decision, the court
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majority found "the 'unconstitutional motivation' too remote from the
judicial annexation decree, which firmly rested on nonracial grounds, to
warrant a grant of any relief." Moreover, the majority wrote:
. . . What was done or not done had strong and legitimate reason. Under
these circumstances, it far surpasses judicial power to strike down
legislativeaction because some of the legislatorsmay have been motivated
by some impermissible reasons, found by the District Court, in effect, to
be compelling, and which had set them on their consistent course.
Under the circumstances, no violation of any Fifteenth Amendment
right was worked by the annexation. .. .58
Two jurists disagreed Both dissenters found that the annexation settl(}ment was "dictated by invidious purposes." Circuit Judge Harrison L.
Winter, however, affirmed Merhige' s decision and remedy; whereas ,
Circuit Judge John D. Butzner, Jr. (who, incidentally, was a member of
the annexation court in 1962 when Richmond was pursuing its suit
against Henrico County) stated that "the only adequate remedy is to
require Richmond to divest itself of the annexed area" In support of his
position, he made the following observation:
Although the city professed that it was seekingvacant land for business
and industry, it settled for only 475 acres (.74 of a square mile) of
potential commercial land Developed industrial and commercial land
amounted to even less-312 acres industrial, and 352 commercial. On
the other hand, residential land, of which almost half was already
developed, aggregated 12,356 acres, or more than 19.5 of the 23 square
miles annexed Indeed, the population density of the area annexed was so
great that the city acquired approximately one-third of Chesterfield's
school children and found itself with 3,000 more pupils than its then
existing classrooms could accommodate.59
The press reports, even the editorials, following the appellate court's
reversal of Merhige' s ruling were subdued, with one reporter noting
"that the legal road toward a final resolution of challenges to Richmond's
1970 annexation ... still seemed long and uncertain," and an editorial
writer commenting that, the reversal notwithstanding, "it is difficult to
know where to begin, so mired is the annexation mess becoming." 60 The
editorialist did find one ray of hope ." At least a majority on the Fourth
Circuit has indicated that Richmond is not run by a bunch of bigots." 61
One reason for the caution expressed by observers and by participants
as well was that the appellate court took pains to point out that it was
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dealing with the Fifteenth Amendment issues surrounding the annexation, not with the Voting Rights Act issue, the subject of Holt II.
Venable now moved on two fronts. First, he appealed Holt I to the
U.S . Supreme Court and, second, he filed a motion for a summary
judgment in Holt II, meaning that he sought a quick disposition of the
case since in his estimation there were no material facts in dispute and all
that remained was an interpretation of the law in relation to the facts.
Venable had already successfully used Holt II as a means for enjoining
the 1972 councilmanic elections until the three judge district court could
review the case; however, because the injunction was denied by the three
judge district court, he had to go to the U.S. Supreme Court where Chief
Justice Warren E. Burger, and Justices Harry A. Blackmun and
William H. Rhenquist granted the application on April 24th ( Section 5
authorizes appeals directly from three judge panels hearing Voting
Rights issues directly to the Supreme Court) .
Any hopes for deannexation through the use of constitutional issues
in Holt I were dashed when the Supreme Court denied the writ on June
26 , 1971, thus affirming the decision of the Fourth Circuit As is
customary, the high court did not issue a written opinion though it did
note that Lewis F. Powell, who, by now, had been appointed as an
Associate Justice , did not participate in the decision. 62
With their spirits rekindled by the Supreme Court, Richmond officials
proceeded to approach the Justice Department for the third time. Going
again to Washington and submitting once more a letter to the attorney
general ( now Richard Kleindienst since Mitchell had resigned to work
for Nixon's reelection), City Attorney Mattox pleaded the city's case by
briefly tracing the course of events leading up to the Supreme Court's
decision not to hear the Holt I appeal. He suggested that the Voting
Rights Act was" a codification of the rights guaranteed by the Fifteenth
Amendment" and "in view of the purposes stated in the Act and in view
of the findings of the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals , [and] the denial
of the Writ by the Supreme Court," he requested that "the objection
interposed by the Justice Department by letter dated May 7, 1971 , be
withdrawn. " 63
As in the past, the city had to wait for word from the attorney general,
and as it did, Venable filed a notice in early August that on August 31,
1972, he was going to ask the special district court in Richmond to set a
hearing date for Holt II. The three judges had already been selected,
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including Robert Merhige, Albert V. Bryan, Sr., a senior judge of the
Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals, and U.S. District Court Judge
Richard B. Kellam from Norfolk. With Venable building pressure on
the city and with the city having been turned down twice by the Justice
Department in its efforts to acquire approval and with the city still
waiting for word from the Justice Department about its third overture,
Richmond officials finally decided that it had little choice but to file its
own suit, as it was allowed to do under Section 5. Hopefully, by
acquiring a declaratory judgment from the U.S. District Court in
Washington that the 1970 annexation had neither the purpose nor the
effect "of denying or abridging the right to vote on account of race or
color," Richmond could settle its boundary problems once and for all
Meanwhile, Judge Merhige responded to Venable's August 31st motion
and established October 25th as the hearing date for Holt II, but in so
doing he expressed the wish that the Washington district court should
assume the initiative in resolving the annexation issue. It was obvious
that Merhige was growing weary of the annexation question, particularly
since his alternative remedy proved such a bust and since his decision
was ultimately overturned by the Fourth Circuit 64
With the Holt II suit scheduled for hearings, Venable also sought to
intervene in the city's suit to be heard in Washington by U.S. Circuit
Court of Appeals Judge J. Skelly Wright, U.S. District Judges William
B. Jones and Mrs. June L. Green 65 The Richmond Crusade for Voters
also asked to intervene, with Marsh explaining that "we've learned we
can't put all our eggs in one basket" (referring to Holt's second suit).66
However, the Crusade's desire to participate in the city's case triggered
an angry response from Holt, denouncing the Crusade's move as a
"Johnny-come-lately'' maneuver to get "involved in other people's
matters." Noting the 1970 councilmanic election, Holt said, "Henry L.
Marsh won his election-I was the man who was denied" 67 Holt, too,
was obviously reacting to the fact that a few months earlier, before the
1972 councilmanic was enjoined, he had filed as a candidate but his
candidacy was not endorsed by the Crusade. He and others charged the
Crusade with having lost "its soul" and for having turned increasingly
away from the concerns of poor blacks. Yet, irrespective of the feud
between Holt and the Crusade, both opponents to the city were eventually
granted permission to intervene in Richmond's case pending before the
three judge court in Washington And, in October, Venable again
successfully used the Holt II suit as a basis for approaching Judge
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Merhige and the other two judges on the Richmond court and requesting
them to enjoin local elections for a new clerk of Richmond Chancery
Court as well as to enjoin all future local elections for city council and
constitutional officers ( sheriff, commonwealth's attorney, commissioner
of revenue, and treasurer). Speaking for the panel and citing the
Supreme Court ruling which halted the 1972 councilmanic election,
Merhige granted Venable' s request for a wider injunction.
The legal quagmire was growing daily. Two cases were now pending
before separate three judge panels, one in Richmond and one in
Washington. The question was which one of the federal courts should
take the next step. Venable argued that the Richmond court should grant
a summary judgment favorable to Holt, and Horace Edwards, representing the city, contended that Holt II should be stayed pending the
outcome of the city's suit in Washington. The Richmond court, which
was hearing the debate on October 25th, was clearly caught in the
middle and Judge Merhige queried both parties about the damage that
might occur if the Richmond court enjoined the annexation and the
Washington court approved the annexation. 68 Later, in December, the
Justice Department also asked the Richmond court to delay any
litigation until after the Washington court had ruled on Richmond's suit
It was not until the next year, in February 1973, that the Richmond
court made a move. It supported the city's request for a stay pending a
decision from the D.C. district court "For this court (Richmond) to
take further action at this time," Judge Merhige said upon the court's
granting the city's motion, "would be to run the unnecessary risk of a
conflicting opinion." 69
While Richmond and its opposition were debating before the Richmond court, the U.S. district court in Washington rendered a decision in
another case which would eventually affect the outcome of the Richmond
annexation-related suits. A few miles to the south of Richmond,
Petersburg, Virginia, had also annexed territory and, like Richmond, the
annexation had been disaffirmed by the Justice Department Also like
Richmond, Petersburg sought a declaratory judgment from the Washington court that the annexation of portions of Dinwiddie and Prince
George Counties did not deny or abridge the voting rights of city blacks.
The court ruled in October 197 2 that" ... the annexation of an area with
a white majority combined with at-large councilmanic elections and
racial voting, created or enhanced the power of the white majority to
exclude Negroes totally from participation in the governing of the city
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through membership on the city council" (The Petersburg City Council
consisted of seven legislators, all elected at-large. The annexation added
nine thousand whites to the city's population of roughly 36,000, thereby
dropping the black/white ratio from 56/44 to 47/53.) 70 The court,
however, ruled that the annexation could be approved if the city adopted
"a ward system of electing its city councilmen. " The Washington court
decision was appealed to the U.S . Supreme Court and, on March 5,
197 3, the high court affirmed by summary action the lower court's
ruling and remanded the case back to the Washington court to fashion
the remedy. The lower court directed Petersburg to devise a seven ward
plan. The city complied and developed a plan which was subsequently
approved by the court In so doing, the city's annexation was approved 71
When lawyers for Richmond, the Crusade, Holt, and the Justice
Department ( Justice, at this point, had still not affirmed the city's
annexation) met with the three judges of the Washington district court
during a pretrial conference, Chief Judge Skelly Wright brought up the
Petersburg case and told the lawyers that, in his opinion, there was close
similarity between the Petersburg and Richmond suits. Richmond and
Justice attorneys agreed, but the others viewed the cases as dissimilar
inasmuch as the Petersburg case, in their opinion, was not racially
motivated They claimed Richmond's was. 72
After the pretrial conference and before the beginning of the trial itself,
Richmond's counsel was sufficiently swayed by the Supreme Court's
affirmation of the Petersburg ruling that it approached the city council
and recommended the adoption of a nine ward election system The city
had already drafted various ward plans, including the modified ward/ atlarge plan proposal, which were used in earlier discuss ions with the
Justice Department and U.S . District Court Judge Robert Merhige .
Four plans calling for nine single-member districts were eventually
presented to the Richmond City Council 73 ( The responsibility for drafting
the plans fell largely to Senior Planner Dallas Oslin.) On May 1, 197 3,
the council on a five-three vote directed its lawyers "to petition the
District Court of the District of Columbia to enter an order dividing the
city into nine wards for future elections. " 74 Marsh abstained from voting
since his law firm was assisting the Crusade for Voters as an intervenor
in the suit The three who voted against the petition were committed to
the principle of at-large representation, although they indicated a
preference for ward representation over deannexation. Yet they believed
that somehow Richmond could have it both ways- annexation and
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at-large representation. With instructions from council, City Attorney
Mattox submitted a ward plan to the Justice Department consisting of
four wards with a majority black voting age population and five wards
with a majority white voting age population. After consultations with the
Justice Department., however, the plan was revised to create four
majority black wards, four majority white wards, and one swing ward
with" a substantial number of blacks and whites of voting age." Mattox
argued later that the revised plan" reflected accurately, to the greatest
extent reasonably possible, the black-white ratio of voting age population, as it existed before annexation" 75 ( the ratio was 44.8 percent to 37 .3
percent). The plan was then approved by the Justice Department and
finally adopted by the Richmond City Council on August 25, 197 3. 76 The
problem, however, was that even with the Justice Department's
endorsement of the plan and its decision to now support the city's effort
in court to remedy the racial effects of the annexation by adopting a
system of single-member districts, the court had its own decision to
make and two intervenors were calling for different remedies. Holt was
calling for deannexation and the Crusade for Voters was calling for a
ward plan that was weighted more favorably to blacks, specifically a
plan that would insure five black and four white districts. A weighted
plan, they argued, would compensate for the voter dilution created by
the annexation. 77 Moreover, Venable was cynical about the city's ward
plan, asserting that it was merely an effort "to buy time" until the 1965
Voting Rights Act expired, thus enabling Richmond to revert to at-large
representation. 78 He made his charge partially on the basis of a phone
call which Curtis Holt received from a member of council who told Holt,
"You better take your ward now, because if the law ( Voting Rights Act)
is changed ... the city will go back to at-large [elections]." Venable also
said the the caller was pressing Holt to accept a ward system rather than
deannexation. 79
The three judges began considering several motions related to the
city's suit in July and decided to appoint U.S. Magistrate Lawrence S.
Margolis of Washington to hear the case and make recommendations to
the Washington district court Margolis scheduled the hearings to begin
on October 15, 1973, and anticipated a three to five day trial The
purpose of the trial was twofold It was to determine whether the 1970
annexation was designed to dilute black votes and also to ascertain the
impact of a ward system on the black population. The Special Master
concluded the hearings in three days and set final arguments in the case

166

The Politics of Annexation

for late November, though they were postponed since one of the city's
lawyers, Charles Rhyne, had to appear in the Washington district court
while his client (President Nixon's secretary , Rose Mary Woods)
testified in the Watergate hearings about the mysterious eighteen-minute
gap which appeared in the White House tapes. 80 The final arguments
were rescheduled for December 19th After allowing one day for
lawyers to make concluding statements, Magistrate Margolis began
preparing his report to the district court and the parties waited anxiously
for the results.
When the court appointed magistrate presented his findings and his
recommendations, the results were greeted with euphoria and shock .
The city experienced the latter. On January 28, 197 4, Margolis filed his
opinion, concluding that "although an annexation may be benignly
conceived, racial intent may later permeate the annexat ion plan so as to
obviate the initial benign purpose ." 81 And such was the case in the
Richmond-Chesterfield annexation. The city was not so stunned by the
finding of racial motive ( though it obviously disagreed with Margolis)
since already it had been charged with impermissible motive in the U.S .
District Court in Richmond What stunned Richmond was the recornmendation--deannexation! The magistrate had found the ward system
that the city and the U.S. attorney had submitted an unsatisfactory
remedy for the dilution of black votes brought about by the annexation .
"Ward plans, no matter how equitably drawn, " Margolis said, "cannot
serve to cure an impermissible racial purpose." 82 Thus, he reasoned,
" . . . in view of the finding that de-annexation will not prove unduly
burdensom or costly, de-annexation is the only method by which the
instant impermissible racial purpose may be cured " 83
As one might expect, the Times-Dispatch and the News Leader had a
field day. The former editorialized that deannexation should be " no
cause for joy." It suggested that Margolis' s recommendation" illustrates
the offensive restrictions that have been imposed upon self-government
in Virginia and, indeed, in most of the Soutlt" 84 The News Leader
editorial argued that the deannexation recommendation could" seal the
fate of this city with indisputable finality'' since the magistrate
urges nothing less than rendering Richmond a vast ghetto whose residents- the poor and the black-would know only endless dark streets of
trouble, calamity, and squalid isolation ... deannexation would mean
giving up $435 million worth of taxable property-or nearly one-fourth
of the taxable property in Richmond It would mean returning to
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Chesterfield 50,000 persons who are helping greatly to provide the
services that Richmond's existing poor and blacks demand Take away
those people, and you devastate Richmond's revenue source. 85

Of course, the Master's recommendations remained just thatrecommendations. They would not have the force of law unless they
were adopted by the U.S. District Court Meanwhile, the city began
filing exceptions to the report, focusing particularly on Margolis' s
dismissal of the city's ward plan as a remedy for the dilution of black
voting power. The nine ward proposal, the city argued, "guarantees four
black seats ( on City Council) and a possible fifth. This corresponds to the
voting age population prior to annexation. This is a simple mathematical
fact " 86 Another point stressed by Richmond's lawyers was that the
city's bonded debt would be dangerously close to the legal debt ceiling
( established at 18 percent of the assessed value of property) if Richmond
had to return the twenty-three square miles which contained 23 to 25
percent of the total taxable values in the city.87
The Crusade, too, objected to the Margolis report It was still holding
out for a weighted ward plan. In response to Venable' s argument that a
councilmanic ward system would not address the citywide election of
constitutional officers, the Crusade conceded that black votes "would
be diluted to some extent with the so-called' constitutional officers' in
the enlarged city." It added, however, that" this is of little significance
since blacks historically have not run for those posts, preferring to
concentrate on the politically significant City Council ... " Furthermore, according to the Crusade:
. .. there is no reason to think that anyone would be advantaged by such
a course [deannexation] , with the possible exception of white citizens in
the annexed area Even if black voters stood a chance of gaining
significant political power from de- annexation, [it] would give them
precious little because of the difficulties facing the city within its old
boundaries . . . If ... black voters can obtain significant political power in
an expanded city, they will be able to direct city government so as to
benefit both blacks and whites to a significantly greater degree than has the
entrenched power structure.
Both expansion and a political voice . . . are necessary. [Also the]
Richmond public schools would instantly be transformed from a black
majority system to a virtually all-black system with staggering implications
for the course of desegregation efforts in which Richmond blacks have
been involved for more than a decade . .. .88
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Venable, Holt, and the annexed area residents were jubilant over
Margolis' s report But Venable realized that the report was not law and
knew, therefore, that he had to reinforce his position by replying to the
city's and Crusade's comments. Venable again stressed ( 1) that
deannexation was the only effective cure to black voter dilution, (2) that
the court ought to enjoin the city from exercising jurisdiction over the
annexed area, and (3) that elections ought to be called immediately
without the participation "of the diluting annexed votes." He also
denigrated the ward remedy of the city and the Crusade, noting that
while districts guarantee blacks some councilmanic seats, wards also
"guarantee a limit to the number of black seats on council and severely
limit the potential growth of black voting influence on council" Also, he
said that wards "are merely a second line defense of white supremacy
and first line defense of personally motivated black political bosses
who would insulate themselves in pocket bouroughs." Moreover, he
argued that the 1970 annexation "neither met nor satisfied either the
need for growth or expansion room'' and concluded with the observation
that deannexation "is not a voyage upon unchartered seas." 89
Perhaps the people most excited about the magistrate's de annexation
recommendation were the annexed area residents. They continued to
raise money to support Holt's deannexation efforts, although it should be
pointed out that the money consistently fell short of the actual expenses
incurred by Venable. (Venable was also able to use unpaid college
students to assist in the research, but, in the final analysis, he made a
considerable investment of his own to support the suits.90 Again, it
should be stressed that although he was undertaking Holt's cases largely
on a pro bono basis, the cases gave him statewide, indeed, national
visibility and established him as one of the city's leading defense
lawyers. In short, his "investment'' paid off.) During a meeting of the
South Richmond Council of Civic Associations, C. G. Loomer appealed
to the residents to contribute to the fight, suggesting that it was only a
matter of time before the annexed area would once more be part of
Chesterfield County 'We have won!" he exclaimed "We' re gonna be
deannexed . . . My children are going to go back to neighborhood
schools," an obvious reference to the city's crosstown busing order
promulgated by the U.S. District Court He also said that deanexation
would bring about reduced taxes. "Your utility taxes are going to be
eliminated- r ve stopped paying mine and I suggest you do the same
thin~" 91
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On March 20, 197 4, the U.S. District Court for the District of
Columbia began hearing arguments relative to the suit and the Special
Magistrate's report On May 29, the court rendered its decision,
concluding that
... Richmond's 1970 changes in its election practices following upon the
annexation were discriminatory in purpose and effect and thus violative
of Section S's substantive standards as well as the section's procedural
command that prior approval be obtained from the Attorney General or
this court 92

Though the court did not approve the annexation, agreeing also with the
Master that the ward plans were insufficient compensation for the
dilution of black votes and that the city failed to provide acceptable
economic or administrative reasons for the annexation, it did not agree
with the Master's recommended remedy, deannexation. Rather, it
determined that the remedy should be fashioned by the three judge court
in Richmond where Holt II was still pending.
Calling the court's ruling a" non-decision," the News Leader asserted
that while a federal tribunal once again found" leaders of Richmond to
have been, well, conspiring bigots" and while a federal court "once
again" has declared" that Richmond violated the Voting Rights Act of
1965 by not clearing the annexation with the Justice Deprtment prior to
putting the annexation into effect," the court "once again" has "done
nothing" about these findings. Consequently, "the voters ofRichmondincluding the voters in the annexed area- will be denied their local
franchise for, probably, at least another year." The writer reminded the
readers that for" 15 years the Richmond-Chesterfield annexation case
has been in the courts. Fifteen years. Still there is no final disposition of
the case. And what of Richmond's voters? Oh, yes: the voters. For five
years, in the name of protecting the voters, the federal courts have
denied the voters' right to-vote." 93
Neither of the primary adversaries was thoroughly pleased with the
decision. Richmond failed to acquire its declaratory judgment stating
that the city's boundary expansion was permissible under the Voting
Rights Act Holt failed to get his remedy, deannexation. The Crusade,
too, was disappointed It failed to persuade the court to adopt its plan for
single-member districts.
And if the picture was not blurred enough by now, shortly after the
court decision, Venable instituted a third suit in behalf of Curtis Holt, Sr.
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Also a class action suit, this new initiative ( Holt III) before the U.S .
District Court in Richmond was designed to dissolve the 1970 Richmond
City Council to institute new elections in the old city, to remove city
control from the annexed area, and to return the area to the county. The
suit charged that the members of council were holding office illegally
since the Washington court ruled that the 1970 councilmanic election
was "illegally held" and constituted a violation of the 1965 Voting
Rights Act 94 The new suit notwithstanding, it was doubtful that new
elections would be forthcoming given the litigation still ahead on the
city's suit Undoubtedly, however, the city's political environment was
deteriorating as a result of the injunction against local elections. Three of
the council members elected in 1970, James Carpenter, William Daniel,
and Howard Carwile, resigned Daniel resigned due to compelling
business reasons; Carpenter because of his decision to undertake
missionary work in Ecuador; Carwile because of his desire to run for the
Virginia House of Delegates. Though the courts had enjoined local
elections, the city council was still authorized to fill any vacancies by
appointing replacements. Two of the people appointed to council, Julius
R. Johnson and Raymond Royall, had actually lost their bids for council
seats in the 1970 election, with Johnson and Royall ranking 19th and
21st respectively. Both had been endorsed by TOP. The third appointee
was Willie J. Dell , a member of the Richmond Commission on Human
Relations and supporter of the Crusade for Voters. 95 The consequence of
the resignations and appointments was that the council, once characterized by a six-three split between TOP and Crusade endorsees, was now
characterized by a seven-two split Clearly, the victim of the injunction
against elections was, ironically, the black community.
The city attacked Holt's third class action suit, charging that Holt
could not effectively claim that he represented blacks when his counsel,
W. H. C. Venable, was receiving financial support from whites living in
the annexed area The city won that point in that Judge Merhige, during
arguments before the court on June 25, 197 4, stripped Holt III of its
class action status. And, to compound the confusion, Venable himself
asked the court to dismiss the suit since it was duplicative of Holt II.
And, stranger still, the city opposed the motion. What was involved,
however, was attorney's fees. The city had always viewed Holt III as an
abuse of the judicial process but did not want the case dismissed until
Judge Merhige ordered Holt to pay the city for the time it invested in the
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case. However, on July 11th, Merhigeissued a conditional dismissal of
the case. The condition was the Holt not institute additional litigation
relating to the 1970 Richmond-Chesterfield annexation To goad Holt
into accepting the dismissal with the condition, Merhige said that Holt
would face the prospect of paying legal fees to the city in connection with
Holt III if he did not accede to the qualification Obviously, Holt could
not finance the city's defense. He was not even financing his own
counsel The condition was accepted and the case was dismissed 96
Running parallel to the city's moves to counter Holt II were its efforts
to counter the decision of the Washington district court Failing to
acquire a stay of the court's order, Richmond prepared an appeal of the
order to the U.S. Supreme Court And concurrent with the appeal was
the city's attempt to delay the hearings on Holt II ( which had been
scheduled for September 12th) until the U.S. Supreme Court acted, but
that attempt also failed As a consequence, while it looked to the
Supreme Court to overturn the Washington court, it looked to the three
judge district court in Richmond not to declare the annexation invalid
The city fared well once the Holt II hearings began The court did not
dismiss the suit or refrain from granting Holt's request to declare the
annexation null and void, but it did decide to continue the case until after
the resolution of the city's suit Now the city could concentrate strictly on
its Supreme Court appeal 97
Good news came to City Hall on December 16, 1974, when the
Supreme Court announced its decision to consider Richmond's appeal
The high court, however, did not set a date for hearing the appeai but at
least the city cou_ld count on stating its case and perhaps resolving the
annexation issue favorably before the nation's highest court 98
The Supreme Court set aside April 23, 1975, to hear twenty minute
arguments from each of the four parties; namely, the city, Curtis Holt,
Sr., the Crusade for Voters and the Justice Department which, as noted
earlier, had joined the city in its efforts to remedy the annexation through
single-member district representation The one twist in the appeal was
that the Crusade, in its oral arguments before the court as well as in its
brief, now viewed deannexation as a "virtual inevitable consequence"
of the Washington court's refusal to grant the city a declaratory
judgment Thus, the Crusade lawyer indicated the group's support for
an "at-large election in the old city. " 99 It was not so much that the
Crusade had abandoned its drive for a racially sensitive system of
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single-member districts as much as its recognition of reality and its
.knowledge that at-large representation within the city's preannexation
boundaries would serve its interests as well
On June 24, 1975, the Supreme Court ruled By a vote of five to three
(Justice Powell did not participate) the court rendered a decision which
enabled all parties to claim a victory of sorts. Writing for the majority,
Justice Bryon R White held "that an annexation reducing the relative
political strength of the minority race in the enlarged city as compared
with what it was before the annexation is not a statutory violation as long
as the postannexation electoral system fairly recognizes the minority's
political potential" 100 The court relied heavily on City of Petersburg v.
United States in framing its opinion In Petersburg, The Supreme Court
affirmed the lower court's ruling that the cure for that city's annexation
which had the effect of diluting black votes was the adoption of a ward
plan "We are also convinced that the annexation now before us, in the
context of the ward system of election finally proposed by the city and
then agreed to by the United States, does not have the effect prohibited
by Section 5." 101 What is significant about the Supreme Court ruling is
that while it was a split decision, all eightjustices agreed that Richmond's
annexation was racially motivated The majority found that "the
annexation, as it went forward in 1969, was infected by the impermissible purpose of denying the right to vote based on . race through
perpetuating white majority power to exclude Negroes from office
through at-large elections." [italics added]102 Justice William J. Brennan,
representing Justices William 0. Douglas and Thurgood Marshall in a
minority opinion, was much blunter:
In my view, the flagrantly discriminatory purpose with which Richmond
hastily settled its Chesterfield County annexation suit in 1969 comp~lled
the District Court to deny Richmond the declaratory judgment The
record is replete with statements by Richmond officials which prove ·
beyond question that the predominant ( if not sole) motive and desire of
the negotiators of the 1969 settlement was to acquire 44,000 additional
white citizens for Richmond, in order to avert a transfer of political control
to what was fast becoming a black population majority. 103

If the court was united as to the purpose of the annexation, at least the
latter stages of the annexation, it was divided over remedy. While the
minority opinion "would affirm the judgment below [the Washington
district court], and let the United States District Court for the Eastern
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.District of Virginia set about the business of fashioning an appropriate
remedy as expeditiously as possible," 104 the majority took a different
turn-one that baffied all four parties to the suit Justice White opined
that, impermissible purpose notwithstanding,
. .. we are . . . persuaded that if verifiable reasons are now demonstrable
in support of the annexation, and the ward plan proposed is fairly
designed, the city need to do no more to satisfy the requirements of
Section 5 . . . . It would also seem obvious that if there are no verifiable
economic or administrative benefits from the annexation that would
accrue to the city, its financial or other prospects would not be worsened
by deannexation. 105 [ italics added]

Accordingly, the Supreme Court returned the city's suit to the Washington district court where the question of the annexation's economic or
administrative benefits to the city was to be resolved
The city was relieved that the court had not ordered deannexation,
although the court had not terminated the litigation and Richmond, to
keep the land, would have to show that it was benefitting economically or
administratively from annexation Holt's lawyer claimed a victory,
calling the ruling " a great decision It's exactly what I wanted and asked
for." 106 Actually Holt had asked for de annexation, but the court was not
compliant It did say, however, that deannexation would" seem obvious
if there are no verifiable economic or administrative benefits from the
annexation .. ." Given the court's coupling of Richmond v. U.S. and
Peters burg v. U.S., the Justice Departmenttook heart since the Supreme
Court sanctioned the use of single-member districts as a equitable
remedy and specifically endorsed the ward plan proposed by the city
and the attorney general But, the court also ruled that a ward plan alone
was insufficient The Crusade was obviously disheartened by the court's
approval of the city's ward plan, but inasmuch as the Crusade had
indicated its approval of at-large elections in the old city, the organization
was encouraged by the court's favorable position on de annexation
should Richmond be unable to prove economic or adminstrative gains
from the annexed area In short, if there were no clear-cut losers, there
were also no clear-cut winners. City of Richmond v. United States had
something for everyone and total victory for none. The one clear
message from the Supreme Court, however, was that the original
emphasis on the broad policy issues involved in the 1970 RichmondChesterfield annexation ( issues pertaining to the Voting Rights Act and
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the U. S. Constitution) was to be replaced with an emphasis on such
narrow subjects as cost-benefit analysis, administrative operations, and
service delivery.
The responsibility for determining whether Richmond could justify
the annexation on the basis of" verifiable economic or administrative
benefits from the annexation" was now that of the Washington district
court As they had earlier, the three judges referred the matter to Special
Magistrate Lawrence Margolis who, again, was to hear the evidence,
present his findings, and offer his recommendations to the court
Margolis was to have begun hearings on the case in October, 1975, but
the three judge panel granted the city's request for a delay to enable
Richmond officials to complete the collection of data The hearings
were then scheduled for November, but, this time, Venable requested
( and received) a delay in order to study the city's evidence. 101
It was not until January 12, 1976, that the testimony finally began.
Each side presented expert witnesses in the fields of economics, planning,
and public administration, all of whom presented technical data that
supported their party's arguments and challenged the arguments of the
other party. With each side calling into question the research methodology
of the other, the debate quickly turned into disagreements over highly
complex formulas for ascertaining costs and benefits associated with
the annexation Perhaps the debate was made more complicated by the
fact that both parties were venturing into areas where research methodologies were not highly refined and where no standard instrument
existed for measuring annexation- related costs and benefits. However ,
as one scholar noted, in their effort to prove the benefits of annexation,
Richmond officials probably learned more about the costs and revenues
associated with running a municipality than most other city administrators. And, indeed, one of the contributions of the Richmond case
was the development of various models for analyzing the administrative
and financial impacts of annexation 108
Essentially, the city claimed that the annexed area produced a surplus.
Richmond presented data indicating that it allocated about $15.2
million in expenditures in the annexed area and that it received about
$20 million in revenue from the area 109 The city also argued that the loss
of the area would result in tax increases for citizens living in the old city.
The Justice Department, too, showed that the city was benefiting from
annexation The national agency relied on a study it had commissioned,
which was undertaken by Thomas Muller and Grace Dawson of the
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Urban Institute. The study's results differed somewhat from the city's
conclusions, though the Muller/Dawson study also showed the annexed
area generating a surplus, with annexed area residents" contributing $43 2
per capita in local revenue to Richmond, and incurring $361 per capita
in expenditures." 110 Venable, however, using a different methodology,
asserted that the city lost between $4.8 million and $6 million during the
197 4-75 fiscal year as it serviced the annexed area In making his
argument, Venable indicated that the city's data were incomplete and
failed to reflect the full range of government expenditures , particularly
those in the old city which relied on revenues from the annexed area 111
Such was the nature of the trial Protracted debates broke out over
attempts to gauge the impact of annexation on land, bonded indebtedness,
capital projects, service delivery, administrative personne~ and manageent To reiterate, the texture of the trial was significantly different from
that of previous trials. Earlier, the major issue was local power-how
annexation stemmed from and affected the political process. Now the
focus was on municipal administration-how annexation affected the
operational dimension of city government
After the long and tedious hearing, Margolis amassed the volumes of
information and prepared a report which he submitted to the district
court on May 24, 1976. He found that the city's benefits from annexation
exceeded its losses and, consequently, concluded "that there are now
objectively verifiable, legitimate economic and administrative benefits
or advantages from the annexation now accruing to the City of
Richmond" 112 The ruling was the best news the city had received
relative to the annexation since the July 1, 1969 decision of the
annexation court It appeared that the end was in sight, although
Richmond lawyers knew that Margolis' s only power was to report to the
district court
As expected, Holt instructed Venable to file objections to the Margolis
report In announcing his intention, Holt said, "I can't see how
[Margolis] can try an economic case that is based on discrimination. He
has changed his whole attitude, after ruling in my favor two years ago."
Moreover, Holt claimed that he would still seek deannexation and, in so
doing, took a swipe at the Crusade. "The Crusade .. . didn' t come to my
rescue when I first filed an objection [to the annexation] in 1970. More
blacks would love fo see deannexation than annexation," he continued 113 Meanwhile, the Crusade decided to drop its intervention in the
city's suit Crusade President Ralph Johnson noted that "we are just
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waiting for the decision of the thre~judge panel," though adding that
"we still hold our same position in favor of our ward system." 114 His
comment did not quite jibe with that of Marsh who, in January of 197 5,
reluctantly indicated that deannexation was the only answer. 115 With the
Justice Department continuing its support of the city, Holt was the lone
opponent of the annexation.
On August 9, 1976, the Washington district court affirmed the
annexation without specifically addressing the question of whether
legitimate reasons existed for the annexation It simply noted:
Under the circumstances as required by the mandate of the Supreme
Court, it is hereby declared that the plaintiff [Richmond] has complied
with the Voting Rights Act of 1965 with respect to the annexation of 1970
in the context of the ward plan for councilmanic elections. 116

The city's long sought affirmation of the annexation had arrived It now
appeared that what the Roanoke Times classified as "the worst siege by
the federal government since General Grant was choking Petersburg
back in early 1865" was finally coming to an end 117 It also appeared
that Richmond would once again begin holding local elections, an
appropriate event inasmuch as the nation was celebrating its bicentennial Barring an unlikely reversal by the Supreme Court, the decision of
the Washington court ended the city's suit, thus clearing the way for the
city to seek the removal of court injunctions against local elections. The
Washington court's decision was obviously disappointing to Holt, but
he also knew that the chances of now acquiring deannexation were next
to impossible. He also knew that the lack oflocal elections was extending
the TOP majority. Indeed, as noted earlier, the TOP controlled council
had actually increased its strength by appointing replacements for
legislators who had resigned Accordingly, after conferring with members of the city's black community and deciding that appeals and other
legal action were only delaying the reinstatement of councilmanic
elections, Holt decided not to appeal the decision to the Supreme Court
Given the ward plan approved by the high court, the black population
could be assured of at least four predominantly black districts within the
nine district plan and possibly a fifth, given its almost 40 percent black
population Consequently, with ward elections, blacks could capture four
and perhaps five seats on city council Even without deannexation, it
was conceivable that blacks for the first time since Richmond's founding
could acquire a council majority and elect their own mayor.
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With the city's suit resolved, the injunctions against elections were
lifted and a special councilmanic election was called for March 1, 1977 .
Furthermore , Holt II, which was stayed pending the outcome of the
city's suit, was withdrawn by the Richmond district court upon request
of both the city and Curtis Holt, Sr. 118 The legal battle was over. And on
March 8th, the first local election involving councilmanic districts was
held since the 1940s and, when the dust had settled, blacks had acquired
five seats. During the first season of the newly elected council, Richmond' s first black mayor (Henry Marsh, Ill) was elected
One of the ironies of the Holt suits and the 197 7 special election was
that the man largely responsible for altering the city's political landscape
was himself unsuccessful in his bid for council in 1977, never even
getting the endorsement of the Crusade. The person victorious in Holt's
district was Henry Marsh, III. Nevertheless, while Holt never acquired
a seat on council, his suits led to a change in the electoral system
whereby blacks captured a majority . True , the Crusade championed a
ward system, but the organization came into the litigation after Holt had
initiated the action. Furthermore , had it not been for Holt's press for
deannexation and the effectiveness of Venable in advocating deannexation, the ward concept might not have been so attractive to the city since
it knew that such a remedy was the only way to beat Holt's effort to
return the annexed area to Chesterfield County. In short, had it not been
for Curtis Holt and his attorney, the challenge in the federal courts ( if it
had ever materialized) might not have been such a serious assault on the
city's power structure . Moreover, the challenge that was mounted was
undertaken by an" outsider'' to the Crusade and one who found that the
Crusade, while not supporting Holt, was quite willing to use his suits as
a vehicle for pressing its own interests.
The Holt litigation, together with that surrounding the city's suit,
captured the attention of lawyers, politicans, and students of public
affairs across the nation. Never before in American history had a city
gone so long without local elections as a result of federal court injunctions, and never before in recent American municipal annexations had a
single boundary expansion acquired such notoriety. Beyond the fact that
the litigation was extremely complex ( involving the Richmond district
court, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals, a special three judge district
court in Richmond, the three judge district court in Washington, D .C., a
Special Magistrate, the U.S. Supreme Court-not to mention the
lengthy negotiations with the U.S. Justice Department), the litigation
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raised important questions related to annexation and constitutiorraVstatutory law and to measurements for ascertaining the impact of
annexation on municipal finance and administratio1t The 1970 Richmond-Chesterfield annexation, in short, was a landmark policy move,
the consequences of which rippled through the city, the Commonwealth
of Virginia and, indeed, the nation as a whole.
The Aftermath
Given the convergence of the many issues that surrounded the annexation it is important to analyze the fall-outs resulting from Richmond's
boundary expansio1t The resolution of the dispute through the courts did
not necessarily end the debate among the parties. The federal court
decisions merely ended the legal warfare; the political and economic
conflicts between blacks and whites, city and counties, continued
unabated
In the regular 1978 councilmanic election, the battle was again
between the Crusade and the white power structure. (By 1978, the Team
of Progress had changed its name to Teams for Progress.) The Crusade,
having become a majority"party" as a result of its success in the special
election of 1977, was eager to retain its control of council. Its core slate
consisted of the five incumbent black council members. The Team's
core slate consisted of the four white incumbents who ran in the
predominately white districts, and one white nonincumbent who ran in
the swing district 119
Discussions of race were kept to a minimum, surfacing only in District
8 ( the swing district), District 4 ( a predominately white district), and
District 5, originally one of the four black districts but which now became
a potential swing district in 197 8 since the black incumbent was corrfronted by both a white and a black challenger.
The Eighth District was the pivotal district that could swing the
councilmanic race either towards retention of the black majority or the
creation of a white majority. The black incumbent, Claudette B.
McDaniei was opposed by G. Richard Wainwright, a white. The
gravity of the need to install a white majority was expressed by a white in
the district "We're up against it out here in the 8th District If we don't
put a white in this time, we probably never will again." 120 One of
Wainwright's flyers may have added fuel to this sentiment when it
stated: "The right City Council ... begins with the right city councilman
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for the 8th District" 121 Many blacks translated" right'' as a code word for
"white." In the Fourth District race between two whites, candidate
Perley A. Covey accused Mayor Henry L. Marsh and council members
Willie J. Dell and Walter T. Kenny of injecting race into the campaign
for their saying," elect five ofus." 122 He first characterized the statement
as "racist," but later apologized, calling the term rather strong and
instead voiced his preference for the term "racial overtones." 123 He
himself uttered remarks on the importance of race in the election by
noting that there was very little interest in the Fourth District contest
" because both candidates are white." 124 The Fifth District contest was
the only race that pitted the incumbent, H. W. "Chuck " Richardson,
against a black challenger, William R. " Randy'' Johnson, Jr., and a
white challenger, F. Wilson Craigie, Jr. Johnson ran against Richardson
in the special 1977 election and lost to him by twelve votes. 125 He ran in
197 8 because he thought that a twelve vote margin was not a mandate
from the district Throughout the campaign, Johnson felt compelled to
deny the rumor that he had entered the race merely to split the black vote
with Richardson and thus allow Craigie to win.126 This fear among some
blacks in the district may have intensified after it became public
knowledge that five hundred new voters had registered in the Fifth
District with more than four hundred of these registered by the Craigie
camp. 127 Johnson accused the Crusade of starting the rumor of his
alleged scheme to split the black vote. He also accused the Crusade of
introducing race into the Fifth District and noted that the "struggle for
power'' was also a part of the split between him and the Crusade. He
urged citizens to vote on the basis of a candidate's philosophy rather
than his race. 128 Richardson refrained from mentioning race during the
campaign; Craigie made only an indirect reference to race when he said
that the district needed an "independent'' who was neither closely
linked to the predominately white Teams nor to the predominately black
Crusades. 129 Throughout the campaign the Crusade maintained that it
would recapture the Fifth District The election results supported their
optimism
Ironically, the annexation issue that had blocked councilmanic elections for seven years was mentioned only briefly, once during the
election and once immediately afterwards. Covey, whose district was in
the annexed area, complained that property taxes had increased 300
percent in the annexed area since Thompson, the incumbent, has been
on council 130 Golding, the victor in the Ninth District, compared his

180

The Politics of Annexation

district in the preannexation and postannexation periods and noted that
the quality of the sevices rendered had declined 131 Outside of the two
scattered remarks the vast majority of the candidates simply saw the
annexation as a fait accompli and ignored it Even Curtis Holt, Sr.,
again a candidate in the 197 8 race, refrained from mentioning the
annexation
The May 2, 1978 vote returned all the black incumbents to council in
the Third, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, and Eighth districts. White incumbents
won in districts one, two, and four. Raymond D. Royall , an incumbent
from the Ninth District and a Teams candidate, was the only incumbent
not reelected He was defeated by William I. Golding, who was not
endorsed by Teams . The results of the election and the racial composition of the council are depicted in the table below:
TABLE 6
THE 1978 COUNCILMANIC
(W

=

ELECTION

white; B = Black)

I st District
Kemp(W) : 4,3 12
Soulious (W) : 914 (W)

2nd District
Rennie ( W) : 2,611
Ambrose ( W): 948
Troubetzkoy(W) : 158

3rd District
Dell (B): uncontested

4th District
Thompson (W): 2,984
Covey ( W): 1,041

5th District
Richardson ( B): 2.508
Craigie ( W) : 1,027
Johnson (B) : 533

6th District
Kenney ( B): uncontested

7th Distri ct
Marsh ( B): 2,01 1
Holt ( B): 422

8th District
McDaniel ( B): 2,617
Wainwright ( W) : 1,710

9th District
Golding ( W): 1.148
Royall ( W) : 1,006
Hall(W) : 442

Source: Richmond Times-Dispatch, May 3. 1978.

Dr. William S. Thornton, founder of the Crusade , hailed the election
results as "the greatest victory" of the Crusade in its twenty-five year
history and noted that the results were" proof positive " that the Crusade
had indeed become a force with which to reckon in city politics . 13 2 He
added that the victory meant that the city' s political leadership will be
.. more receptive to the needs of the city' s poor residents," and will
support more social issues and social programs including the public
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school system 133 Mayor Marsh saw the results as a mandate from
Richmond voters to continue a "people-oriented council" for two more
years. He declared that the majority on council "has tried to provide
clear and fair-handed leadership," and that he, along with others, will
attempt to make Richmond such an exciting place that people will want
to come back in 134
The Leidinger Affair
The first confrontation between the five black majority and the four white
minority council members centered around William J. Leidinger, the
city manager appointed by the pre-1977 white majority council On
August 2, 1978, Mayor Marsh met with Leidinger and informed him that
the five black council members were displeased with his performance
and wanted him to resign so that they could choose a manger who they
thought was more agreeable to the social programs and objectives of the
council majority. 135 Leidinger immediately sought counsel among leaders
of the white financial community who requested a meeting with Mayor
Marsh and the four black council members shortly thereafter. At this
meeting, the dozen or so business leaders who, it was said, "must have
been worth more than $50 million," basically voiced their disapproval of
the attempt to force Leidinger to resign 136 The businessmen also attacked
the move as racist and implied that they, too, had some aces up their
sleeve: they threatened to scuttle Project One, the proposed downtown
renewal program involving an office, hotei and convention center
complex; they threatened to halt downtown construction and improvement programs; some vowed to move their firms out of the city. 137
According to one writer, the confrontation between the white business
establishment and black elected officials was the "first clear indication
that the imposition of the city's nine-ward council election plan last year
and the resulting election of a majority black council have caused a shifting of power in Richmond " 138 Said one writer of the split between the
black council members and white business leaders: "Economic power had
run into political power and it had lost" 139 One businessman-politician
saw the diversion as evidence that there were now two centers of power in
Richmond: "Political power rests with the Crusade for Voters while
economic power remains vested along Main Street" 140 Though several
business leaders objected to the manner in which Leidinger' s dismissal
was being handled, they saw the situation as a routine power struggle
between the" ins" and the" outs" since it was a normal procedure for the
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victorious political faction to oust the appointee of the defeated faction.
Also, they indicated that it was normal for people in Leidinger' s position
to be asked to resign before being fired A few businessmen noted that
Leidinger was arrogant and should have gone to the council for support
rather than seeking help from white business leaders. For his part,
Marsh accused the white business community of unreasonableness and
of reacting with hysteria. He recounted his support for the many projects
initiated by the business leaders, some of which garnered him criticism
from many blacks. 141
The business leaders did not convince the black council members to
back down in the Leidinger case and on August 14, 1978, a resolution
was read in council to terminate the service ofLeidinger as city manager
as of October 6, 197 8. The resolution was later passed by a vote of five
to four. Its introduction to the council opened another phase of the
warfare between black council members and the Richmond white power
structure; this time the warfare was with the minority white council
members. In a study supervised by one of the present authors entitled,
"Conflict Among Richmond City Council Members," Jon Shaffer found
that three of the four white council members viewed Leidinger' s dismissal as purely racially motivated The exception was Muriel H. Smith
( a majority appointee who ironically was subsequently defeated by
Leidinger in a 1980 council election. Smith had been appointed to fill the
seat vacated by Wayland Rennie who resigned in 1979 for business and
personal reasons.) Smith viewed the firing as a result of ideologicai not
raciai clashes. 142 Councilman Kemp believed Leidinger was fired so
that the black majority could appoint a black city manager; Councilman
Thompson believed the firing occurred because Leidinger could not get
along with the black majority; Mrs. Carolyn Wake, who was appointed
to the council in December, 1978, to replace William Golding, Sr.,
( who, it was later revealed, had had an arrest record) stated that
Leidinger was fired because the black council members did not like
him. 143 Black council members viewed the Leidinger conflict as more
philosophical and policy-oriented than racial Speaking of Leidinger,
one black councilman said: "I want to tell him it's not personal ... I
want to tell him it's professionai that while we have to deal with it in
personal terms, it's not that . . . 144 Leidinger was characterized by
black council members as not having" his vision of the city in line with
the majority," "marching out of time with the desires and intent of the
people," "not being effective enough," and of being" insensitive to the
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human needs of the community." 145 Richmond's evening newspaper
called the situation "tawdry business" and saw it as a sign of irresporr
sibility and instability; it also viewed the Leidinger case as a threat to
Project One, the middle class, the city's business future, and warned that
the firing would affect the quality of the city administration. 146
Conflict on City Council: Insiders Become Outsiders
The firing of Leidinger proved to be merely the beginning of a series of
conflicts that saw council votes sharply divided along racial lines. In this
sense Richmond was not unusuat several studies have shown that the
level of tension and conflict increases whenever blacks become a
majority on formerly all-white or majority white councils or when blacks
become mayors and must deal with a majority white council. 147 The
stakes are usually very high for black politicians because blacks under
city governments that made no attempts to satisfy their political or
economic needs often expect quick solutions ( even miracles) to problems
that have been festering for_decades. For example, when Richard
Hatcher became the first black mayor in Gary, Indiana, he was visited by
blacks during his first week in office. These blacks demanded that he
give them an account of why" all blacks did not have jobs and why all of
Gary's slums had not been eliminated" 148 A new black political
majority is, therefore, under immense pressure by its black constituency
to prove itself and differentiate itself from the policies and practices of
the previous white majority government It is almost compelled, therefore, to attempt to alter the government's orientation and to focus more
on human service programs. 149
What happened in Richmond was a changing of the guard The fact
that blacks, the old outsiders, became the new insiders, and whites, the
old political insiders, became the new political outsiders, added fuel to
the growing racial power clash. If we interpret, as some council
members did, the black majority-white minority conflict purely along
power supremacy lines, we ignore the crucial factor of race that
precipitated the need to restructure the electornl system from at-large to
single-member representation If we ignore power and only account for
race, we lose sight of an important dimension of traditional party and
group perspectives that have helped to shape the politics, economics, and
social fabric of American cities. Nevertheless, it does appear as if
almost every issue that came before the Richmond City Council became
one phase of a continuing black majority-white minority battle. The
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Leidinger case was only one example of the collective positions taken by
each side. Similar collective positions were evident on other issues such
as ( 1) councilmanic redistricting, ( 2) bonds for the city's capital improvement program, and ( 3) a no- strings expense account for council
members.
On redistricting ( required after the 1980 census was completed),
white council members have argued that the 1980 plan proposed by
blacks and adopted by a 5-4 vote along racial lines was racially and
politically inspired in that it would guarantee continued black rule in the
city. 150 The black council members' position on redistricting was
mirrored in remarks made by lawyer Oliver W. Hill( the first black to win
a council seat in this century when he was elected to the council in 1948)
on the first day of public hearings to discuss the boundary lines of the nine
council districts. In an emotional appeal before the council, Hill said:
The real issue as I see it and as it is perceived by a large body of citizenry
... is whether or not the minority bloc on counci~ the Richmond power
structure, the Richmond newspapers and white citizens generally ... have
reached the level of maturity where they are able to accept the fact that
blacks have a right to exercise the symbols of power ... for centuries the
city of Richmond was governed with very little, if any, regard for the
sensibilities of its black citizens. While in more recent years some
constructive efforts have been made . . . the local response is still
unending resistance. 151

On August 19, 1981, Richmond's four white city council members,
along with a dozen civic group leaders and a dozen business people met
in Washington with lawyers for the Justice Deprtment to argue against
adoption of the plan submitted by the council's black majority. 152 This
meeting marked the first time that a group of white citizens had ever
argued that a redistricting plan discriminated against white citizens. 153
The group contended that the present city council does not adequately or
fairly represent the city's white population, and that if the plan proposed
by the majority is adopted, blacks would be able to maintain their edge
in municipal elections for the next ten years, or at least until the next
redistricting. 154 William L. Leidinger, former city manager who was
fired by the black majority on council in 1978, and who won a council
seat in 1980, was the general spokesman for the group. In addition to the
four white council members, others who accompanied the group to
oppose the black majority redistricting plan were Henry L. Valentine II,
a businessman and a former council member; Thomas P. Bryan, Jr.,
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retired vice-president of Miller and Rhoads, a local department store; J.
Harwood Cochrane, Overnite Transportation Co., chairman; Virginius
Dabney, retired Times-Dispatch editorial page editor; Howard B.
Cone, Universal Leaf Tobacco senior vice president; Charles E. Moore,
United Virginia Bank vice president; Bruce B. Nolte, First and Merchants National Bank general counset Stuart Shumate, Richmond,
Fredericksburg and Potomac Railroad, president In addition, many
other civic and political organizations were represented at the Washington meeting. 155 The Justice Department will review the two opposing
redistricing plans and make a decision in October of 1981. This issue
has divided the council along racial lines more than any other issue. The
fact that the minority council members saw fit to take some of the major
leaders of the Richmond business community with them to help press
their case attests to the importance they placed on redistricting as a
possible vehicle for recapturing city government from blacks.
The protracted battle over redistricting can be seen as one of the fal~
outs from the annexation dispute- the shift from at-large to singlemember district elections. When the Shaffer study was conducted, three
of the four white council members viewed the ward system as "petty
politics," "perpetuating self-interest," and "helping to widen the gap
between blacks and whites." Black council members saw the ward plan
as "bringing the government closer to the people," and" making elected
officals more accountable." 53
Marsh blames most of the tensions on the Richmond newspapers.
Also he insists that many whites still have not accepted the fact that five
blacks are making policy decisions in the city. 156 At one point, black and
white council members were warring to such an extent that whenever
harmonious meetings took place they made the headlines. One headline
read: "Council Works in Harmony"; however, the story informed the
readers that the council meeting was harmonious due to "the lack of
major issues." 157
The 1979 Annexation Package
The strife between Richmond, Chesterfield and Henrico counties
prompted the Virginia General Assembly to take a closer look at citycounty relationships. According to the Report of the Commission on
City-County Relationships, popularly known as the Stuart Commission,
city-county disputes over annexation had "grave underlying implications
which far transcend the local interests involved" 158 According to
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Thomas J. Michie, Jr., and Marcia S. Mashaw, the annexation disputes
in the 1960s and 1970s highlighted the need for legislation that addressed
four objectives: ( 1) developing alternatives to annexation that were less
costly and divisive; (2) ending annexation in areas of the state where the
procedure was no longer appropriate; (3) providing mechanisms for
negotiation and cooperation between cities and counties involved in
boundary disputes, and ( 4) reducing the fiscal pressures that prompted
cities to initiate annexation proceedings. 159
Legislation was introduced in the 1977 General Assembly which
sought to address city-county concerns. The bills were direct results of
the basic thrust of the Stuart Commission: Annexation was no longer
feasible in the state's most highly urbanized areas. 160 The state legislation
approved a key recommendation of the commission; namely, the counties
with certain population characteristics could obtain complete or partial
immunity from annexation. Complete immunity was possible for counties
with a minimum population of 20,000 and a density of at least three
hundred persons per square mile or a minimum population of 50,000
and a density of at least 140 persons per square mile. Partial immunity
was available for those counties in specific areas if it were determined by
the circuit court that adequate urban services were being provided 161
The 1970 General Assembly also provided financial aid to localities- a necessary measure for those cities like Richmond which were
surrounded by counties eligible for annexation immunity. The legislation
provided assistance for local police departments. A major concession to
the state's large cities was the agreement to pay"75 percent oflocal cost
for hospitalization and treatment of welfare receipts." 162 The legislation
also provided money for the maintenance and construction of city streets.
Though this legislative package failed to solve all of the problems
confronting large cities it did address the problems germane to citycounty annexation disputes.

City-County Relations
In general, the relations between Richmond, Chesterfield and Henrico
counties following the resolution of the Richmond-Chesterfield annexation suit can be best described as an "armed truce." The bitterness,
frustration, and suspicion that characterized the county's fears that
Richmond would attempt to annex their territories have been abated
somewhat by the 1979 Annexation Laws. The fear of annexation,
however, was only one of a multitude of concerns that served to
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exacerbate city-county conflict The truth is that city-county relations
have never been particularly warm due, in part, to the perception of
county officials that Richmond wants to control and dominate the
counties. Conversely, many city residents view the surrounding counties
as economic parasites. 163 Despite these opposing positions, however,
Richmond and the two counties are forced into administrative cooperation
for their mutual support and survival For example, there is city-county
administrative cooperation in the regional planning commission 164
Then there is the Metropolitan Economic Development Council which
attempts to oversee the location of new industry into the region so as to
benefit all jurisdictions. 165 Richmond and Henrico County are the only
political jurisdictions that cooperate on the Capital Region Airport
Commission, a group designed to study air transportation need and set
standards for airports in the Richmond area Chesterfield has steadfastly
refused to join in this effort 166
Nevertheless , Richmond city officials are still troubled by the failure
of the counties to assist in supporting those city-owned facilities used by
county residents. Recently, however, the city has taken unilateral action
in several areas that affect county residents . First ofali as ofJuly, 1981,
it has required county residents to pay a $2.00 fee to enter Bryan Park, a
park located just inside the city along the Richmond-Henrico boundary
line. 167 Secondly, as of July 1, 1981, county residents must pay a $15
yearly fee to use all city libraries. 168 County residents resent these city
policies. Another irritant is the city's residence law which requires that
city workers live within the city. County officials generally oppose the
law as too arbitrary. The city sees the law as helping to protect jobs for
city residents . 169 What is gleaned from these areas of city-county
friction is that most of the splits evolve around economics and attitudes;
namely, the unwillingness of county residents to contribute to the city
financially and the city's overbearing posture relative to the counties.
Annexation and Elitist Politics
The annexation conflict has to be seen as simply another phase of what
historically has been a well-calculated strategy among Richmond's
white leaders to circumvent any change in the political status quo. The
1970 annexation illustrated the degree to which key decisioirmakers
were able to mobilize their vast resources- time, legal acumen, and
economic influence-in an attempt to ward off what was for them a
frightening reality, the emergence of a city government controlled by
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blacks. The annexation also revealed the common cause forged between
the state and local elite to insure the continuity of an" enlightened role in
the capital city."
Two important factors had to be considered by Richmond's elite in the
late 1960s: (1) the increased involvement of the United States government in local discrimination cases due to the passage of civil rights
legislation, 170 and (2) the emergence of the Crusade for Voters as the
major opposition in city politics. 171 For these reasons, racial politics had
to be played slightly different, though the end- continued white political
control-was always the objective. Nevertheless, new tactics and
strategies had to be designed Under this plan, the economics of
annexation rather than its primarily racial premises were emphasized
Though they may deny it, the elite argued from the assumption that
blacks were incapable of governing except under the constant guidance
of whites. This racial assumption helps to explain why these elite reacted
with horror at black population increases during the 1960s and the
growth of the Crusade's political efficacy.
The Richmond experience also showed how urban electoral reforms
mandated by the federal government were used to rectify the diluting
effects of the annexation and how, ironically, the very fear that guided the
behavior of the white elite, that of black majority rule, became a reality
in postannexation Richmond Events in the late 70 s and early 80 s do not
lead us to assume that the elite, having lost one battle, will fold up their
tents. Having governed the city for decades prior to the current black
majority on council and still adhering to a racial politics that blacks
perceive as black subordination, the elite wil~ no doubt, continue to
struggle for a return to white rule in Richmond 172
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